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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation examines U. S. American intergenerational witnesses to 
the Holocaust, particularly how addressees turned addressors maintain an ethical 
obligation to First Generation witnesses while creating an affective relation to this 
history for new generations. In response to revisionism and the incommunicability 
of the Holocaust, a focus on (accurate) First Generation testimony emerged that 
marginalizes that of intergenerational witnesses. The risk of such a position is that 
it paralyzes language, locking the addressee into a movement always into the past. 
Using examples of intergenerational witnesses (moving from close to more distant 
relationships), this project argues that there is a possibility for ethical 
intergenerational response. There are two major discussion arcs that the work 
follows: self-reflexivity and the use of the Banality of Evil as a theme. Self-
reflexivity in intergenerational witnessing calls attention to the role of the author 
as transgenerational witness, an act that does not seek to appropriate the 
importance or position of the Holocaust survivor because it calls attention to a 
subjective site in relation to the survivor and the communities of memory created 
within the text. The other major discussion arc moves from traditional depictions 
of the Banality of Evil to ones that challenge the audience to consider the way evil 
is conceptualized after the Holocaust and its implications in contemporary life. In 
these ways, intergenerational witnesses move from addressee to addressors, 
continuing to stress the importance of this history through the imperative to pass 
Holocaust testimony onward into the future. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
So, how does a white woman of European descent raised in a Christian 
tradition start writing about the Holocaust?  On a certain level, the answer is 
obvious: the Holocaust demands a moral response that acknowledges not only its 
factual reality but also investigates and tries to understand what the fact of its 
occurrence means for us as a society.  And yet, as individuals constantly point out 
to me, the demands I see are not universally acknowledged; for many, the 
Holocaust is something that happened in the past, unconnected to our current 
existence.  So, does the fact that I see a kind of moral imperative really 
acknowledge why I came to study the Holocaust?  In the end, is it the fact that 
there is really no set response to the Holocaust why I came to study responses to 
the Holocaust rather than the event itself?  Am I only writing to find my place in 
response to the Holocaust? 
Can I admit to a certain fear?  As a scholar, it is so easy to use the 
interpretive models with which we are trained to distance ourselves from the 
subject of our research.  And, in making our research into an object, what 
potential do we contain to wrong what we are studying?  And yet, how else are 
we able to deal with our subjects without potentially being overwhelmed?  How 
much does our subject position potentially affect our analysis? 
I ask these questions because I feel I am already guilty of objectifying 
someone’s story, of using interpretive tools to distance myself in a safe cocoon of 
intellectual analysis.  In many ways, this experience is the beginning of why I 
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came to this project.  As an undergraduate in English, I pursued two major 
courses of study.  In English, I focused on 20th century African American writers 
for my Honors thesis.  In my minor, History, I focused primarily on WWII.  The 
link between the two, for me, was that both chains of study spoke to an 
understanding of contemporary society—how and why are we who we are as a 
culture?   
In one of my history classes, I was asked to interview any individual who 
was alive during WWII.  Through my mother’s volunteer work at the local 
library, she connected me to a man who had served in WWII.  While he was lucky 
enough to escape the horror of the Normandy invasion by a few days, he was 
unfortunately captured almost immediately after he arrived in France.  The bulk 
of his time during the war was spent in POW camps; when he was finally 
liberated, he said he weighed 90 pounds.  For the most part, I sat, took notes, and 
made sure the voice recorder was working.  I remember that I had come over later 
in the day to his home in the trailer park and that the room we were sitting in was 
warm from the late afternoon exposure and no air conditioning. 
The details of his narrative are vague now; after all, this interview 
happened well over a decade ago.  But there is one part that still is clear.  He was 
talking about how his group was continually being moved due to the Allied 
victories.  Finally, he and his fellow POWs were put onto a train and sent into 
Germany; they traveled for a couple days with minimal food and water.  When 
they finally arrived in the small German town, children threw rocks at them as 
they were forced into the camp.  At this point, his group was desperate for 
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water…what little rations they were given had been used and they welcomed their 
arrival as a chance to finally get some water.  Yet, when they came to the camp, 
they found that all of the water containers were dry.  And then, “out of a clear 
blue sky, it began to rain.”  He said it was a miracle. 
And, suddenly, my mind began to wander and I found myself thinking 
about how I would analyze this part of his story; that it was like a piece of 
magical realism (which, of course, the critic I am now will say it was not).  He 
was silent for a bit and I suddenly found myself pulled out of the sort of day 
dream I was in to see him looking at me, his tearing eyes demanding that I 
recognize his emotion.  This was how he saw that experience and, whether or not 
I agreed with his interpretation, I had to acknowledge it.  I felt (and still feel) 
ashamed.  In that moment, I allowed my subject position—the fact that I did not 
have his experiences, that I did not follow a faith—to overwhelm his narrative.  In 
looking back at that experience, I do not think it is necessarily wrong to approach 
witness testimony with a critical lens.  The issue was that it became a misreading, 
a potential usurpation of his experience that, fortunately, was caught. 
The interview with the WWII survivor became a moment where I began to 
look at the ways in which my subject position could potentially affect my work as 
a scholar.  I began to question how I and we, as a society, approach historical 
events.  What, within our realm of experience, allows us to connect to the past?  It 
was during my first semester as a teacher that I learned that the gaps that 
separated individuals from events were more complex than just time.  It could be 
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the medium through which we experienced an event that could affect how we 
perceived it. 
I began teaching at Arizona State University in the Fall of 2001.  Within a 
month from the start of the semester, 9/11 happened.  One of the ways that ASU 
responded to 9/11 was by asking the teachers in the department of English to act 
as first level trauma counselors—basically, to help students deal with the trauma 
of the event by taking a class period to talk about what students (and ourselves) 
were feeling and give students resources to seek (real) counselors if they needed 
it.  Our classes were chosen because of the relatively small class size and 
potentially closer connections with our students.  Almost all of the students from 
my two freshman composition classes came to our next class meetings.  Some had 
family in New York; others were worried about family and friends who were 
traveling.  None of my students, however, had anyone who was directly caught in 
the attacks…perhaps a key point in understanding the position from which they 
were witnessing.   
During our conversation, we came to talk about the obsessive ways we 
were watching the attacks, almost as if we could not stop watching the television, 
the medium through which we witnessed the events and the aftermath.  At one 
point, one of my students talked about what the attacks “looked like,” in 
particular, that the attacks looked like scenes from the movie, Independence Day, 
where the aliens destroyed landmarks around the world (a beam coming down 
from alien space crafts and the buildings below exploding/collapsing).  Many of 
the students agreed, particularly those who did not have a strong connection to or 
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memory of the sites of the attacks.  I was initially surprised by the connections the 
students were making until I came to consider what, within their realm of 
experience, they had to draw on to allow them to understand what they were 
seeing.  None of them had witnessed destruction on that scale before except 
through film and television shows—through fiction.  The medium through which 
they were witnessing, the television, added to that sensation.  Intellectually, they 
knew these events were real but the emotional affect was lessened through the 
ways in which they applied what they were witnessing to their own lives.  Even 
though most of the class saw 9/11 as it was happening (in particular, the second 
plane hitting the Twin Towers and onward), there was a distance already in place 
between themselves and the event. 
In combining both of these experiences, I began to question how 
individuals came to understand and interpret historical events—what was innate 
in the position of the intergenerational witness and what could be read as a 
misappropriation.  Perhaps more central to those questions, however, was how 
new generations were responding to the history of the Holocaust.  I still remember 
a couple of years ago listening to a barista (she was perhaps 17 or 18 years old, 
still in high school) talking about how, every year in school, she studied the 
Holocaust.  What she didn’t know, she said, was why she had to study the 
Holocaust every year for the past ten.  Clearly, she knew the history but it failed 
to affect her—she saw no application of the Holocaust to her own life.  As we 
move further away from that event and as the last witnesses disappear, the fear is 
that response will become all too common.  Perhaps the ultimate concerns of this 
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work is why this response happens and how might we counteract it—how can we 
transmit the history and trauma of the Holocaust in ways that have an affective 
impact on new generations without violating our ethical responsibilities to those 
who experienced the Holocaust. 
In chapter one, I discuss the potential for the discourses surrounding the 
Holocaust to fall into stasis and how intergenerational responses potentially allow 
for a bridge to overcome the differend and revivify communities of memory.  In a 
response to revisionism, a focus on (accurate) First Generation testimony arose 
that marginalized or excluded intergenerational responses to the Holocaust.  Yet, 
in spite of that focus, there is a possibility for an ethical intergenerational response 
that utilizes a self-reflexive position and addresses our conceptualization of evil 
after the Holocaust.  In chapter two, I begin a discussion arc on self-reflexivity 
and the use of the Banality of Evil as a theme with Art Spiegelman’s Maus books.  
Through the way in which Spiegelman’s texts function as autobiography, he calls 
attention to his act of entextualizing his father’s story.  This begins an arc of 
discussion throughout the work from the most self-reflexive texts to the least.  
Speigelman’s work also reflects the beginning of an arc from a minor discussion 
of the Banality of Evil (centered on his father’s choiceless choices) to the more 
developed uses in the later texts discussed in this project. 
Chapter three focuses on a discussion of Joseph Skibell’s Blessing on the 
Moon.  His self-reflexive position as an intergenerational witness is invoked 
through the character based on his great grandfather.  By beginning the novel with 
Chaim Skibelski’s death, Skibell calls attention to the way in which he accesses 
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the memory; he has a family connection that is marked by loss since he cannot 
access the memory of those family members killed in the Holocaust directly.  
Skibell’s text also utilizes the themes of the Banality of Evil (through his 
portrayal of Chaim as a flawed character) and a stylized version of what Langer 
calls the deathlife narrative.  Chapter four, the discussion of Jonathan Safran 
Foer’s Everything is Illuminated continues the self-reflexive discussion arc 
through its use of metafiction and the creation of a memory that replaces his 
actual experience in the Ukraine, where he found no trace of his grandfather’s 
shtetl.  Foer’s novel addresses the Banality of Evil through the role of the 
perpetrator—the one who faces a choiceless choice and bears the guilt for that 
decision.  Indeed, the emotional consequences of that choice are passed down 
through the generations until it is finally confronted.  Like Skibell, Foer uses a 
stylized version of the deathlife narrative, especially in terms of the idea that 
one’s life is marked by the death of another.  The chapter ends with the creation 
of a mini arc of discussion concerning the adaptation of the novel into a film; by 
changing the character of Alexander’s grandfather into a Jewish victim, Liev 
Schreiber changes the message underlining Foer’s use of the Banality of Evil in 
the novel.  This leads to a question of whether film, as a medium, limits 
discussions on the Banality of Evil that force the audience into a direct 
consideration of it in relation to their own lives. 
In Chapter five, I discuss the novel and film versions of The Pawnbroker.  
Of the novels discussed in this work, it is the least self-reflexive; in contrast to the 
other works discussed, Edward Lewis Wallant calls attention to his position as 
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author through the setting, New York.  In addition, Wallant’s use of the deathlife 
narrative most closely fits the description provided by Langer—someone whose 
journey chronologically forward is limited by his memories of the past and the 
unnatural deaths of his friends and family.  Wallant’s use of the theme on the 
Banality of Evil is, however, less narrow since it draws potential parallels 
between the social conditions of blacks in New York and the Holocaust.  These 
parallels do not mean that both experiences are interchangeable; rather, the text 
asks its audience to consider how the Banality of Evil continues to exist.  While 
Sidney Lumet’s film captures that message in relation to the character of Sol 
Nazerman and his participation in a criminal syndicate, the film fails to draw a 
connection to institutional power structures by changing the white mob boss to an 
African American, thus indicating that the levels of violence seen in the film are 
perpetuated by blacks on their own communities.   
The final chapter draws out a comparison between intergenerational 
witnessing in African American literature to that within Holocaust literature.  
Through Signifying(g), African American authors form connections to other 
works and the history of slavery, thus enabling these authors to transmit this 
history to new generations.  In each act of repetition and revision, the 
intergenerational witness calls attention to his or her position in relation to the 
trauma—an act that does not seek to usurp the original testimony.  Instead, the 
goal is to make the history pertinent to new generations.  The difficulty for both 
forms of intergenerational witnessing is how to create an affective relationship 
with a larger audience without being appropriated by the dominant discourse. 
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In many ways, The Pawnbroker functions as a metadiscourse on the need 
for intergenerational transmission.  Nazerman is a last native speaker, living with 
the memory of his trauma but unable to communicate it to those around him.  
Indeed, he does not even try since he feels that none can understand his 
experiences.  It defies language.  In focusing solely on First Generation witnesses 
as those alone who have a right to speak about the Holocaust, there is a risk of 
creating a kind of hopelessness in each addressee.  Trapped into a movement 
always into the past, how do we move into the future?  It paralyzes language.  
Instead, we need to focus on how to continue creating communities of memory 
through our roles as addressors, mindful of our obligations to the native speakers 
but also concerned with how to reach new generations in the future.   
 
  10 
CHAPTER 2 
MOVING FROM MODERN TO POSTMODERN DIALOGUES:  
LOOKING AT THE VALUE AND DANGER OF LIMINALITY IN 
INTERGENERATIONAL NARRATIVES 
 Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, 
which has turned my life into one long night, seven times cursed 
and seven times sealed.  Never shall I forget that smoke.  Never 
shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose bodies I saw 
turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky. 
 Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith 
forever. 
 Never shall I forget the nocturnal silence which deprived 
me, for all eternity, of the desire to live.  Never shall I forget those 
moments which murdered my God and my soul and turned my 
dreams to dust.  Never shall I forget these things, even if I am 
condemned to live as long as God Himself.  Never. 
      -Elie Wiesel, Night 
 
Nephew: “I’m bored with WWII.” 
Me: “Excuse me?” 
Nephew: “I’m bored with WWII.” 
Me: “Why?  Why would you say that?” 
Nephew: “I just am.  I’m sick of all the WWII video games.  All 
you get to do is run around and kill a lot of Nazis.  It’s 
just…boring.” 
-from a private conversation a little over two years 
ago. 
 
Perhaps it is unfair to pair the above passages together—one representing 
Wiesel’s powerful depiction of his first night at Auschwitz and one representing a 
conversation between my nephew and myself.  After all, it is hard to conceive of 
anyone reading Wiesel’s account to respond with boredom.  Plus, I am fairly sure 
that part of the reason my nephew said what he did was to provoke me since he 
knew that WWII, specifically the Holocaust, was a focus of my studies.  Even 
supposing that my nephew’s comments were meant to provoke, the basis on 
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which he was drawing his knowledge—a series of video games like Medal of 
Honor and Call of Duty —illustrates the intergenerational gaps that potentially 
exist between the discourses of first generation witnesses of the Holocaust and 
those of generations growing up 50 years later.  The gap between the canon of 
Holocaust literature (mainly testimony) and now goes beyond concerns of the 
potential impossibility of finding common discourses in which to hold the 
Holocaust.  The Holocaust, as one of the most traumatic and inexpressible events 
of the century, continues to elude human understanding, especially as it is passed 
down from one generation to the next; in its horror, perhaps it can never be fully 
understood.  Or, perhaps, the ways in which we have traditionally tried to express 
it are what ultimately limits any attempt.  By continually defining the “Witness” 
(as in who has the right to be a witness) through a focus on factual, verified 
testimony, a canonized discourse was created.  While the canon of Holocaust 
literature served a useful purpose in counteracting revisionists who continue to 
emerge today, a form of stasis emerged that limits how the Holocaust is passed 
down and what sorts of discourses can emerge from each generations’ responses 
to the Holocaust.   
Instead of exploring the complexity of various discourse encounters that 
postmodern thought draws on from an appropriation of oral traditions passed 
down through generations, the canonization of Holocaust literature represents a 
modernist perspective (paralleled to the idea of the written word) focusing on 
narratives that—for very good reasons—uphold (document) the factual reality of 
the Holocaust.  Stasis becomes an issue in that there is resistance (even as far as 
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outright rejection) to narratives written by those who have no direct experience of 
the Holocaust and who therefore, by the very position of its writers, create 
fictional narratives.1  Because many view the Holocaust as a tragic fulfillment of 
modernity, the event also fractures modernist modes of understanding.  By 
looking at the potentialities of postmodern responses combined with the freedoms 
offered by postmodernist thought, we can begin to (re)negotiate the 
intergenerational witness: one who is the addressee of the original Holocaust 
narratives and whose obligation is not to the addressor but to retelling, one who is 
fundamentally separated from the event and yet speaks to it, one who has a sense 
of justice that can be without precedent, one who will influence how new 
generations can and will approach this memory.  In essence, intergenerational 
witnesses who represent the best hopes of those who pass on their stories and their 
worst fears. 
 The canonization of Holocaust discourses, in the beginning of its 
evolution, arises out of necessity.  The fear that the historical reality of the 
devastation and brutality that the Holocaust represents would be subject to deniers 
was felt immediately after the war.  In 1948, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
autobiography, Crusade in Europe (a title that clearly indicates a metaphysical 
Good vs. Evil paradigm that continues to dominate popular culture’s response to 
the Nazis in particular), reflects Eisenhower’s conviction that the scale of atrocity 
committed, counteracting as it does any commonly held metanarratives of the 
progression of humanity, would invoke disbelief.  His description of his first tour 
of what he calls a “horror camp” indicates his recognition of the importance of 
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witnessing: “I visited every nook and cranny of the camp because I felt it my duty 
to be in a position from then on to testify at first hand about these things in case 
there ever grew up at home the belief or assumption that ‘the stories of Nazi 
brutality were just propaganda’” (Eisenhower 409).  In this moment, Eisenhower 
recognizes the possibility of other, potentially contradictory discourses and the 
risk for those discourses to, at an extreme level, deny the Holocaust.  At a less 
extreme although perhaps equally damaging level, Eisenhower recognizes the 
potential for indifference; the widespread use of propaganda, a discourse based on 
exaggeration, could, he felt, lead to dismissal of the full magnitude of the 
Holocaust. 
 While Eisenhower’s autobiography is useful for understanding the early 
importance of factual testimony of the Holocaust (something that the Nuremburg 
trials also established and problematized), his testimony is not part of the canon of 
Holocaust literature partly because his discourse is outside the event—he is 
witness to the result, not the experience of the Holocaust.  Testimony instead 
turned towards those who were witnesses (now called first-generation witnesses); 
for Americans, Elie Wiesel and Anne Frank are perhaps the two most dominate 
figures.  Frank’s diary, which holds a key foundation in understanding popular 
cultural representations of the Holocaust, generally serves as a point of entry into 
Holocaust history for many young schoolchildren (such was the case in my 
primary education).  The reasons behind the prominence of both Wiesel and 
Frank in American education about the Holocaust lie in the manner of both 
authors’ ability to engage their audience and the absolute factual nature of their 
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stories (even taking into consideration Frank’s father’s editing of his daughter’s 
diary after her death in Bergen-Belsen).  The focus on factual discourses became 
central in determining which texts became canonized. 
 The canonized discourse that arose in Holocaust testimony was initially 
established in response to revisionist discourses that questioned anything from 
whether the Holocaust actually happened to Hitler’s role in the Holocaust.  Thus, 
testimonies of the Holocaust were subject to documentation, especially given the 
perceived damage of fictionalized testimonies that claimed to be factual such as 
Jerzy Kosinski’s The Painted Bird or the scandal arising in late 2008 concerning 
Herman Rosenblat’s Angel at the Fence.3  In his discussion of the difficulties 
facing artists working in visual mediums, Stephen C. Feinstein characterizes the 
Holocaust as “forbidden”: “The term forbidden is used here because of the taboos 
of both depiction and metaphor, as well as the question of authenticity” (203).  
While visual mediums are subject to perhaps more forms of scrutiny given many 
popular interpretations about Adorno’s injunction against aestheticizing the 
Holocaust, the question of authenticity permeates all responses to the Holocaust.  
The process of documentation (writing memoirs or recording oral testimonies) is 
subject to analysis that checks the validity of the memory. With this form of 
documentation comes an idea of permanence: the documentation can be amended, 
referred to, but not ultimately altered—it will continue to exist in its original state.  
It is this idea of permanence, of documented facts, that many historians and 
scholars draw on in their studies of the Holocaust.  The major source is 
eyewitness accounts, even though many of these exist as oral performances that 
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are recorded (in audio, video, or, more recently, in digital formats including 
YouTube) rather than in a written form.  Despite the potential freedoms that are 
possible, even with responses to written testimonies, stasis emerges as only 
factual, first person responses are seen as valid forms of entry into a relationship 
with the Holocaust. 
The focus on documentation—and the idea that they can be evaluated 
objectively—leads to certain questions even as one utilizes first person witness 
accounts.  In Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and 
History, Dori Laub discusses the role of memory as a constructed act.  Given the 
reality that it is impossible to recount events exactly as they happened since all 
memory results from interpretations of experience, the testimonies of Holocaust 
survivors is questioned because it does not provide an objective (if such a position 
is possible) account of the events witnessed.  Laub recounts an experience of a 
survivor, a woman, narrating her experience of the camps; in particular, Laub 
focuses on her account of the explosion of one of the chimneys in Auschwitz.  
During a conference at which this woman’s recorded testimony was shown, Laub 
talks of the response to her testimony that four chimneys exploded instead of one: 
“A lively debate ensued.  The testimony was not accurate, historians claimed.  
Historically, only one chimney was blown up, not all four.  Since the memory of 
the testifying woman turned out to be, in this way, fallible, one could not accept—
nor give credence to—her whole account of the events” (Testimony 59-60).  In 
this sense, the truth (the objective reality) is deemed even more important than the 
affective truth the survivor is trying to convey.  In his opposition of this dismissal 
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of the testimony, Laub states: “The woman was testifying…not to the number of 
the chimneys blown up, but to something else, more radical, more crucial: the 
reality of an unimaginable occurrence.  One chimney blown up in Auschwitz was 
as incredible as four” (Testimony 60).  For Laub, the validity of the narrative rests 
on her ability to convey a subjective truth—one that encompasses the emotional 
reality of the experience.  Through this narrative, one can see the dangers of a 
focus on static forms of documentation: the cost of resisting revisionism rests on 
limiting the affective quality of the accounts, which fundamentally restricts how 
this history is transmitted to new generations of listeners. 
The documentation surrounding Holocaust testimony (with its subsequent 
scrutiny) leads to a very Modernist form of stasis.  In the move away from oral 
narratives that invoked history and cultural values for many groups, Western 
culture adopted written forms that documented such things as history, ownership, 
etc.  Fundamentally, the precedence given to writing lays in its perceived 
permanence.  The downside to that permanence is that it resists adaptation; in oral 
forms, each new speaker added and changed the narrative, thus giving it a life and 
relevance that written texts have a much harder time grasping.  By impacting the 
affective potential, written documents have a tendency to lie in stasis, defined by 
the moment in which it was written.  While certain texts have transcended their 
respective contexts, new readers often fail to see their relevance, especially as 
metanarratives such as humanism have lost currency.  The issue of perceived 
relevance is the danger that Holocaust testimony faces. It is also the question that 
discourses on the Holocaust must face: Is it better to continue to combat possible 
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revisionists by focusing on factual narratives or should one 
allow/encourage/nourish affective truths about what the Holocaust might mean 
transgenerationally?  Both possibilities are fraught with dangers.  In the latter 
scenario, postmodern responses, while certainly encouraging the give and take 
structure of oral traditions, potentially mean a loss of control that many Holocaust 
survivors, historians, and scholars are unwilling to grant—especially at the 
expense of the six million who died during the Holocaust. 
There are, however, dangers in relying on Modernist forms of 
understanding to shape how we respond to the Holocaust.  At a fundamental level, 
the Holocaust is, for many, simultaneously the result and ending of modernity.  
Drawing on Lyotard and Bauman, David B. Clarke notes, “After Auschwitz, 
modernity as a whole is flung into crisis—for the Holocaust was not some kind of 
reversion to premodern barbarity, but a systematic deployment and 
implementation of modern rationality.  It even exemplified modernity” (Clarke 
110).  The rationality that informed the bureaucratic structure and implementation 
of the mass genocide undermines structures for making meaning such as 
humanism and progressivism, also components of Modernity.  Yet, even as one 
may look on the Holocaust as an ending of Modernity, those discourses still exist.  
In his analysis of the historiography of the Holocaust, Dan Stone expresses his 
concerns about how Modernist modes affect historical analysis of the Holocaust: 
No doubt in several centuries’ time the Holocaust will be no more 
than another disaster in the history books.  But the philosophy of 
history, which will permit this outcome, this normalization of the 
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horrific, can be challenged.  Indeed, it must be, for this is not 
merely a question of finding a philosophy of history suitable for 
guarding the memory of the victims (which can easily become 
melancholic fascination); rather, it is a question of replacing a 
philosophy of history which is itself part of a culture which permits 
mass murder as an option for self-styled civilized states.  
Incorporation domesticates violence, and passes on the seeds of 
disaster. (3) 
One of the most shocking examples of the tendency of historians to normalize 
violence can be found in Stone’s critique of modern German historiographers 
Rainer Zitelman and Michael Prinz and their focus on “socially progressive” 
elements of the Nazi state: “But it is precisely because their project takes for 
granted the terror of the regime that concentrating on its ‘normalities’ or 
‘achievements’ in, for example, social policy, does allow the horror to be 
forgotten” (37).  By reinscribing the Nazi regime within a metanarrative of 
progressivism, the Holocaust becomes a “stepping stone” of history rather than 
the challenge to Modernity.  Are we then to reconceptualize Hannah Arendt’s 
notion of the Banality of Evil as a necessary step in mankind’s progress?  The 
problem of continually allowing and participating in evil becomes, in this 
scenario, something that mankind cannot control—rather than metaphysical 
concepts of evil, we are faced with historical forces that are just as much outside 
our power…and that leave us just as free of responsibility.   
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 While such a critique is certainly easier for me given my position as an 
American, the modern discourse of progressivism offers other trials to the 
affective value of Holocaust narratives, especially if they are in a form a stasis.  
The ongoing challenge lies in the question of “What does this have to do with 
me?”  While the figure of the Nazi in popular culture is now a sign of evil (just as 
the cliché of the cowboy in the black hat once was), it is often seen as out of 
context for modern society and even divorced from the framework of the 
Holocaust itself.4  Thus, my nephew, bored by the simulated act of continually 
killing Nazis in a video game, fails to see a relationship to his present day life 
either through the concept of the Banality of Evil or through a connection to first 
generation witnesses.  The stasis embedded in the move towards a form of 
canonization of Holocaust literature that centers on factual representation means 
that there can be an impact on the affective nature of these texts, especially as 
they enter into a liminal space where the reader, taking his/her discourses into this 
space in-between, constructs his/her own meaning.   
 The possibility for detachment between discourses through a potential 
negation of the affective quality of first generation witness accounts as they are 
received transgenerationally can seriously impact how new generations 
understand the Holocaust, especially if we conceptualize that transmission 
through a postmodern framework of the relationship between the addressor and 
addressee.  In this sense, we are looking at a return to the types of structures one 
can see in oral traditions.  The addressor speaks; the addressee listens.  The 
addressee becomes the new addressor.  In oral tradition, this passage from 
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addressor to addressee who becomes addressor marks the continuation of culture: 
“To be named is to be told about.  There are two aspects to this: every narrative, 
even an apparently anecdotal one, reactualizes names and nominal relations.  In 
repeating it, the community assures itself of the permanence of legitimacy of its 
world of names by way of the recurrence of this world in its stories.  And, from 
another standpoint, certain narratives explicitly tell stories of naming” (The 
Differend 153).  In this sense, the repetition within the stories ensures the passage 
of cultural values through generations.  By looking at the stasis surrounding first 
generation witness responses, the passage of these stories through generations 
faces a serious obstacle.  It relies on the first generation witness to transcend their 
own historicity and rely on a universal sense of humanism—one that many feel 
was destroyed through the fact of the Holocaust itself. 
 The Holocaust also presents challenges as one tries to conceptualize the 
(original) addressor.  Who is the true witness to the Holocaust?  For Lyotard, this 
informs his concept of the differend: “The differend is the unstable state and 
instance of language wherein something which must be put into phrase cannot yet 
be” (The Differend 13).  The impossibility of putting into phrase, in a legal sense, 
“would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be 
equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments” 
(The Differend xi).  It is with the legal interpretation of the differend that Lyotard 
begins his argument in response to the revisionist claims of Robert Faurisson, 
who argued that since there was no deportee who could claim to have seen a gas 
chamber, the Holocaust itself was a hoax.  The differend arises, as Lyotard notes, 
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due to the nature of the gas chamber: “…there is no victim that is not dead; 
otherwise, this gas chamber would not be what he or she claims it to be” (The 
Differend 14).  If one follows this path of reasoning, it would lead to an absence 
of justice: “This is what a wrong [tort] would be: a damage [dommage] 
accompanied by the loss of a means to prove the damage” (The Differend 15, 
translator’s notes).  The damage, the loss of life, exists; in order to address that 
damage, one needs to be able to prove that it happened.  For Lyotard, the ones 
who can witness are those who survived—the act of narration offers a means to 
resolve the differend: “The multitude of phrase regimens and of genres of 
discourse finds a way to embody itself, to neutralize differends, in narratives” 
(The Differend 158).  Thus, the original addressor—the ones who witnessed the 
gas chamber and died—addresses the addressee, the one whose survival means 
that the addressor’s story can be passed on.  
Giorgio Agamben’s conceptualization of testimony and the transmutations 
that occur as stories move from those who cannot speak to those who can further 
illustrates the complexity of the conceptualization of the addressor and the 
process through which testimony is achieved.  Much like Lyotard, Agamben’s 
concepts begin with the speechless; in Remnants of Auschwitz, he also deals with 
those who died although his ultimate sign of the one who is speechless is the 
Musselmann, based off of Primo Levi’s representation:  
The Muselmann stands in this point [the convergence between 
ideas that the lesson of Auschwitz is the human being survives the 
human being or the non-human in the form of the Muselmann]; 
  22 
and it is in him that we find the third, truest, and most ambiguous 
sense of the thesis, which Levi proclaims when he writes that, 
‘they, the Muselmanner, the drowned are the complete witness’: 
the human being is the inhuman; the one whose humanity is 
completely destroyed is the one who is truly human. (133) 
Here, it is those that have lost their humanity who are the complete witness of the 
horror of the Holocaust; death does not necessitate the same loss of all that makes 
one human as does those who are pushed beyond the limits of what one is capable 
of holding.  While Agamben is cautious about the use of the word inhuman 
(recognizing the implication that this could potentially fulfill Nazi rhetoric that 
called Jews “inhuman”), this extreme position where one is physically alive and 
yet psychically dead represents an aspect of the horror of the Holocaust—the 
position between human and dehumanized—that the death tolls alone cannot 
address. 
 In looking at where Lyotard and Agamben conceptualize the “true” 
witness, one begins to imagine the testimonial weight assigned to those witnesses 
who survived, the first generation Holocaust witnesses.  To be responsible for the 
stories of not just the relatives, friends, neighbors who died, but all of the six 
million deaths and all those whose experiences pushed them beyond what one 
individual is capable of bearing is an extraordinary burden.  It is also a burden that 
any one person’s testimony can never fully encompass.  Thus, the truthfulness 
assigned to first generation responses relies on its factual truthfulness but also on 
its ability to also speak for those who cannot—a step that relies on the first 
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generation witness’s to testify beyond oneself.  Agamben envisions the testimony 
between speaker and speechless thus: 
Testimony takes place where the speechless one makes the 
speaking one speak and where the one who speaks bears the 
impossibility of speaking in his own speech, such that the silent 
and the speaking, the inhuman and the human enter into a zone of 
indistinction in which it is impossible to establish the position of 
the subject, to identify the ‘imagined substance’ of the ‘I’ and, 
along with it, the true witness.  (Agamben 120) 
In this passage, Agamben seeks to create a witness position where both speaker 
and speechless occupy the same space that blurs the boundaries between the one 
who survived and the one who did not, thus erasing the subject position, “I.”  
Testimony can only exist in between the speaker and the speechless, subjectivity 
and desubjectivity: 
But the relation between language and its existence, between 
langue and the archive, demands subjectivity as that which, in its 
very possibility of speech, bears witness to an impossibility of 
speech.  This is why subjectivity appears as witness; this is why it 
can speak for those who cannot speak.  Testimony is a potentiality 
that becomes actual through an impotentiality of speech; it is, 
moreover, an impossibility that gives itself existence through a 
possibility of speaking.  These two movements cannot be identified 
either with a subject or with a consciousness; yet they cannot be 
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divided into two incommunicable substances.  Their inseparable 
intimacy is testimony.  (Agamben 146) 
Thus the two discourses—speech and the impossibility of speech—form a 
differend.  For both authors, the addressors who cannot speak pass their stories 
on, which appears in the narratives/testimonies of the first generation witness. 
 The space in which these narratives/testimonies develop is impossible to 
define.  For Agamben, the lack of boundaries—the sense of being always in-
between—permeates the testimony.  In much the same way, Lyotard 
conceptualizes the linking of phrases as a border zone: 
A phrase, which links and which is to be linked, is always a pagus, 
a border zone where genres of discourse enter into conflict over the 
mode of linking.  War and commerce.  It’s in the pagus that the 
pax and the pact are made and unmade.  The vicus, the home, the 
Heim is a zone in which the differend between genres of discourse 
is suspended.  An “internal peace” peace is bought at the price of 
perpetual differends on the outskirts.  (The same arrangement goes 
for the ego, that of self-identification).  This internal peace is made 
through narratives that accredit the community of proper names as 
they accredit themselves. (The Differend 151) 
This sense of liminality in both Lyotard and Agamben reflects the possibilities 
that come into play when discourses come into contact.  In this sense, it follows a 
process of subjectivization in that the conflict of discourses resolves into a newly 
constructed “I,” which is never completely stable since the process of 
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subjectivization is ongoing.  Lyotard’s reference to proper names refers again to 
his analysis of the Cashinahua—the ways in which an oral tradition passes down 
cultural discourse.  In this sense, the differend is only resolved through the duality 
of the narrative that refers to the community from which it comes as it calls 
attention to itself.  Thus, each addressee who becomes an addressor invokes the 
larger culture as he/she also references one’s own position in relationship to the 
culture. 
 The role of referencing oneself is important in looking at the give and take 
between the addressor and the addressee since it highlights the danger inherent in 
transgenerational responses as well as their potential.  In Just Playing, Lyotard 
notes that the transmission of discourse is embedded within culture:   
Here we are in a mode of transmission of discourse that elaborates 
itself through its insistence on the pole of reference (the one who 
speaks is someone who has been ‘spoken’) and on the pole of the 
narrattee (the one who speaks is someone who has been spoken to).  
The subject of the enunciation makes no claims of autonomy with 
respect to his discourse.  On the contrary, both through his name 
and through the story he tells, he claims to belong to the tradition. 
(33) 
Since the new narrator is embedded within a tradition, as in the Lyotard’s 
example of the Cashinahua and the remembrance and passing down of names, the 
story reflects the culture of discourse in which it claims a part.  Yet, there are 
dangers in the passing down of discourse through generations since the new 
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narrator is not necessarily completely tied to his/her original addressor: “In other 
words, someone speaks to me; he places me under obligation…What kind of 
obligation?  The obligation to retell.  But not necessarily to my teller.  I am not 
obligated to give it back to him, no, that’s not it; but I am obligated in the way of 
a relay that may not keep its charge but must pass it on” (Just Playing 35).  While 
this lack of obligation may be less apparent in the internal peace established 
between the addressor and the first generation witness—the one who is our 
addressor— as conceptualized by both Agamben and Lyotard, it can easily 
become more apparent as the testimonies move through transgenerational 
narratives.  In this sense, the self-referential aspect becomes important so that the 
new addressee sees the narrative as one that is “passed down.”  Yet, the self-
referential characteristic of the transgenerational narratives potentially means that 
something can be left out, particularly if the new addressor’s lack of obligation 
constitutes a revision of the facts/meaning behind the original narrative.  In such a 
scenario, the differend cannot be resolved.  In that sense, however, the 
transgenerational response is not passing on a culture/discourse since a revisionist 
response creates a new, potentially oppositional discourse. 
 The question becomes how are we able to begin judging what constitutes a 
transgenerational response and what constitutes a revisionist discourse?  The 
current models of criteria, which reject all but factually accurate accounts, have 
limitations in their affective impact, as I discussed earlier.  In addition, the act of 
structuring criteria limits the freedom of the postmodern addressee/addressor 
relationship and could also impact the affective quality of the narrative.  While I 
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will be presenting two models on which I base my investigation of 
transgenerational texts later in this chapter, the self-reflexive and the e/affective 
use of the concept of the Banality of Evil, neither category presents specific 
criteria on which to judge texts.  This is a deliberate choice.  In exploring the 
affective impact of discourses in contact, the resulting analysis is and must be 
subjective.  Further, the creation of a set of criteria moves the analysis back into 
Modernist modes of thinking about texts that, in turn, creates another form of 
stasis.  This does not and cannot mean that judgment in impossible.  Instead, I 
turn again to Lyotard to find a model of judgment through his concept of 
paganism: “…when I speak of paganism, I am not using a concept.  It is a name, 
neither better nor worse than others, for the denomination of a situation in which 
one judges without criteria.  And one judges not only in matters of truth, but also 
in matters of beauty (of aesthetic efficacy) and in matters of justice, that is, of 
politics and ethics, and all without criteria” (Just Playing 16).  Since judgment in 
this sense operates on a case-by-case system without relying on precedent, it 
becomes possible to look at the texts in terms of the interplay of discourses that 
they offer, especially as they move through a transgenerational relay.  In this way, 
truthfulness can become a component of “aesthetic efficacy” and ethics as one 
examines texts to see if the response embodies an e/affective response to the 
Holocaust. 
 One must ask, here, what constitutes an e/affective response?  Certainly, a 
portion of that belongs to the talents of the storyteller to reach his or her 
audience—an important component of “aesthetic efficacy.”  Yet, it also requires, 
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as we’ve learned from Laub’s story of the woman who recounts four chimneys 
being destroyed at Auschwitz, openness on the part of the addressee.  Again we 
are faced with the potential conflict of discourses as they come into contact.  In 
rejecting “truthfulness” as a stand-alone category, one must investigate what 
constitutes ethics as narrations are passed intergenerationally and through the 
conflict of discourses coming into contact or conflict through liminal spaces of 
subjectivization.  In Testimony, one can see the process of discourses in contact in 
Felman’s account of her class entitled “Literature and Testimony” where she 
explored the historical, the clinical, and the poetical dimensions of testimony 
(41).5  Towards the end of the class, Felman chooses two videotaped Holocaust 
testimonies to show her class.  In this way, she sought to end the class “with a 
striking, vivid, and extreme real example of the liberating, vital function of 
testimony;” the effect of the testimony was that it “carried the class beyond a limit 
I could foresee and had envisioned” (Testimony 47).  In facing the crises in her 
class, Felman realizes “that the unpredicted outcome of the screening was itself a 
psychoanalytic enhancement of the way in which the class felt actively addressed 
not only by the videotape but by the intensity and intimacy of the testimonial 
encounter throughout the course” (48).  The class, prepared as they were by the 
previous course readings, lectures, and discussion, entered into an 
addressor/addressee relationship with the Holocaust survivors that they watched 
in the videos.  Felman’s students did not simply look at the videos for the 
truthfulness of the testimony; rather, they began to deal with their relationship to 
the survivors’ testimonies. 
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 In recounting the crises of her class, Felman is depicting a liminal space as 
her students worked through the contact of discourses.  After the silence 
immediately following the viewings, Felman’s students began to talk.  But this 
was not yet a new discourse.  Instead, the talking was compulsive and fragmented 
but persistent as her students “could talk of nothing else no matter where they 
were, in other classes, study rooms, or dorms.  They were set apart and set 
themselves apart from others who had not gone through the same experience.  
They were obsessed.  They felt apart, and yet not quite together.  They sought out 
each other and yet felt that they could not reach each other…They felt alone, 
suddenly deprived of their bonding to the world and to one another” (Testimony 
48).  In essence, Felman’s students were caught in-between—not yet able to 
process a new discourse out of their sudden positioning as an addressee.  The 
extreme nature of their liminality (in the context of exploring potential addressees 
of the first generation witness and not from the extreme limit figures like the 
Muselmanner that Agamben focuses upon) relied on their openness to being 
affected by the videotaped testimonies shown in the class. 
 The feeling of closeness, of being “addressed” by the first generation 
testimony becomes the foundation on which to build an understanding of ethics in 
transgenerational responses.  In Avishi Margalit’s The Ethics of Memory, he sets 
up the differences between ethics and morality in terms of the closeness of one’s 
relationships:  
The drift of this idea…obviously hinges on the distinction between 
ethics and morality.  In my account, this in turn is based on a 
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distinction between two types of human relations: thick ones and 
thin ones.  Thick relations are grounded in attributes such as 
parent, friend, lover, fellow-countryman.  Thick relations are 
anchored in a shared past or moored in a shared memory.  Thin 
relations, on the other hand, are backed by the attribute of being 
human…Thick relations are in general our relations to the near and 
dear.  Thin relations are in general our relations to the stranger and 
the remote. (7) 
In this sense, morality encompasses our sense of right as human beings; ethics 
governs our sense of right in our more personal relationships.  The more personal 
the relationship, the more powerful the impetus is to do what is good (although 
this does not mean that the possibility of doing wrong does not occur in our thick 
relationships).  Morality still holds an important role for the breadth of our 
relations since “We need morality to overcome our natural indifference to others.  
Indeed, we need morality not so much to counter evil as to counter indifference.  
Evil, like caring, is a scarce commodity.  There is not so much banality of evil as 
banality of indifference.  Yet, one has to admit that the combination of evil and 
indifference is lethal, like the combination of poison and water” (Margalit 34).  
The more distant the connection, the easier it is to put one’s personal concerns (or 
those concerns governed by our thick relationships) over the rights we see by 
nature of being human.  For the students in Felman’s class, their relationship with 
the video taped testimony became thick by virtue of being addressed…and by 
allowing themselves to feel addressed in so personal a way.   
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 The personal response of Felman’s class to the testimony illustrates why, 
in terms of memories like that of the Holocaust, it is important for collective 
memory to be based on thick relations.  The thinner the relationship, the easier it 
is for indifference to seep into the ways that memory is relayed to future 
generations, especially if the intergenerational transmission is not through 
communities that have a thick relationship to the Holocaust.  The danger of my 
nephew’s boredom with WWII (assuming that he was serious when he said it) lies 
in how easy it is for indifference to govern the way Holocaust discourses find a 
place in present-day consciousness.  In moving from the dialectical relationship of 
morality and indifference towards a thick relationship, I am not arguing that one 
can become what Margalit calls a “moral witness”—a designation that relies on 
shared experience (in terms of the Holocaust, only first generation witnesses 
could be called moral witnesses in such a scenario).6  Instead, I want to draw on 
Margalit’s idea of a collective memory’s ability to bring a memory “to life”: 
What does the power, or rather the illusion of power, to bring to 
life by collective memory amount to?  I believe that it amounts to a 
great deal.  It strongly indicates that a community of memory is a 
community based not only on actual thick relations to the living 
but also on thick relations to the dead.  It is a community that deals 
with life and death, where the element of commemoration verging 
on revivification [the idea that the dead are brought to life in 
essence, not form] is stronger than in a community based merely 
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on communication.  It is a community that is concerned with the 
issue of survival through memory. (Margalit 69)  
By containing thick relations with both the living (first generation witnesses) and 
the dead, which echoes the limit positions that Lyotard and Agamben grapple 
with, an essence is preserved.  Lawrence Langer invokes a similar conception of 
memory in stating “when memory imprints on us the meaning of the presence of 
‘absence’ and animates the ghost that such a burden has imposed on our lives, 
then the heritage of the Holocaust will have begun to acquire some authenticity in 
out postwar culture” (xviii).  In reviving the essence, one diminishes the 
possibility of indifference. 
 It is the essence that needs to survive in order for a cultural discourse to be 
passed down intergenerationally.  In Lyotard’s focus on the Cashinahua in both 
The Differend and in Just Playing, he notes the importance of names as the 
primary means through which the culture of the Cashinahua is transmitted.  
Margalit picks up a similar theme in his discussion of the colonel who forgot the 
name of one of his soldiers who was killed by friendly fire; the outrage that it 
sparked stems from the fact that the community felt that the colonel’s inability to 
remember marked his lack of caring (18-19).  Remembering a name, in this sense, 
marks a thick relationship.  But the memory of names also marks the importance 
of the survival of the essence.  Margalit then moves into a discussion of David 
Edgar’s play, Pentecost, to further his point:  
They [the children on their way to a concentration camp] are 
squeezed into a cattle truck, so hungry that they eat the cardboard 
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nametags tied to their necks.  It is clear that no trace of the children 
and no trace of their names will be left after they perish.  What is 
so terrifying about this play is not just the knowledge that the 
children are on their way to be murdered but that they are going to 
be murdered twice, both in body and in name.  This image of the 
double murder is, I believe, at the core of our attitude toward 
memory in general, and in particular toward the memory of 
personal names as referring to the essence of human beings in a 
way nothing else does.  (20-21) 
Names, in this context, are the most visible signs of identity.  If one dies, the hope 
that one’s name will be passed on means that we feel that some part of our 
essence is also transmitted.  Yet, the fact of the existence of the play that 
documents the loss of names (for, after all, how can we know who these children 
are for sure or if they even existed as the play depicts?) means that it responds to 
an essence embedded in memory.  Thus, an essence can be transmitted that does 
not necessarily rely on names.  The essential function of relaying a discourse is 
that it must address the essence of the memory—an essence tied to real life 
individuals.  It is with them that we must have a thick relationship. 
  It is clear from the trauma of her students that Felman’s class develops a 
thick relationship with the narratives/individuals they viewed in class.  When the 
extent of the trauma becomes apparent to Felman, she decides to intervene, to 
help them deal with the experience.  In her address to students, Felman notes the 
personal nature of the students’ feelings: “Many of you, indeed, quite literally said 
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that they felt they did not count after the first session, that, had they been there in 
the camps, they are certain they would have died” (Testimony 51).  As the 
students entered into the liminal space between their discourses and that of the 
Holocaust survivor, they began to compare their lives with that of the survivor—a 
very personal way of making meaning that is not unlike the experiences of second 
generation witnesses (in Chapter 2, I discuss some of the psychological studies of 
second generation witnesses in relation to Art Spiegelman’s identity position as a 
child of Holocaust survivors).  They are also compelled to pass on what they 
experienced.  Felman quotes one of her students as saying, “I was compelled…to 
speak about the Holocaust testimonies, the class, etc., to friends who were not 
disinterested but who were perhaps a bit surprised” (Testimony 50).  Thus, the 
students move from addressee to addressor, seeking to convey the essence of what 
is a new discourse.  Yet, at this moment, they are still in a liminal space since no 
new, coherent discourse had yet emerged.  The student goes on to say “This 
speaking was at best fragmentary, dissolving into silence: at moments, lapsing 
into long, obsessive monologues.  It was absolutely necessary to speak of it, 
however incoherently…At times, I felt that I would simply have to abduct 
someone and lock them up in my room and tell them about the ‘whole’ thing” 
(Testimony 50).  The fragmented nature of their speaking combined with the 
importance they see in conveying the essence of the memory, speaks to how 
personal a relationship they felt to the testimonies they witnessed.  In many ways, 
the fragmentation of the discourse represents the fragmentation they feel in their 
own discourses.  If we looked at this as a process of subjectivization, we could 
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say that the “I” is still split—fragmented by the discourse to which they give 
authority.  In this moment, their discourse is fragmented because the “I” is split; 
until they work through the liminal space created by the discourses in contact, 
they will be unable to articulate a new, cohesive discourse. 
 In addressing the crises of her students, Felman assigns a writing activity 
that is designed to enable her students to gain a new discourse—one that 
addresses the students’ feelings of inadequacy by empowering their subject 
position.  In this sense, she is aware of the devastating blow to ego that the “did 
not count” had on her students.  Rather than picking up the self-negating aspect of 
their response (which could lead to a potentially problematic new subject position 
for the students), Felman focuses on the value of their discourse: “And I am 
inviting you now to testify to that experience, so as to accept the obligation—and 
the right—to repossess yourselves, to take, in other words, the chance to sign, the 
chance to count” (Testimony 51).  Here, Felman articulates a sense of obligation 
but, as Lyotard would say, it is not to the original addressor.  Obligation, here, 
centers on oneself and the idea that our new discourses have meaning.  It is an 
obligation to create new discourses and, by the very nature of the writing process, 
to relay the discourse to other addressees.  At the same time, the urge to relay the 
message is based on the thick relationship the students felt with the testimonies 
they viewed. 
   Based on the two excerpts Felman includes in the chapter, a sense of how 
one passes on narratives combined with a feeling of collectivity and a focus on the 
importance of literature as a means of conveying memory emerge in the final 
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assignment.  The first excerpt from a Chinese woman begins by questioning what 
gets passed on:  
He [the testifier] wondered aloud what sorts of testimony one 
leaves to one’s children, when one does not confront the past.  I 
thought at first, what sorts of burdens will I pass on to my children, 
in the unlikely event that I have any.  And then I thought of my 
father, who lived through the Chinese Civil War, and four years of 
incarceration as a political prisoner on the Island of Taiwan.  What 
sorts of burdens has he passed to me? (Testimony 55)    
In the first part of the excerpt, the woman acknowledges the role of the relay in 
conveying memory.  This quickly transforms to a self-reflexive questioning of her 
role as a relay—of becoming an addressor to her children, if she has them.  The 
experience of the class also makes her aware of the multiple discourses she’s 
received. The impact of the Holocaust testimony leads her to question what other 
discourses (burdens) she inherited from her father.  The self-reflexive mode of her 
questioning gives her the tools to understand her discourse positions; it also 
allows her new addressees (we the readers, Felman) to glimpse the discourses at 
play in speaking her own testimony. 
 The second part of the excerpt from Felman’s female student moves from 
the singular mode to comment on her sense of collectivity with the class.  As a 
woman of Chinese descent, she tended to feel Othered in her interactions with 
classmates.  Yet, the impact of being addressed and forming a thick relationship 
with the Holocaust testimonies creates a discourse of collective memory: “In an 
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odd sort of way, I feel a strange sort of collectivity has been formed in the class.  
This, of course is a most frightening thing.  As I mentioned above, my mode of 
interaction with those whom I do not know, as always been one of radical 
differentiation, rather than of collectivization.  My autonomy has been rendered 
precarious, even fragile” (Testimony 55).  Given that she values her discourse of 
independence, the new discourse of collective memory in which she is engaged 
through the shared crises of the class challenges her subject position.  As with all 
discourses in contact, the female student’s perspective acknowledges that there is 
no easy or necessarily stable resolution—the discourses exist within her now and 
continue to be at play: “Somehow, though, I have managed to survive, whole and 
a bit fragmented at the same time; the same, but decidedly altered.  Perhaps this 
final paper can only be testimony to that simple fact, that simple event” 
(Testimony 55).  In this moment of self-awareness—of recognizing her role as a 
new addressor—she still manages to convey the affective impact of the 
experience, which informs her decision to limit her narrative to the personal. Due 
to the nature of her self-reflexive questioning, she avoids a disingenuous empathy.  
In The Fragility of Empathy after the Holocaust, Carolyn J. Dean discusses 
scholarly critiques of empathy where the boundaries between the self and other 
are “obliterated” (9).  As Dean notes, “This discussion links disingenuous 
empathy to Enlightenment universalism, whose emphasis on our own likeness 
may erase our real differences in the interests of those gentiles who define the 
standard against which ‘likeness’ or ‘difference’ is measured” (11).  While 
Felman’s female Chinese student is connecting her identity discourses to that of 
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the Holocaust survivor, it is only through the mode of passing on testimony.  In 
her self-reflection, she clearly holds on to her identity discourse but also 
acknowledges that other discourses are at play.  Difference, here, is highlighted 
through the fact of her position as a relay of “that simple fact, that simple event.”  
As inadequate as some may view that relay, it contains a power in addressing the 
transformation she feels.  
 The male student’s response (Felman only identifies him as not Jewish) 
speaks to the importance of being addressed and the power for literature to 
convey memory, similar to Lyotard’s resolution of the differend through 
narration.  Unlike the previous excerpt from the female student, the male student 
begins by acknowledging the lack of connection he previously felt to the history 
of the Holocaust: “Viewing the Holocaust testimony was not for me initially 
catastrophic—so much of the historical coverage of it functions to empty it from 
its horror.  Yet, in the week that followed the first screening, and throughout the 
remainder of the class, I felt increasingly implicated in the pain of the testimony, 
which found a particular reverberation in my own life” (Testimony 55-56).  The 
concern Stone addresses about the normalizing impact of historicism is seen in the 
male student’s writing; the lack of an emotional connection indicates a thin 
relationship with the memory of the Holocaust.  Like the female student, the fact 
of feeling addressed through the videotaped testimony allows the student to 
develop a thick relationship with the survivors he watched.  As his discourse 
comes into contact with those of the survivors, his perception of the Holocaust, 
and literature in general changes: 
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Literature, as that which can sensitively bear witness to the 
Holocaust, gives me a voice, a right, and a necessity to survive.  
Yet, I cannot discount the literature which in the dark awakens the 
screams, which opens the wounds, and which makes me want to 
fall silent.  Caught by two contradictory wishes at once, to speak or 
not to speak, I can only stammer.  Literature, for me, in these 
moments, has had a performative value: my life has suffered a 
burden, undergone transference of pain.  If I am to continue 
reading, I must, like David Copperfield, read as if for life. 
(Testimony 56) 
Although he does not address the idea of collectivity as specifically as does the 
female student, the male student is clearly envisioning himself as connected to a 
larger group through the medium of literature, especially as it contains an essence 
of memory—of the lives affected by and lost during the Holocaust.  That 
connection, which for both contains pain, transforms the discourses he sees 
himself participating in and thus his subjectivity.  The male student also sees 
himself as continuing as an addressee in terms of his role as a reader.  Yet, clearly 
he is also an addressor.  While he sees his discourse as stammering, it is clear that 
it has an impact.  After all, Felman herself moves from addressor of her students 
to the addressee of their trauma.  This chapter, and even the whole of Testimony is 
motivated by her experience as an addressee: “And it was this crises which made 
this class unique in my experience, this crises which determined me to write about 
it, and which contained, in fact, the germ—and the germination—of this book” 
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(Testimony 47).  The classes’ crises, motivated by the thick relationship they 
developed with the testimonies, created an affect that addressed Felman, who 
becomes a new addressor through the writing of this text. 
 While Felman’s class, which Felman herself labels as unique, is not 
representative of every individual’s response to the Holocaust, it does allow us to 
begin conceptualizing an ethics that underscores intergenerational responses to 
the Holocaust.  The way that this ethics appears, however, must be judged in a 
case-by-case scenario.  In the male and female narratives that Felman includes in 
Testimony, we can see that the responses of the students are based on the interplay 
of the Holocaust discourses with the discourses that the students themselves bring 
into the liminal space in which they entered.  While one can read connections 
between the two responses, there are substantial differences especially if one 
examines the influence of the ethnic identity contained in the female student’s 
response.  Allowing for these differences is essential.  Just as no one Holocaust 
testimony can encompass the whole of people’s experiences during the Holocaust, 
responses can take a myriad of forms based on the subject positions of the 
addressees and which addressors they connect with.  In looking at how ethics 
develops through an intergenerational relay, one must consider how the responses 
seek to revivify the essence that informs a collective Holocaust memory. 
 One way in which we can view the passage of Holocaust discourse and the 
e/affective impact the narratives have on the addressee turned addressor is by 
examining the self-reflexive quality of the intergenerational responses.  Self-
reflexivity calls attention to the process of the relay as an addressee turns 
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addressor—the act of being addressed, of developing a relationship to the 
discourse, of moving into a liminal space in between discourses, and of emerging 
with new discourses.  In his critic of historiography of the Holocaust, Stone 
emphasizes the postmodern approach of the self-reflexive text: “A self-reflexive 
text, in which the historian muses on the creation of the representation at the same 
time as the past is represented as history would immediately position the historian 
both textually and contextually within the debate in Holocaust studies” (43-44).  
By being placed within the debate, the historian cannot be viewed as an authority 
in the sense of speaking an absolute, objective view of history.  As Lyotard notes, 
“And any attempt to state the law, for example, to place oneself in the position of 
enunciator of the universal prescription is obviously infatuation itself and absolute 
injustice, in point of fact” (Just Playing 99).  By denying the impact of one’s 
discourses on one’s views of history, the historian can perpetrate injustice both on 
the subject matter and his/her readers.   Instead, the self-reflexive nature that 
Stone advocates calls attention to the fact that the viewpoint is situational.  Stone 
goes on to note: 
And, most importantly, the otherness of the past, its difference, 
while remaining the touchstone of historical writing, can, by 
situating the historian in relation to the events in the text, be the 
source of current unease, a means not of filing away the past, but 
of rendering it a continued issue for the present.  In this way, 
historism truly fulfills its claim to be the study of change, and the 
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Holocaust maintains its force to question the mores of the present. 
(Stone 44)      
Given the various discourses that historians bring into play when writing their 
histories (as I previously noted in Stone’s critique of German historiography) and 
the authority that readers grant to the idea of History, calling attention to the 
situational perspectives of history writers allows new generations to continue 
discussions about the meaning and impact of the Holocaust.  In this way, 
intergenerational addressees can become part of the discussion—an openness that 
allows them to become part of a collective memory. 
 While Literature, by its nature, does not make the same claims about 
“truth” that History does (at least, in the types of authority that readers give to 
each respective genre), many intergenerational responses invoke self-reflexivity.  
Often, authors can have very complex relationships with the Holocaust; for 
Jewish writers, this can stem from the closeness (the thickness) of their 
relationship with the Holocaust.  As Cynthia Ozick notes in an interview 
published in The Atlantic, “All the same, I'm against writing Holocaust fiction: 
that is, imagining those atrocities… I'm definitely on the side of sticking with the 
documents and am morally and emotionally opposed to the mythopoeticization of 
those events in any form or genre. And yet, for some reason, I keep writing 
Holocaust fiction. It is something that has happened to me; I can't help it. If I had 
been there and not here I would be dead, which is something I can never forget” 
(par. 20).  On one level, Ozick’s statement can be read as a concern about 
disingenuous empathy that negates the uniqueness of the Holocaust; at the same 
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moment, her comment about mythopoeticization invokes a concern that such 
narratives would be held as the representations of the Holocaust.  And yet, she 
does write holocaust fiction.  The contradictory emotions Ozick invokes (to speak 
or not to speak) calls attention to the unease underlying her writing—similar to 
the unease that Stone advocates as the means for making the discussion of the 
Holocaust a part of the present rather than solely of the past.  In voicing 
contradictory discourses, Ozick calls attention to the fact that she is a relay, one 
who is passing on the affective essence of the Holocaust as she perceives it.   
 Ozick is certainly not alone in the move to self-reflexively call attention to 
the position of the author as part of a relay.  In later chapters, I will be discussing 
the self-reflexive positioning other authors take in writing intergenerational 
responses to the Holocaust (Art Spiegelman as a second generation witness, 
Joseph Skibell as a fourth generation witness, and Jonathan Safran Foer as a third 
generation witness).  At this moment, I would like to explore a self-reflexive text 
that comes out of Israel, David Grossman’s See Under: Love, that offers a 
complex view of self-reflexivity through its use of Postmodern narrative 
strategies, especially metafiction.  In including a brief discussion of Grossman’s 
work here, I am not inferring that the concerns belonging to Jewish communities 
in Israel are the same as they are in America.  Instead, I want to illustrate how the 
impetus for collective memory and the relaying of cultural discourse are similar 
between various authors who have thick relationships to the memory of the 
Holocaust.  Throughout much of the surreal novel, the writer/protagonist, Momik 
Wasserman (readers are invited to conflate Momik with Grossman as author 
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through the switch to the “I” that occurs in the chapter labeled Bruno), calls 
attention to his unease with writing, which often results in his inability to write.  
Yet the protagonist is haunted by his relationship with his grandfather’s brother, 
Anshel Wasserman (who Momik calls Grandfather), a Holocaust survivor and, 
before the war, a children’s author who lived with his family.7  Even when he 
becomes a fish, he cannot escape the Anshel’s story: 
“Do you by any chance know the story Anshel Wasserman 
told the German called Neigel?” 
Bruno swiveled a gill and shut his eyes with concentration.  
“It’s a fabulous story, oh yes,” he said, and his strange face lit up. 
“Only there’s…ha!  The devil take it!  I’ve forgotten!”  And with a 
smile, as though remembering suddenly, he added, “But of course!  
That was the essence of his story, Shloma, you forget it and you 
have to recall it afresh every time!” 
“And someone who never knew it, had never heard it in his 
life, remember it?” 
 “Just as a person remembers his name.  His destiny.  His 
heart.  No, my Shloma, there is no one who doesn’t know that 
story.” (Grossman 181)                    
This moment is important for Momik, since it gives him the motivation to return 
to land and to write Anshel’s story.  It also invokes the idea of collective memory 
through the retelling of narratives.  Even though the original story is forgotten, the 
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essence of it remains in each retelling of the story.  Anshel’s story belongs to the 
collective memory. 
 In the last two sections of the text, Wasserman and the Complete 
Encyclopedia of Kazik’s Life respectively, metafiction and the act of writing lead 
to revivification not just of Anshel’s story but Anshel himself.  In the text, 
Grossman presents the idea of a white room, a liminal space in which Momik as 
writer connects with Anshel.  In the final two sections of the text, there exists 
multiple levels—the narration of Anshel telling a story to the head of the 
concentration camp, Niegel; Anshel talking to Momik about the process of 
writing, and the characters of Anshel’s story speaking as well.  Here, Anshel 
guides Momik’s story so that Niegel is forced to recognize the humanity of the 
people he is brutally killing…and take his own life.  In doing so, Momik is faced 
with writing about and killing a baby in the space of a day; since the various 
levels, at play with each other, brings to life the essence of the characters, Momik 
becomes horrified at what he must to the baby.  He tries to leave the white room: 
I stood up and wanted to leave the White Room.  There was 
nothing left to look for.  I had forgotten the language spoken there.  
But I couldn’t find the door.  That is, I touched the walls, I walked 
all the way around the room, but there was no door.  The walls 
were smooth.  But there had to be a door! 
 And Anshel Wasserman comes in and faces me.  As before.  
Bowed, hunchbacked.  His skin yellow and sagging.  He wants to 
show me the way out.  He knows the way.  All his life he has been 
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lost in this forest, scattering crumbs of words to help him find the 
way out.  The man from the fairy tales, Anshel Wasserman-
Scheherazade.  (Grossman 297)8 
In this passage, one can see the White Room as a liminal space, defined by 
discourses in contact: Momik, who does not want to go on with the tale, and 
Anshel’s, who is pushing the narration down a path where Niegel must confront 
the humanity of his victims.  The story is fragmented with words scattered about.  
The only way that Momik can work his way through is to write a new discourse: 
 “Grandfather?” 
 “Write about the baby, Shleimeleh.  Write about his life.” 
 “I want to get out of here.  The White Room scares me.” 
 “The whole world is the White Room.  Come walk with 
me.” 
 “I’m afraid.” 
 “So am I.  Write about the baby, Shleimeleh.” 
 “No!!!” 
 I screamed and threw off the soft, warm hand where the 
story streamed in torrents.  I flung myself against the smooth white 
walls, across the pages of my notebook, at the mirror, at my soul—
there was no way out.  Everything was blocked. 
 “Write then,” said Anshel Wasserman patiently, gently.  
“Sit and write.  There is no other way.  Because you are like me, 
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your life is the story, and for you there is only the story.  Write, 
then, please.” (Grossman 297) 
It is only through the act of writing that the differend, which exists between 
Momik’s and Anshel’s respective discourses, can be resolved and a new narration 
created.  The essence of Anshel is revivified through the collective memory 
invoked by the multiple levels Grossman is employing in the latter sections of the 
text.  In the same moment, the reader is aware of the author’s agency in writing; 
by using the “I” and conflating the protagonist Momik with himself, Grossman as 
author, Grossman employs a pseudo-autobiographical move that calls the readers 
attention to the writing of the book.  In this way, the reader becomes aware of 
how he or she is situated as an addressee in relation to the multiple discourses at 
play in the text. 
  Through Grossman’s text, one can see how the self-reflexive 
characteristic of the metafictional strategy he employs fulfills a range of 
characteristics laid out through my exploration of ethics and intergenerational 
memory.  In the text, a thick relationship based on Anshel’s presence and 
participation in the text is created that allows the intergenerational addressee to 
come into contact with the discourse of the Holocaust.  In Grossman’s case, one 
can see the intergenerational addressee as Grossman himself, invoked by the 
pseudo-autobiographical style of the “I.”  Despite the unwillingness to write, 
knowing that it will lead to the premature death of the baby (and Neigel’s 
suicide), the author is compelled to write.  The thickness of his relationship to 
Anshel manifests itself through his participation in the act of writing.  To be just 
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to Anshel, Momik/Grossman must complete the story.  It is the only way for him 
to work through the conflict between his discourse and Anshel’s; until there is 
resolution, Momik/Grossman cannot leave the White Room. Yet, the 
metafictional style also forces the reader to be aware of the action of writing 
itself, a move that breaks the boundaries between text and reader, thus allowing 
for the probability of the reader feeling addressed by the discourses at play—an 
act that emphasizes the fact that collective memory needs to expand beyond the 
boundaries of any given text.  The text is a relay.  Grossman positions himself as 
addressee turned addressor through his fictional depiction of the process of 
becoming a relay.  Thus, he works to ensure that this cultural discourse is 
transmitted while calling attention to his discourse position—a function of the 
text’s affective purpose.  The choice for authors to employ self-reflexive modes of 
discourse calls attention to the fact that the discourse of the Holocaust is mediated 
by other discourses that intergenerational witnesses automatically bring into play 
by the nature their subject positions.  In this way, they call attention to the fact 
that their perspectives are not universal.  Rather, one sees what Holocaust 
discourse means to them—a position that puts them into the debate that is 
essential in the continued transmission of collective memory. 
 The impetus for revivification of the essence for those who suffered and 
died during the Holocaust is understandable for the authors I am discussing in the 
later chapters of this text; three of the authors (Spiegelman, Skibell, and Foer) are 
connected through family ties, one (Edward Lewis Wallant) through his status as 
a Jewish American writer.  The authors with family ties tend to employ various 
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self-reflexive modes (as I will be discussing in each respective chapter).  Yet, 
when one speaks of the essence of Holocaust discourse, the question, “How could 
this have happened?” is haunting…especially as it is paired with “Never Again.”  
This forces one to look at the nature of the perpetrators.  Immediately post war, 
the desire to abject the actions/motivations of the Nazis from the rest of the 
category of “humanity” and more specifically from Western civilization manifests 
in an Othering of the Nazis:   
Nevertheless, the desire of the Nuremberg prosecutors to create a 
better world, but without having to question too closely the 
characteristics of the old, necessitated formulations such as 
Jackson’s [‘It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of 
human beings that we accuse them.  It is their abnormal and 
inhuman conduct which brings them to this bar’].  Unfortunately, 
these formulations reiterated the same charge against the Nazis—
that they were not human—that the Nazis used against the Jews. 
(Stone 104) 
Just as the realization of the humanity of his victims forces Niegel in See Under: 
Love to confront the immorality of his actions, a similar understanding of the 
Nazis as human beings offers challenges in understanding the nature of evil 
within ourselves.  As Susan Neiman in Evil in Modern Thought notes, “A more 
common way to deny the significance of Auschwitz combines a completely 
secular vocabulary with a curiously theological structure.  While the first view 
regards Nazis as one more variation in the long history of anti-Semitism, the 
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second views them as singularly demonic.  On this view, Auschwitz reveals much 
about one nation in particular but nothing about humanity in general” (254).9  
Understanding the Nazis and their actions as undeniably human certainly did not 
coincide with the desire of the Allied countries to see themselves as “good 
triumphing over evil.”  Yet, the idea of the Nazis as a sort of metaphysical evil 
(and certainly a sign of such evil) is common in popular culture. 
 While we can look at the Nuremberg trials as one possible source for the 
view of Nazis as metaphysical evil, Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil, offers another understanding of why the Holocaust 
happened and what it means for humanity.  When Eichmann was captured and 
brought to trial in Israel, many received the news as a sign of justice; one of the 
individuals in a major position of power was finally going to face his crimes.  The 
trial, however, revealed to Arendt the underlying flaw to this perspective.  The 
Holocaust, in its magnitude, could not have occurred had not a large number of 
average people allowed it to happen.  For Arendt, Eichmann represented the 
common not the fantastic: “The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so 
many were like him, and that many were neither perverted or sadistic, that they 
were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal” (Arendt 276).  In reporting on 
Eichmann’s trial, Arendt realized that despite the attempts of the prosecution to 
prove otherwise, she could not help feeling that she was facing a very average sort 
of person.  As Neiman notes:  
Criminals like Eichmann have none of the subjective traits we use 
to identify evildoers, yet his crimes were so objectively massive 
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that they made subjective factors irrelevant.  His attempts to prove 
he was completely normal were as arduous as the prosecution’s 
attempt to prove that he was not.  Both attempts are wasted, if 
what’s at issue is what’s appalling: the most unprecedented crimes 
can be committed by ordinary people. (273) 
The perception of Eichmann’s normalcy forced Arendt to reconceptualize her 
discourse about humanity’s relationship to Evil.  If Eichmann was a normal 
person and his motivations were trivially average, than great Evil did not need to 
be a sign of the metaphysical—it could be (and was) simply banal. 
 Like many Nazi officers, Eichmann noted that there seemed to be no 
widespread critique of the Nazis’ Final Solution.  Arendt notes, “As Eichmann 
told it, the most potent factor in the soothing of his own conscience was the 
simple fact that he could see no one, no one at all, who actually was against the 
Final Solution” (116).  The very fact that there seemed to be no critique allowed 
Eichmann to disregard the morality of his organization of mass deportations.  He 
was more conscious of trivial concerns like getting promoted rather than the 
reality of what his job meant in terms of committing genocide (although the fact 
that many Nazi officials worried about what would happen if Germany lost the 
war indicates that they were not unaware of how other nations would perceive the 
Final Solution…and how they would be punished if they were caught).  Yet, 
because Eichmann’s relationship with his victims was thin, morality lost to 
indifference. 
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 Arendt’s conceptualization of the Banality of Evil does not focus on 
Eichmann alone; his comment about seeing no one against the Final Solution 
implicates a much larger population as responsible for the Holocaust: 
Many Germans and many Nazis, probably an overwhelming 
majority of them, must have been tempted not to murder, not to 
rob, not to let their neighbors go off to their doom (for that the 
Jews were transported to their doom they knew, of course, even 
though many of them may not have known the gruesome details), 
and not to become accomplices in all these crimes by benefiting 
from them.   
But, God knows, they had learned how to resist the 
temptation. (Arendt 150) 
The irrevocable fact that had there been widespread protest (on the part of the 
Germans, the Polish, the French, etc.), the Holocaust might have not been so 
extreme a limit experience nor would so many have perished, indicates 
widespread complicity.  Even though the Final Solution was against many 
people’s morals, they overwhelmingly failed to act.  Arendt also extends this 
critique to the victims themselves by noting “Without Jewish help in 
administrative and police work—the final rounding up of Jews in Berlin was, as I 
mentioned, done entirely by Jewish police—there would have been either 
complete chaos or an impossibly severe drain on German manpower” (Arendt 
117).  For many who read Arendt’s work, the idea of blaming the victims of mass 
atrocity is hard to bear.  First generation witnesses address this critique by noting 
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the “choiceless choices” one made, especially in a situation where survival was 
often completely arbitrary.  While such a reading certainly underlines Israel’s 
conceptualization of itself as a state, many intergenerational responses focus more 
on the role of the perpetrators as a means to ensure the call of “Never Again.” 
 In Evil in Modern Thought, Neiman focuses on Auschwitz as the event 
that changed how society conceptualized evil.  In the past, society tended to 
conceptualize Evil in metaphysical terms; Auschwitz challenges that perception: 
It’s easy to see that evil will is absent in things like earthquakes, 
but what did it mean for evil to be present in humankind?  
Auschwitz stood for moral evil as other war crimes did not because 
it seemed deliberate as others did not.  Sending children to fight for 
Britain in the mud of Flanders without grasping the power of the 
weapons you have put in their hands can be called gross criminal 
negligence.  Rounding up children from all ends of Europe and 
shipping them to gas chambers in Poland cannot. (Neiman 270)10 
Here, Neiman argues that the fact that the scale of the genocide represented in the 
Holocaust employed detailed planning and the use of a bureaucratic structure, 
means that we must face the Holocaust as a deliberate action that is in no way 
natural.  Nor can it be assigned to a supernatural power: “Arendt’s account was 
crucial in revealing what makes Auschwitz emblematic for contemporary evil.  It 
showed that today, even crimes so immense that the earth itself cries out for 
retribution are committed by people with motives that are no worse than banal” 
(Neiman 273).  The combination of the deliberation of some with the widespread 
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indifference of many is, as Margalit notes, a lethal combination.  The fact that the 
Holocaust challenges metanarratives such as Progressivism indicates a new mode 
of understanding Evil.  It does not mean, however, that humanity is completely 
free of older conceptualizations of Evil: “It is just this identification of evil with 
evil intention that lead to a widespread misreading of Arendt.  Because she argues 
that Eichmann’s intentions were only trivially bad ones, she was held to have 
argued that his actions were nothing worse.  Her point was not to deny 
responsibility but to demand that we understand responsibility anew” (Neiman 
277).  In looking at Evil as a metaphysical force, one does not need to take 
responsibility.  After all, what power do we have when faced with events that we 
ascribe to a supernatural force such as God or Satan?  Understanding how and 
why the Holocaust reached the scale it did offers a contradictory discourse—one 
that requires us to examine the nature of our own humanity. 
 For Arendt, this questioning of the nature of evil forced her to rethink the 
nature of goodness.  The problem at the heart of the Banality of Evil is how easy 
it is to ignore the thin relationships we have with others.  Warren Zev Harvey, in 
“Two Approaches to Evil in History,” quotes an excerpt from Arendt’s 
correspondence with Gershom Scholem:  
“You are quite right: I changed my mind and do no longer speak of 
‘radical evil.’…It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never 
‘radical,’ that it is only extreme, and that is possesses neither depth 
nor any demonic dimension.  It can grow and lay waste the whole 
world precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface.  It 
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is ‘thought defying’…because thought tries to reach some depth, to 
go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with evil, it is 
frustrated because there is nothing.  That is its ‘banality.’  Only the 
good has depth and can be radical.” (331) 
The insidious nature of the Banality of Evil lies in the fact that humanity wants to 
abject that aspect of ourselves—to Other it—so that we do not have to address it.  
While this makes for a positive subjective discourse, it is not an honest one.  In 
examining the essence of the Holocaust, we must ask if and how the 
intergenerational narrative e/affectively incorporates the Banality of Evil as part 
of the cultural discourse that is transmitted. 
 As the discussion on the Banality of Evil gained more cultural currency, 
authors began to address that concept in their own work.  Harvey notes that the 
concern with how texts represent Evil in the context of the Holocaust led to self-
examination by first generation witnesses: “It was a desire to restrain the mythical 
interpretation of the Holocaust that in recent years led the survivor-author Ka 
tzetnik to question his own powerful and unforgettable description of ‘the planet 
Auschwitz,’ whose laws differ from those on our planet.  Auschwitz, he now 
stressed, was run by human beings, not Satan, and was located here on earth” 
(Harvey 331).  The discourse of the Holocaust presents challenges of 
representation, especially as it comes into play with other discourses.  Yet, it is 
important that those challenges be met.  In his analysis of Maimonidean versus 
kabbalistic approaches to the Holocaust, Harvey privileges the Maimonidean 
since this discourse forces one to look at the role of humanity: “As opposed to the 
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kabbalistic approach, the Maimonidean one begins with the fact that the evils of 
the Holocaust were perpetrated by human beings against human beings.  It seeks 
to understand the psychological and political causes of those evils, that is, to 
identify the privations of knowledge that made them possible.  To understand how 
the Holocaust came about is to understand how a future Holocaust can be 
prevented (Harvey 330-1).  While invoking Jewish religious practices often meets 
resistance based on the desire not to center Judaism on the Holocaust, it is clear 
that Harvey is exploring discourses that allow for the recognition of the very 
human nature of the banality of Evil.  As Amos Funkenstein notes,  
If, however, we turn from God to man, the Holocaust is neither 
incomprehensible nor meaningless.  It was neither bestial nor 
indeed pagan.  It was, instead, an eminently human event in that it 
demonstrated those extremes, which only man and his society are 
capable of doing or suffering.  It pointed at a possibility, perhaps 
unknown before, of human existence, a possibility as human as the 
best instances of creativity and compassion. (647) 
Since the possibility for evil based solely on indifference is as much a part of 
humanity as our best ideals, the depth of the choice to be good becomes clear.  
Both evil and goodness make up our inherent nature; the problem is that the 
selfishness of our nature—the instinct for comfort, security, survival—means that 
we often take the safe road.  In order to be good, we must find ways to address 
that impulse.  An intergenerational discourse that fails to recognize the humanity 
of evil opens up the possibility for atrocity. 
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 In exploring the intergenerational narratives in the later sections of my 
text, I will be focusing on the essence of the Holocaust both in terms of the thick 
relationships the authors embody to those who experienced the Holocaust and the 
way they address the Banality of Evil.  American national discourse about the 
Holocaust, on a basic level, allows for both modes of criteria as Mariam 
Niroumand notes in the ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust through an excerpt 
from a speech made by Jimmy Carter in April 1979, “‘Secondly, however, we 
must share the responsibility for not being willing to acknowledge forty years ago 
that this horrible event was occurring’” (61).  Here, President Carter is only 
acknowledging a small portion of what Americans take responsibility for during 
the Holocaust.  Now, we recognize that we contributed to the mass genocide by 
not taking in refugees and by failing to attack the infrastructure that allowed so 
many Jews (and members of other groups) to be transported to their deaths.  Yet, 
even in taking this amount of blame, it is a fairly safe discourse.  After all, 
Americans were not Nazis.  We liberated the camps and stopped Hitler.  Yet, such 
discourse fails to grasp the essence of Holocaust discourse.  If our goal is truly 
“Never Again,” than the intergenerational discourses that we create must 
seriously explore how we place ourselves in the larger debate of the Holocaust 
through its affective relay of the essence of the Holocaust. 
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Notes: 
1Gary Weissman addresses implications of this stance in Fantasies of Witnessing: Postwar Efforts 
to Experience the Holocaust: “Those who claim that the Holocaust is unrepresentable effectively 
demand a degree of fidelity to the past that is impossible to realize, as it would ultimately require a 
representation to be the reality that it represents, and to have the same effect on readers and 
viewers that past events had on those who were there” (208). 
 
2As Dan Stone, in Constructing the Holocaust, notes, the weight given to factual testimony during 
the Nuremburg Trials led to a reliance on Nazi documentation “at the expense of the experiences 
of Jews and other victims” (5).  While this choice can fairly be characterized as problematic at the 
time (given the Nazi’s use of euphemisms, the destruction of documentation as the end of the war 
approached, etc), Stone critiques this choice since it also dictated how early historians approached 
the Holocaust. 
 
3Rosenblat’s Angel at the Fence, which he claimed was the story of meeting his future wife while 
a prisoner at Buchenwald, was initially scheduled for release by Berkley Books in Feb. 2009.  
Rosenblat’s story got a great deal of publicity, including from Oprah Winfrey, until the veracity of 
the love story was questioned (Rosenblat is a Holocaust survivor but the main part of the story 
about his wife helping him to survive by passing food to him through the camp fence was untrue).  
I would argue “perceived damage” but fully acknowledge that the position is based on my 
perspective as one who does not question “the event” itself.  In another’s hands, the claim of 
truthfulness made by these authors and others I have not mentioned here, could be used as a tool 
for revisionist rhetoric. 
 
4One example can be seen in the mediocre 2008 movie, The Spirit by Frank Miller where Samuel 
Jackson’s character of The Octopus dresses as a Nazi—an appropriation that focuses more on 
power and, in the context of the film, the idea of the “Super Man.”  While this is only one of many 
examples, the fact that the image of the Nazi appears throughout popular culture in ways that de-
emphasize the Holocaust means that the discourses many young people take into this liminal space 
can fail to connect to the factual first generation accounts.    
 
5Felman’s class, “Literature and Testimony,” was a graduate seminar at Yale (Testimony 6). 
 
6
 “Or project of characterizing moral witnesses seems to go against the scientific trend of shifting 
the emphasis from personal authority of the witness to the evidence itself.  While we do not invest 
the moral witness with traditional authority, we seem to endow him with a special sort of 
charisma.  The charisma comes from having a special kind of experience which is elevated to 
some sort of high spirituality that makes the witness a moral force” (Margalit 178). 
 
7The story of Momik and Anshel Wasserman makes up the first section of the text, named Momik.  
In this part, Anshel tells Momik of his experience in the Holocaust but, because of his family’s 
silence on or cryptic references to the Holocaust, Momik does not fully understand the Holocaust 
experiences he hears. 
 
8In Grossman’s text, Anshel is described as a reverse Scheherazade.  Anshel cannot die (no matter 
how many times the Nazi try to kill him) but longs for death as an escape from the camp.  Anshel 
strikes a deal with Niegel that Anshel will tell him part of the story each night if Niegel promises 
to try to kill him at the end of each part. 
 
9Neiman uses Auschwitz as a representative term for the Holocaust (253). 
 
10In particular, Neiman focuses on the earthquake of 1755 that destroyed the city of Lisbon (1). 
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CHAPTER 3 
IN SPEAKING YOUR STORY, I AM TELLING MINE:  
THE TRANSITIONS BETWEEN AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND BIOGRAPHY IN 
ART SPIEGELMAN’S MAUS I & II 
But above all I am the one who saw his grandmother go to heaven.  
Like a flame, she chased away the sun and took its place.  And this 
new sun which blinds instead of giving light forces me to walk 
with my head down.  It weighs upon the future of man.  It casts a 
gloom over the hearts and vision of generations to come… 
 
I told her: as a child I lived with the perpetual fear of forgetting my 
mother’s name after I died.  In school my teacher had told me: 
three days after your funeral, an angel will come and knock on 
your grave.  He’ll ask you your name.  You will answer.  “I am 
Eliezer, the son of Sarah.”  Woe if you forget!  A dead soul, you 
will remain buried for all eternity… You will be condemned to 
wander the sphere of chaos where nothing exists, neither 
punishment nor pain, neither justice nor injustice, neither past or 
future, neither hope nor despair.  It is a serious thing to forget your 
mother’s name.  It is like forgetting your own origin.   
     -Elie Wiesel, The Accident 
 
 It is impossible to fully understand the effects of the Holocaust upon those 
who experienced it; the separation from that experience by time, by geography, by 
various other discourses all impact how Holocaust discourse is processed 
intergenerationally.  For those of us who access the memories of Holocaust 
survivors through oral histories or written texts—even in our recognition that the 
essence of Holocaust memory needs revivification—the initial thinness of our 
relationship to first generation Holocaust witnesses can impact how Holocaust 
discourse addresses us.  To establish a thick relationship, there must be a 
willingness on the part of the addressee to allow Holocaust discourse to affect our 
initial discourses as we move through the liminal space of contact between 
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discourses.  For the children of Holocaust survivors, their connection is different; 
while they do not hold the discourse of the Holocaust the way their parents do, it 
is impossible for them not to develop a thick relationship with the Holocaust 
because of their connection to their parents.  Certainly this is true of Art 
Spiegelman, the author of Maus I & II.  Through his two structural narratives 
(biography and autobiography), Spiegelman explores his personal relationship to 
the Holocaust.  On one level, these texts are the recording of Vladek 
Spiegelman’s experiences during the Holocaust—a biography of Spiegelman’s 
father.  On another level, the texts function as autobiography as Spiegelman tries 
to come to terms with his father’s memories, his mother’s suicide, and his Jewish 
identity—a visual depiction of liminality as he works through his 
intergenerational contact with the Holocaust discourse of his father.  In Maus I, 
Spiegelman’s construction of himself through his text is subtle; masked by the 
role of recorder, the focus seems to be on his father’s memories before the camps.  
In Maus II, the transitions to autobiography are more pronounced as Spiegelman 
self-reflexively calls attention to his role as the artist and recorder (addressor) of 
his father’s—his culture’s—discourses.  The autobiography, split as it is into three 
“I”s of self, author, and narrator (the last of which is split into an adult/child 
duality) is fundamentally Spiegelman’s public act of dealing with the trauma of 
the Holocaust as it affected his family; it is this focus of the autobiography within 
biography that forces the recognition the thick relationship that guides 
Spiegelman through liminality as he moves from the position of addressee to 
addressor as a relay of the essence of Holocaust discourse.1 
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 In categorizing Maus I & II as an autobiography, it is important to clarify 
precisely what role the autobiographical sections of the texts play in terms of 
understanding Spiegelman the author, the narrator, and the self.  Indeed, there is 
some resistance to naming these texts as autobiography.  For instance, Dominick 
LaCapra resists the automatic assumption that the fictional Artie can be easily 
connected with Spiegelman the man (self):  
It is important to insist that Spiegelman and the Artie-figure cannot 
simply be conflated; there is a complex relation of proximity and 
distance between the two.  In this sense it would be misleading to 
see the text as simply autobiographical or even as a form of 
cooperative autobiography.  It is clear from comments in 
interviews that Spiegelman did not fully identify with Artie and 
intentionally created ways in which Artie would not appear as a 
fully sympathetic character or object of transferential identification 
for the reader. (History 153) 
The fact that Spiegelman does not fully relate to Artie does not necessarily mean 
that this text is not autobiographical; LaCapra’s caution against an easy conflation 
of the self within to the self outside the text in the midst of an abundance of 
criticism that clearly accepts the texts as representations of Spiegelman’s life 
marks the complicated roles—multiple "I"s—that are invoked in the 
autobiographical pact of the text.2   
 The confusion of labels (including the initial controversy concerning Maus 
being labeled as fiction) illustrates to some extent the trickster role that 
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Spiegelman plays with the text and the reader.  While inferring a clear 
differentiation between himself and the character he creates in interviews like that 
which LaCapra notes, Spiegelman also emphasizes the connection between Artie 
within the text to Art, the man outside of the text, by releasing audio tapes of his 
interviews with his father in the CDRom version of Maus in 1994.  These 
recordings connect the visual depiction of “Artie” the narrator with the man 
“Art,” who lives outside of the text.  How then are we to understand the elements 
of Maus that seem to be autobiographical?  In other essays that focus on 
autobiography, critics seem to use the theoretical convention of autobiography 
that differentiates between the roles that the “I” plays.  Nancy Miller critiques the 
separation of narrator and author she sees in Ethan Mordenn’s work: “The man in 
the mouse mask is precisely the figure of the son as the artist” (48).  Michael 
Levine notes a similar structure in his discussion of the relationship between 
Vladek and Art: “Although Art as a character appears to be taken in by Vladek’s 
ruse, Spiegelman the artist uses the scene to introduce the figure of the smoke 
screen as a key to the structural principle of displacement operative in the text” 
(80).  Both critics emphasize two roles: the narrator within the text and the 
author/self outside.  This complicated reading of the autobiography within Maus, 
however, still cannot fully account for a situation where the self outside of the text 
does not like the narrator self within the text that the author self created.     
  It is at this point that Lejeune’s model for the autobiographical pact 
allows for a critical framework in which the complexities of the multiple selves 
(connected with three distinct roles) can be understood.  In reference to the name 
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printed on the cover, the reader understands the various “I”s within a text to 
represent that name which stands for a real person (Lejeune 11).  Within the 
autobiographical pact, various “I”s appear that are produced because of the roles 
they play in the text.  In terms of the larger question of whether Maus can be read 
as autobiographical, it is important to look at the three different, un-unified “I”s of 
an autobiographical text: the “I” as the self (Art) who is active, experiencing, 
living; the “I” as the narrator (Artie) who is self-reflexive, remembering, 
observing; and the “I” as the author (Spiegelman) who is creative, interpretive, 
entextualizing.  The “I” of self that Spiegelman exposes in the text is limited to 
the self in relationship to the discourses of the Holocaust and his Jewish-
American identity.  This self is clearly separated from the “I” of the author (artist) 
who creates a narrator who is intentionally unlikable at times (as LaCapra notes).  
The last “I,” that of the narrator, is an intentional construction of the artist.  In an 
effort to articulate the “I” of the self who is the child of survivors, the author/artist 
splits the “I” of the narrator into an adult/child dualistic image.  None of these 
“I”s come together in autobiography as a unified whole; none of these come 
together in Maus I & II to give the reader an idea of Spiegelman as a complete 
subject.  Rather, the focus of the autobiographical nature of these texts lies within 
Spiegelman’s attempts to come to terms with his family’s history, his personal 
trauma, as it relates specifically to the memory of the Holocaust; by working out 
the trauma in a public form, Spiegelman allows himself the opportunity of 
expressing rather than suppressing his trauma.3  The fragmented discourse created 
by the multiple levels of “I” at play in the text highlights the process of liminality 
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that Spiegelman is working through in his very personal, thick role as addressee to 
his father’s Holocaust discourse.  Maus I & II addresses Spiegelman’s personal 
trauma rather than a recounting of truth—especially of a true self; the 
autobiographical focus of the multiple “I”s is an act of resistance to the pain of the 
Holocaust.4 The duality of the adult/child split within the narrative “I” indicates 
Art’s attempt to work through trauma, specifically in relation to the ‘I” of the self 
as a second-generation survivor.  Given that these texts always operate in relation 
to the Holocaust, it is useful to see Maus I & II as Spiegelman’s attempt to come 
to terms with the memory through the creative medium of an autobiographical 
narrative that is composed of both text and visual images in the form of highly 
sophisticated comic books. 
 Even though the project begins with Spiegelman as a grown man, the 
viewpoint of the text is controlled by his position as a child of survivors.  One of 
the subtexts throughout Maus I & II is the child’s perspective.  This does not 
mean that Spiegelman is trying to make the texts childlike; he is, however, always 
referencing his role as a child: in relation to his parents and in his relation to the 
history of the Holocaust itself.  The form of these texts, the comic book, is in 
itself a reference to the controlling theme of being a child, a distanced witness to 
the Holocaust.   The traditional view of the genre of comic books as a genre for 
children is played upon by Spiegelman as he breaks the traditional conventions 
associated with comic books (as fun, fantasy, and unrealistic) and transforms the 
genre into a medium of horrific memory.  As Joseph Witek notes, “Serious 
literature in comic-book form is a relatively recent and slightly unsettling concept 
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in American culture, but a comic book which takes on the Holocaust as a subject 
compounds the problem of artistic decorum a hundredfold” (97).  The 
complications of this choice are evident in the criticism that has surrounded this 
text; many feel that the form is inappropriate for the subject matter.  In Witek’s 
study, Comic Books as History, he notes resistance to Maus is coupled with an 
overall opposition to any form that aestheticizes the Holocaust (97).  However, 
the controversy over these texts is compounded particularly by the form itself: “In 
a society which views comic books as essentially trivial, Maus thus might appear 
as a grotesque degradation of the Holocaust, mocking the catastrophic sufferings 
of millions of human beings as the squirming of cartoon rodents” (Witek 97).  
Both points are not lost on Spiegelman who, in Maus II, illustrates this dilemma 
of representation and form when he depicts himself drawing at a desk that rests 
upon the dead, emaciated bodies of the mice, which are his visual representation 
of Jews (41).  Spiegelman also notes, “I need to show the events and memory of 
the Holocaust without showing them.  I want to show the masking of these events 
in their representation” (Young 222).  The theme of masking works on multiple 
levels (which will be discussed in detail later) but the idea of showing these 
events “without showing them” is significant in this discussion of the genre.  The 
comic book allows Spiegelman to illustrate the role of “race” (race as a discourse 
of ideological fiction) through the various characterizations of Jews as Mice, 
Germans as cats, etc.  The illustration of the texts indicates a simplified 
perspective; the author/artist is visually limiting the “I” of the self through the 
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construction of the “I” of the narrator as a symbol of Jewish identity—the 
depiction of a mouse.5  
 The comic book form also serves another function that is implied 
throughout the texts: Art Spiegelman’s dual role as both an adult artist and as a 
child of Holocaust survivors.  In Maus II, Spiegelman focuses upon his role as 
intergenerational addressee in relationship to the Holocaust as he reflects upon the 
acclaim given to him after the publication of Maus I.  When Spiegelman depicts 
the scene concerning the publicity/marketing of Maus I, he transforms Artie from 
the adult artist (wearing a mask of Jewish identity, a mouse) to a child in 
search/need of his mother.  This transformation from adult to child remains as 
Artie goes to his psychiatrist, Pavel, who is also another survivor of the 
Holocaust.  As Artie talks to Pavel, he is trying to come to grips with his success 
and his parent’s history: “No matter what I accomplish, it doesn’t seem like much 
compared to surviving Auschwitz” (Maus II 44).  In this moment, the “I” of the 
self merges with the questioning of the artist through the words of the narrator; 
the autobiographical subject is present.  This statement, as it reflects other 
statements made by the children of survivors, specifically recalls his discourse as 
a child to that history and to his parents: “And any victory of my own paled 
before what they had achieved.  When I became aware of myself, I began to 
wonder whether I, in the same circumstances, would have survived” (Mostysser 
7).  This connection to other children of survivors illustrates the ways in which 
Spiegelman’s self-reflexive panel constructs an identity discourse of himself in 
relationship to the Holocaust discourse of his parents.  The link to other second-
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generation survivors is further emphasized by the fact that the visual depiction of 
Artie is as a child.  In the act of illustrating his history, the author/artist depicts the 
narrative “I” as a child—a reference to both being a child of survivors and 
childlike in the face of the overpowering memories of the Holocaust.  It is not 
until after he has left the psychiatrist that Artie again becomes the adult artist.  
This artistic shift reflects the interpretation of the narrative “I” in terms of the 
adult/child duality.   
 The form of the comic book and the choice to draw these characters also 
reflects the bifurcated identity of Spiegelman as adult and child through the 
deceptive simplicity of the form.  The actual drawings of the mice are basically 
simple outlines of the form; Spiegelman generally does not use a lot of shading to 
give his characters “life.”  Instead, the visual depictions of the mice are 
minimized with a few details to give them expressions.  This references the child 
theme of the texts since simplicity is generally associated with children.  Yet, 
Spiegelman will break into this visual occasionally with frames that are very 
detailed like the one depicting Auschwitz at the end of Maus I (157).  In this 
frame, the scenery at the gate to Auschwitz is illustrated with a lot of detail: the 
gate itself appears with the inscription, “Arbeit Macht Frei,” the train cars are 
shadowed, a vicious dog is caught in mid-jump in the foreground, and the guards 
(with their cat faces) look particularly dark and menacing, The detailed frame 
illustrates the complexity of this art form and undermines the simplicity that is 
generally associated with the genre of comic books.  If simplicity is a reference to 
childishness, then the complexity of the images combined with the fact that the 
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passages often occur at transitional moments like entering Auschwitz indicates 
adult sophistication through the interpretation of the artistic self. Thus, the 
illustrations are not “trivial,” but form a visual framework in which to understand 
Spiegelman’s construction of an (child/adult) intergenerational relationship to the 
Holocaust. 
 For the most part, Maus I tends to focus on the biography of Vladek 
Spiegelman; throughout most of the text, Spiegelman visually/textually 
emphasizes Artie’s role as recorder/interviewer.  There are, however, several 
clues that indicate that this is not just Vladek’s story: it is also the story of Art’s 
intergenerational development and coming to terms with his subjectivity as a 
child of the Holocaust.  Maus I begins with a vignette of Art’s childhood.  As he 
roller-skates with his friends, Artie’s skate comes loose and he falls; his friends, 
rather than waiting for him, skate off calling him “Rotten Egg” (Maus I 5).  Artie 
turns to his father for comfort, explaining that his friends have left him.  Vladek 
responds, “Friends?  Your friends?  If you lock them together in a room with no 
food for a week…Then you could see what it is, Friends!” (Maus I 6).  This 
depiction, which occurs as an introduction to the text, indicates the effects that 
Holocaust discourse has on the Spiegelmans’ family dynamics: Artie comes 
searching for sympathy and Vladek, rather than giving that sympathy, compares 
the fact that Artie’s friends left him after he fell with his own horrific memories.   
Vladek’s inability to give sympathy to his son is not unusual for Holocaust 
survivors: “For severely depressed survivors, a preoccupation with anger and 
experienced losses diminished their ability to empathize and help with the 
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problems of their children” (Haas 94).  In this scene, Spiegelman is setting up the 
autobiographical aspect of his work in terms of coming to grips with being a child 
of survivors. The focus of this text is not only telling Vladek’s story and thereby 
ensuring its memory; it is also Spiegelman’s attempt to illustrate the 
psychological effects of the memory of the Holocaust on himself. 
 Even the depiction of Artie as a recorder of his father’s memories is 
double-voiced; certainly the act of recording comprises one aspect of his role 
within this project, yet, it is clear that Spiegelman is seeking, within his father’s 
story, to tell his own.  The texts reflect both voices, even when the focus is upon 
Vladek’s biography: “The omnipresent tape recorder—mediating between Art and 
Vladek, Art and his artistry, Art and the reader—accompanies the telling from 
beginning to end” (Horowitz 281).  Since the biography—Vladek’s testimony of 
the Holocaust—provides the focus for Spiegelman’s attempt to come to terms 
with his role as a second-generation witness, the tape recording of Vladek’s 
memories speaks also of Spiegelman’s role as author (the one who entextualizes) 
and as Artie the narrator (the one who observes and articulates experience).   
Maus I, in particular, focuses upon Artie talking with his father about his 
memories about the Holocaust, with an emphasis on the period before both of his 
parents arrive at Auschwitz.  On the surface of the text, there are clear markers 
between the autobiographical and the biographical; when Spiegelman deviates 
from the recounting of Vladek’s memories, the insertions of self are very clear.  
Spiegelman notes that these movements in the text are meant to break up the 
metaphor of Jews as mice: 
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 I wanted it to become problematic, to have it confound and 
implicate the reader.  I include all sorts of paradoxes in the text—
for instance, the way in which Artie, the mouse cartoonist, draws 
the story of his mother’s suicide, and in his strip (my own Hell 
Planet strip) all the characters are human.  All those movements 
are meant to rupture the metaphor, to render its absurdity 
conspicuous, to force a kind of free fall. (Feinstein 246) 
The use of paradoxes, of rupturing the representation (and Spiegelman’s 
characterization of that as a “free fall”) indicates the sense of liminality that exists 
throughout the texts.  Maus I & II are not meant to be read as a stable construction 
of a unified discourse.  Just as the interweaving of biography and autobiography 
represents intergenerational contact between discourses, the breaking up of the 
imagery within the text forces Spiegelman’s addressees (us as readers) to become 
aware of the essence at the heart of these discourses—that they represent very real 
people. 
While the comic clearly exposes the artificiality of the choice to depict 
Jews as mice by simultaneously presenting passages that serve to remind the 
reader that these characters are human, the insertion of Spiegelman’s previously 
published comic, Prisoner on the Hell Planet, clearly shifts the perspective away 
from Vladek’s telling of the story to Spiegelman’s autobiographical emotions 
about his mother’s suicide, specifically his guilt.  In Children of Job, Alan L. 
Berger sees this autobiographical passage as “a powerful portrayal of the nature of 
second-generation guilt” (65).  Berger delineates the dynamics of second 
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generation guilt in specific ways that differ from those who witnessed the 
Holocaust:  
This guilt needs, however, to be distinguished from the 
phenomenon of survivor guilt.  Among second-generation 
witnesses, guilt arises from several sources.  For example, many 
feel guilty for not having been in the Shoah.  Others feel guilt, 
quite undeservedly, for the fact that their parents suffered during 
the Holocaust.  Still others feel a sense of guilt for not being able 
to comprehend the meaning of their parents’ suffering and their 
own Holocaust legacy. (Children 65)    
Spiegelman’s characterization of himself in Prisoner on Hell Planet certainly 
exhibits feelings of guilt in these panels since he blames himself for his mother’s, 
Anja’s, suicide.  He writes, “I felt nauseous…The guilt was overwhelming” 
(Maus I 102).  The fact that Spiegelman depicts himself as guilty is almost 
incredible since clearly he has his own personal psychological problems to deal 
with: “I was living with my parents, as I agreed to do on my release from the state 
mental hospital three months before” (Maus I 100).  Yet, despite (or because of) 
his problems, he feels responsible for his mother’s suicide.  The original act of 
writing Prisoner from Hell Planet reflects another attempt of Spiegelman’s to 
address trauma in a specific context: a limited “I” of the self.  
 Prisoner on the Hell Planet also illustrates Art’s relationship to the 
Holocaust; throughout this passage, Spiegelman depicts himself in the prisoner 
garb of the Holocaust—the striped pajama-like outfit with a cap.  However, this 
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attempt to make a connection between the events of his mother’s suicide and his 
position in relation to the Holocaust is underscored by his alienation from his 
cultural heritage: “At her funeral Art reveals his own distance from Jewish ritual.  
He recites verses from the Tibetan Book of the Dead while Vladek recites the 
traditional kaddish (prayer for the dead)” (Children 65).  Art, the child of 
survivors, is alienated from the significant portions of his cultural heritage; the 
overwhelming connection that Spiegelman visually makes in terms of his identity 
discourse as Jewish is mainly in terms of Holocaust discourse.  Throughout this 
autobiographical insertion, the reader gains a fuller understanding of Art’s 
relationship to the Holocaust because he, as the author/artist, connects Anja’s 
suicide to Hitler and to the guilt he feels as a child of survivors.   
 The final passage of Prisoner from the Hell Planet also emphasizes Art’s 
role as a child.  Although the reader sees this characterization of Spiegelman as a 
young man of twenty, the ending of this insertion repeats the duality of the 
adult/child dynamic that Spiegelman develops throughout both texts.  His final 
statement is, “You murdered me, Mommy, and you left me here to take the rap” 
(Maus I 103).  This statement, coupled with the Spiegelman’s visual depiction of 
himself in prison, illustrates the way in which Art’s purpose in coming to terms 
with the Holocaust—the resolution of the child/adult dialectic—is linked with the 
memory of his mother.  That she committed suicide without leaving a note 
(combined with the fact that Spiegelman never fully recounts his personal 
memories of her) signifies the ways in which this aspect of Spiegelman’s 
relationship to his family and to his parents’ discourses remains unresolved.  The 
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child searches for his mommy but Anja, as an individual, is never depicted except 
through Vladek’s memories; she remains unreachable to the child aspect of the 
narratorial “I” as it reflects the “I” of self through the interpretive function of the 
authorial/artistic “I.”  
 This search for Anja is a subtext of Maus I, not only in terms of 
Spiegelman’s depiction of his mother’s suicide, but also in terms of Artie’s search 
for her through her diaries.  Throughout Maus I, Artie asks Vladek for his 
mother’s diaries.  As Artie notes, the diaries would be key in telling her side of 
the Holocaust after she and Vladek are separated: “This is where Mom’s diaries 
will be especially useful.  They’ll give me some idea of what she went through 
while you were apart” (Maus I 158).  For Spiegelman, the diaries serve as a key 
point of reviving the essence of his mother.  The diaries would also serve to give 
Anja a voice that is denied her throughout both texts: “Anja’s radical muteness 
underlies Vladek’s loquacious verbosity, reminding the reader that for every 
survivor story that is spoken and heard, another remains unvoiced, forever lost” 
(Horowitz 280).  However, Spiegelman/Artie/Art’s desire to know his mother is 
thwarted by his father.  Anja’s story is irretrievably lost when Vladek burns her 
diaries.   
 The revelation of this destruction at the end of Maus I reveals to Artie-the-
narrator the fact that his search for his mother through her diaries is impossible.  
At this moment, the “I” of the narrator labels Vladek a “murderer” (Maus I 159).  
In his reading of this passage, Joshua L. Charleson sees this naming as 
unfortunate: “the incongruity of using the word ‘murderer’ to describe his father’s 
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burning of his mother’s words and paper, framed against the harrowing panorama 
of mass murder delineated in his father’s history, is too great to be dismissed as 
unfortunate overreaction” (103).   In some ways, this seems to be the reaction that 
Spiegelman is striving for given the comments he makes about the ending of 
Maus I: “Well, I think people were very troubled by the ending of Maus, and this 
was good.  ‘Why is he calling his father a murderer—his father who went through 
all that horrible stuff.’  It catches people up short because there is a tendency to 
see through the eyes of the narrator in any book you read.  I wanted to provide 
some kind of blockage to that kind of transference” (History 153).  Against the 
backdrop of the Holocaust, the destruction of Anja’s diaries may seem 
insignificant, especially since Vladek is also a victim and to accuse him of murder 
tarnishes his role as Holocaust victim.  Yet, Spiegelman’s comment is partially 
misleading; given that the author has written/illustrated a whole book dedicated to 
both his and his father’s memories of and relationships to the Holocaust, is it 
credible that the destruction of memory—of the only part of Anja that survives 
her suicide—would be of little importance to Spiegelman?  The importance of the 
act of writing oneself into existence cannot be lost on Spiegelman.  In addition, 
any hope that Art has of coming to a closure of his own guilt about his mother’s 
suicide is lost in that burning.  Thus, perhaps it is to the murder of Art’s own self, 
the “I” that is attempting to come to terms with his trauma that Spiegelman refers. 
 There is another reason why Spiegelman might wish to catch his readers 
“up short” in our reading of Vladek since it forces into question our willingness to 
assign guilt to a Holocaust survivor.  In this way, Spiegelman is calling attention 
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to an aspect of Arendt’s concept of the Banality of Evil.  Spiegelman’s texts 
generally deal with the Banality of Evil in common ways—the fact that the 
Holocaust was so widespread depended on the larger community’s unwillingness 
to challenge Nazi policy.  Yet, throughout both texts, Vladek’s biography focuses 
on the choices he made in ensuring his and Anja’s survival, including his 
ingenuity in getting privileged positions at Auschwitz that gave him access to 
better food.  For example, Vladek talks of teaching a kapo English in exchange 
for food (Maus II 32).  While Vladek mentions helping his fellow prisoners, it is 
generally based on when he is able to do extra; in the panels I mentioned here, he 
eats the meal rather than trying to save food for his fellow prisoners, although he 
brings shoes to Mandelbaum after he gets good clothing (Maus II 33-34).  These 
are depictions of choiceless choices.  Since survival was arbitrary, most did what 
they could to survive.  If one decided to smuggle food to one’s fellow prisoners, 
there was no guarantee that the food would even make it there, thus lessening the 
odds of survival for the smuggler.  On the biographical level of the text, this 
aligns with the standard refutation of the accusation imbedded in Arendt’s 
concept of the Banality of Evil—that the Jews themselves participated in their 
own destruction.  When Spiegelman calls his father a “murderer,” the term echoes 
Arendt’s accusation as it exists in Holocaust discourse.  By catching the reader up 
short, Spiegelman is forcing us to face the affect of the critique embedded in the 
notion of “sheep to the slaughter.”  In this way, the text places itself within the 
larger discourse of the Holocaust.  It may not be a complete rejection of Arendt’s 
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concept but it does force intergenerational addressees to face the implications of 
Banality of Evil as it is applied to Holocaust victims. 
 The sections in Maus I that deal with Spiegelman’s autobiographical 
attempts to understand and come to terms with the trauma of his childhood are not 
limited to the obvious markers that shift the focus from Vladek’s testimony to 
Spiegelman’s autobiography; indeed, as critic Jeanne C. Ewert notes, 
Spiegelman’s mediation as an author inserts his childhood into Vladek’s story 
through the figure of Richieu, Art’s brother who died during the Holocaust.  
Specifically, Ewert focuses on the scene after Vladek has returned from fighting 
with the Polish army and is learning about the rationing of food (Maus I 75).  
During this narrative, Vladek recounts what is said by Anja and her family; as the 
author, Spiegelman inserts a visual subtext of Richieu misbehaving: “As the 
textual dialogue never mentions the child or his table manners, however, this little 
tableau is likely to go unremarked.  Yet it is crucial to an understanding of one of 
the book’s principle themes: Spiegelman’s anger over his parents’ idolizing of the 
dead Richieu, and his own sense that his care was neglected by his traumatized 
parents” (Ewert 88).  This small passage serves to compress the image of the child 
Richieu with the neglected child Spiegelman remembers himself to be; he 
transfers his emotions onto Richieu and thereby inserts himself into the biography 
of Vladek.6  In this way, the adult artist—the author—is manipulating the text to 
illustrate Art’s—the self outside the text—viewpoint in terms of his frustrations 
about his parents. 
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     Maus II: And Here My Troubles Began seems to mark a transition from 
the concerns of the child Spiegelman to the concerns of the adult Spiegelman, 
specifically in relation to his role as the author/artist of the text.  This is not to say 
that the child does not continue to exist—indeed, the dedication to Richieu 
indicates that the concerns of the child connects Art to his dead brother (who he 
never knew since that child died in the Holocaust)—but that a major emphasis is 
placed on Spiegelman’s self-reflexive questioning of his role as 
interpreter/creator/addressor.  The subtitle of Maus II, “And Here My Troubles 
Began,” indicates a continuation of the double discourses of Vladek’s biography 
and Spiegelman’s autobiography since it refers to both Spiegelman’s self-
reflexive questioning of his “I” as the artist (the troubles of depicting the 
Holocaust) and to Vladek’s articulation of the most threatening times of his 
struggle for survival.  This text focuses on Vladek’s survival in Auschwitz, the 
biggest of the six death camps located in Poland.  The threats that Vladek faces 
before arriving at Auschwitz are more immediate in this environment of mass 
murder even though he is able to work out a position of relative safety.  The title 
of the third chapter, “And Here My Trouble Began” seems to indicate a specific 
context for “Trouble” since Vladek is forced to leave his relatively privileged role 
in Auschwitz during the mass evacuation of the camp.  In this journey, Vladek’s 
ability to protect himself really comes into question.  Yet, the “My” of the subtitle 
indicates Spiegelman’s voice as well as his father’s; as the author and narrator of 
the story, the “My” can be read as an indication of Spiegelman’s troubles.  The 
first chapter gives the reader an idea of the kinds of “Troubles” that Spiegelman is 
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facing as he questions how he should visually represent his wife, Françoise.  As 
Gillian Banner notes, “Françoise insists that it should be a mouse, Art is 
concerned because this does not adequately represent her Frenchness” (153).  The 
dilemma is really brought forward by the fact of Françoise’s conversion to 
Judaism.  But, given the consideration that she is both French and Jewish, 
Spiegelman, the artist “I,” cannot easily decide on how she should be depicted 
because the choice affects the interpretation.  Thus, at the very beginning of the 
second text, Spiegelman is consciously calling the reader’s attention to the issue 
of representation. 
 This self-reflexive questioning of representation is also repeated in the 
chapter “Auschwitz.”  The previous chapter, entitled “Mauschwitz” indicates the 
ways in which Spiegelman is continuing the theme of Mice.  “Auschwitz” begins 
with Spiegelman questioning is role as artist in relationship to the Holocaust.  The 
strongest image of this crisis of representation is the panel of Spiegelman at his 
desk which sits upon a pile of dead mice bodies, which was discussed earlier in 
terms of Spiegelman’s own questioning about his artistic choices.  This 
questioning is further marked by the theme of masking.  Throughout this segment, 
Spiegelman depicts human characters wearing masks drawn from the thematic 
representations that he has developed throughout both texts: Spiegelman, the 
artist, wears a mask of Jewish identity—the face of the mouse—while the 
reporters/marketers wear masks identifying them as Americans (dog), Germans 
(cat), etc.  The only other section where there is a similar image of masking is in 
Vladek’s story when he talks of “passing” as Polish; since anti-Semitism often 
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focused on physical characteristics, it was possible for many whose families had 
assimilated into the mainstream culture to attempt to hide their Jewish identity 
(especially if they had light hair/eyes).  Vladek does this in very limited ways 
(only when he is trying to avoid the round-ups of Jews in Poland).  Spiegelman 
depicts these scenes with Vladek wearing the mask of a pig (his symbol for the 
Polish) (ex. Maus I 125).  One can make the connection between these two 
images of masking since there is a lot of evidence that Spiegelman, as the artist, is 
aware of the visual similarities between the two images.  The image of the mouse 
wearing the pig mask (with the strings visible) is similar to Spiegelman, the 
human artist, wearing a mouse mask that is obviously tied on.  Since the mask is a 
sign of assumed identity (or a limited identity discourse for the human who is 
wearing a mask), the “I” of the author is encoding an illustration that specifically 
limits any reading of the multiple selves to a focus on Jewish identity.  
Yet, the question then arises: Why is Artie wearing a mask?  The wearing 
of a mask, which Spiegelman has constructed as a visual signifier of Jewish 
identity in his rendering of the Holocaust, serves to focus the autobiographical 
aspect of the work in terms of Art’s relationship to the Holocaust and its effects 
on his family.  The reader is denied a full view of this rendering of the self as “I” 
since the overall text only addresses the self outside the text (Art) through the 
limited lens of Jewish identity in terms of the Holocaust.  Even when Spiegelman 
the artist visually transforms the narrator into a child, it is in connection to the 
artist being overwhelmed by the responsibility of his representations of the 
Holocaust and resisting the marketing of his creation—in this moment, the 
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narrator cries for his mother.  The idea that this is a child trying to come to terms 
with his identity as a second-generation witness is compounded with the idea that 
this text is meant to help the “I” of the self (Art) to work out the trauma caused by 
his thick relationship to Holocaust discourse.  Spiegelman notes that during the 
scene with Pavel, his psychiatrist, he also gives Pavel a mask of identity: “I don’t 
know if it’s clear from my drawings.  But in the frames where I am talking to my 
shrink, I have him wear the mask of my father.  It’s not just that he’s the father I 
might have chosen.  It’s a little observation about the psychoanalytic process.  It’s 
all about transference, which is being able to work out the problems one has with 
one’s parents in a safer setting” (History 153).  Here, Spiegelman makes the 
connection between this work (the “I” as author/artist) and his own process of 
recovery (the “I” of self); the act of transference in his real life is retold in the text 
through the “I” of the narrator.  Indeed, Spiegelman seems to refer to the process 
of the MAUS project as an attempt to gain understanding when he says, “I mean, 
I can’t even make any sense out of my relationship with my father…how am I 
supposed to make any sense out of Auschwitz?…of the Holocaust?…” (Maus II 
14).  This indicates that Spiegelman sees this text as more than a simple recording 
of his father’s story.  It is a liminal space where his discourse is at play with the 
discourse of the Holocaust.  The texts are also a “safer setting” for Art to work out 
his own process of healing. 
There are many indications that Art is coming to terms with some of the 
ghosts that have haunted him throughout his life.  One major figure that Art has to 
confront in this text, Maus II, is that of Richieu, his brother who died during the 
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Holocaust.  Richieu’s actual story, however, is told in Maus I.  It is in the second 
text that Spiegelman attempts to come to terms with the image of his dead 
brother.  The dedication of this text to Richieu is combined with a picture of this 
lost son of Vladek and Anja.  It is interesting that Spiegelman would include the 
picture since it is one that has haunted him throughout his childhood.  He writes: 
 “That’s the point.  They didn’t need photos of me in their room…I 
was alive!…The photo never threw tantrums or got into any kind 
of trouble…It was an ideal kid, and I was a pain in the ass.  I 
couldn’t compete.  They didn’t talk about Richieu, but that photo 
was a kind of reproach.  He’d have become a doctor, and married 
a wealthy Jewish girl…the creep.  But at least we could’ve made 
Him go deal with Vladek…It’s spooky having sibling rivalry with 
a snapshot!” (Maus II 15; bolds in text) 
This is the first point where the reader really begins to see how Art viewed 
Richieu.  Clearly, the image of his brother throughout his life is not a happy one 
since, at least in Art’s mind, the parents’ idolized the son who passed away.  Yet, 
as it has already been noted, Spiegelman uses the image of his brother as a 
connection between the child theme of the texts and his relationship to the 
Holocaust by interweaving the autobiography into the biography.  Here, 
Spiegelman compounds the image by putting the two in tension; it is not until Art, 
the “I” of the self, achieves some resolution to his process of recovery and comes 
to terms with his relationship to his family and the nightmare of the Holocaust 
that the image of Richieu no longer haunts him. 
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 At the very end of Maus II, Spiegelman seems to finally come to a 
resolution of his public exploration of the private trauma of the experiences of the 
Holocaust has on his family through the symbolic death of the child theme of the 
narrative.  In the last frame of Vladek talking with Artie, he calls him Richieu: 
“I’m tired from talking, Richieu, and it’s enough stories for now…” (Maus II 
136).  Whether this is really the last thing that Vladek says to his living son or not 
is unclear; even if this is where the story ended, one still has to acknowledge that 
the choice to include this is Spiegelman’s as the artist.  Here, Spiegelman is 
consciously making a connection between himself, the child theme, and the 
brother who was lost in the Holocaust.  This compression of all of these themes 
into the last section of the text indicates the way in which Spiegelman is closing 
the story not just in terms of his father’s death but in terms of Art’s own change: 
the growing up of the child who is haunted by the Holocaust and its effect on his 
family.   
 The final image of the Maus texts is of a Spiegelman gravestone marked 
with the dates of both of his parents (but not of Richieu).  Underneath the stone, 
Spiegelman writes, “Art Spiegelman 1978-1991” (Maus II 136).  In essence, 
Spiegelman is closing his relationship, his process of coming to terms with the 
Holocaust with a symbolic death.  But whose death is it really?  Is it a death at 
all?    In a very specific way, it indicates the death of the “I” as narrator since that 
“I” cannot exist outside of the text.  But what does it mean for the “I” of the 
artist/author who will continue to create or, even more importantly, the 
intergenerational “I” of the self that is coming to terms with his own trauma?  The 
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dates indicate the thirteen years that Spiegelman worked on the project.  Yet, it is 
also the age of a young child—possibly the child image of himself that he has 
developed throughout both texts.  But the resolution of the tensions between the 
adult and child does not necessarily lie with the death of one or the other since 
death also symbolizes change.  The age of thirteen is also symbolic in Jewish 
culture since it is the age when a boy will have his Bar Mitzvah—the ritual that 
symbolizes the transition from the child to the adult.7  The symbolic death of the 
“I” of the narrator becomes the sign of the future for the “I” of the self and, in that 
future, the “I” of the artist/author.  In essence, the process of writing the Maus 
project is the process through which Spiegelman is coming to terms with what he 
views as his child’s relationship to the discourses of his parents and of the 
Holocaust.  The artist consciously creates a child image to symbolize the way in 
which the adult feels small when compared to this history both within his family 
and within his culture.  The symbolic death/change of the “I” of the narrator at the 
end of the project indicates the fact that Art (the self), through his autobiography, 
is coming of age through the artist/author’s act of writing/drawing Maus.  The 
implications of this coming to terms can be seen in Spiegelman’s latest work, In 
the Shadow of No Towers, where he will again periodically take on the mouse 
persona.  The difference in representation between the texts seems to lie in the 
fact that the mouse persona is no longer a contested site/sight.  It is important to 
view Maus I & II as much Spiegelman’s personal connection to the Holocaust as 
it is Vladek’s testimony of the Holocaust.  Through that duality of narrative 
structure, Spiegelman can address his personal trauma as it relates to an event that 
  84 
continues to haunt future generations.  The memory of the Holocaust cannot and 
does not haunt just the survivors; it haunts the children of survivors and, through 
them, other intergenerational witnesses. 
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Notes: 
1The breaking up of the autobiographical self into the three “I”s of self, author, and narrator is 
based on Phillipe Lejeune’s theory of autobiography as presented in On Autobiography.  Although 
the split is usually presented as author/narrator/protagonist in reference to a self outside the text, 
here I have compressed the narrator to include the role of the protagonist in order to highlight the 
differences between the self as author/artist and the self completely outside the text (to whom the 
name refers).  This is especially important since the author/artist only focuses on a limited 
representation of the self outside the text. 
 
2Instances of this acceptance of Maus I & II can be found in Nancy K Miller’s “Cartoons of the 
Self: Portrait of the Artist as a Young Murderer—Art Spiegleman’s Maus” where she explores the 
idea of autobiography based on alterity and in Michael G Levine’s “Necessary Stains: Art 
Spiegelman’s Maus and the Bleeding of History” where he draws on the connections between the 
texts and Spiegelman’s status as a second generation witness. 
 
3This view is supported by Caroline Wiedmer who points out: “the crises of self-representation is 
resolved precisely through the transformation of a private, subconscious narrative into a pragmatic 
public one, where the stress is shifted from the problems of suppression of images to the problems 
of expressing these same images”(30). 
 
4As Dominick LaCapra recognizes: “Working through trauma involves the effort to articulate or 
rearticulate affect and representation in a manner that may never transcend, but may to some 
viable extent counteract, a reenactment, or acting out of that disabling association” (Writing 42). 
 
5Genre as a way of understanding the “I” of the author can also be seen in the way that the form 
necessitates a familiar visual language in order to be effective.  In his presentation “Comix: 101” 
on February 2nd 2006, Spiegelman noted that many visuals use stereotypes in order to work 
because one cannot create a visual entirely devoid of social meaning and have the reader relate to 
it. 
 
6It is also a moment where the character of his brother comes to life (revivification) in a way that 
is not possible through Vladek’s biography alone. 
 
7Hamida Bosmajian in “The Orphaned Voice in Art Spiegelman’s Maus” also explores the 
connection between the age 13 and its role in Jewish culture. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMAGINING INTO THE VOID: REVIVIFICATION IN SKIBELL’S  
BLESSING ON THE MOON 
The ethics of the twentieth century opens with Nietzsche’s overcoming of 
resentment.  Against the impotence of the will with respect to the past, 
against the spirit of revenge for what has irrevocably taken place and can 
no longer be willed, Zarathustra teaches men to will backward, to desire 
everything to repeat itself.  The critique of Judeo-Christian morality is 
completed in our century in the name of a capacity fully to assume the 
past, liberating oneself once and for all of guilt and bad conscience.  The 
eternal return is above all victory over resentment, the possibility of 
willing what has taken place, transforming every “it was” into “thus I 
wanted it to be”—amor fati. 
 
Auschwitz also marks a decisive rupture in this respect.  Let us imagine 
repeating the experiment of Nietzsche, under the heading “The Heaviest 
Weight,” proposes in The Gay Science.  “One day or night,” a demon 
glides beside a survivor and asks: “Do you want Auschwitz to return again 
and again, innumerable times, do you want every instant, every single 
detail of the camp to repeat itself for eternity, returning eternally in the 
same precise sequence in which they took place?  Do you want this to 
happen again, again and again for eternity?”  This simple reformulation of 
the experiment suffices to refute it beyond all doubt, excluding the 
possibility of its even being proposed. 
    --Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz 
 
 
 In Admitting the Holocaust: Collected Essays, Lawrence Langer writes, 
“The drama of fate reminds us that man, should he so choose, can die for 
something; the drama of doom, the history of the Holocaust, reveals that whether 
they choose or not, men died for nothing” (157).  If Joseph Skibell were to 
respond to Langer’s remark, he might say, “Probably…but what happens 
afterwards?”  In Blessing on the Moon, Skibell’s intergenerational response to the 
Holocaust, the story opens with an Einsatzgruppen killing Chaim Skibelski, 
Skibell’s protagonist and namesake, along with the other Jews of the village.  The 
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story truly begins when Chaim emerges from the mass grave, dead.    Unlike Art 
Spiegelman who interweaves his autobiography as a second-generation witness 
around and through his father’s first-generation story of survival, Skibell’s self-
reflexive positioning as an intergenerational witness, specifically that of a third-
generation witness whose great grandfather and at least seventeen other family 
members were killed in the Holocaust, is marked by silent rather than spoken 
testimony.  It is precisely into this absence that Skibell writes.   Skibell’s use of 
magical realism as a tool to revivify his great grandfather functions as a liminal 
space since it is in the impossibility—the unknown and unknowable—that Chaim 
exists.  Through Chaim, without whom Skibell himself would not exist, Skibell 
invokes discourses in conflict (death and life); in that sense, the text functions as 
Skibell’s attempt to resolve the ongoing impact of the Holocaust by questioning 
the nature of forgiveness, the banality of evil, and redemption through a return to 
cultural heritage. 
  Unlike second-generation witnesses who directly experience narratives of 
the Holocaust from their parents, Skibell’s position as an intergenerational 
witness is marked by a different kind of closeness—the very real and felt absence 
of a large portion of his family.  The presence of this absence has a profound 
affect of second- and third-generation witnesses that creates a different kind of 
closeness to the event.  In “Making Sense of the World,” Andrew Beierle quotes 
Skibell as saying “When I was growing up, my grandfather and two of his 
brothers were living in my town. They never talked at all about these people, and 
as a normally sensitive child, I picked up on it. That silence was very palpable for 
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me. As a child, I assumed that there was some sort of shame in it. Instead, I 
realized later that it was just horrible, horrible grief” (para 11).  Skibell’s 
closeness, even as it is also marked by the silence about the Holocaust that is 
common in many Jewish families and communities, is linked specifically at the 
site of absence and the grief that makes that site’s presence felt.  In her discussion 
of second-generation literature from those who both survived and those who 
perpetrated the Holocaust, Erin McGlothlin notes: 
Just as the pains cannot be traced to their cause, the trauma of the second 
generation is essentially divorced from the Holocaust experience that 
engendered it.  The signifier remains, but it is unable to locate its referent, 
resulting in the truncated relationship between experience and effect.  For 
the children of survivors, this experience is one of unintegrated trauma and 
rupture in familial continuity; for the children of the perpetrators it is the 
family’s unintegratable history of violation and brutality.  (10)1 
Since the referent—the real person who was killed—is absent from the 
intergenerational relationship, a rupture occurs at the site of that absence.  With 
the emotional weight passed to Skibell from his grandfather, that absence 
becomes the signifier loosed from its moors.  The “unintegratable” aspect of the 
absence becomes the site of the liminal space between Skibell’s discourse and that 
of his murdered family. 
 The question then becomes how does the intergenerational witness resolve 
the two discourses, especially if one is marked by its void?  The answer is through 
imagination: “Their imagination of the Holocaust past of the parents becomes a 
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way for them to reconnect to the referent of the mark and thus to try to establish a 
link between experience and effect.  In this way, the writers not only investigate 
the reference point of their invisible inscriptions, but they in turn actively inscribe 
as well, making the ways the Holocaust has impacted them” (McGlothlin 10).  By 
writing into the absence, intergenerational witnesses are working through the 
contact between discourses.  Thus the narrative becomes the resolution of the 
differend—a way of acknowledging the silence and its meaning through the new 
addressor.  In a later passage of his interview with Beierle, Skibell notes, “I grew 
up with all these demonic Nazi images, but in the process of writing this book, I 
discovered that behind this bank of demons was this group of ghosts—literal 
ghosts, my grandfather’s sisters and parents. The easy iconography of the 
Holocaust, which is everywhere today, has kind of blotted out the presence of 
these very human figures, these people. My relatives” (para. 13).  In finding the 
presence of his ancestors, in revivifying them at the point of rupture, Skibell’s 
new role as an addressor is fundamentally based on the very human nature of his 
ancestors.  In that way, Skibell’s discourse on the Holocaust gains in complexity 
since he moves beyond “the easy iconography of the Holocaust.”  Through 
revivification, a community of memory is created; as a new addressor, Skibell 
offers a bridge through his imagination. 
 Given the lack of direct contact between the discourse of the Holocaust 
and the discourse of an intergenerational witness such as Skibell, imagination 
functions where direct memory cannot.  As Avishai Margalit notes, “But 
imagination means two things: the ability to conjure images, and thereby to 
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consider things that are not present but that exist or existed; and the ability to 
fantasize unreal things.  Memory is constrained by the past.  Imagination, in the 
fanciful sense of the word, is not” (140).  It is the freedom of imagination that 
makes the intergenerational witness dangerous, especially if one is not tied to an 
ethical, close relationship to those that “existed.”  In using imagination to create a 
community of memory, one must be ethically tied to the first addressor.  Yet, the 
fact remains that in writing into absence, the only narrative that is possible is one 
based on imagination.  As Eugene Arva, in Writing the Vanishing Real: 
Hyperreality and Magical Realism, notes, “Signification [of reality] becomes 
particularly important when its object is the unrepresentable, a reality of extreme 
events which, by their traumatic nature, resist representation. Signification in such 
a case needs to be understood not as an imitation of reality (mimesis) but, rather, 
as its reconstruction, as its signification by imagination, or re-presentation” (67).  
Since the addressee is compelled to become an addressor, the author must use the 
discourses available to him or her.  In re-presenting reality, the author is enabled 
to re-inscribe the absence so that it functions not as a discourse of void but as a 
means towards the resolution of discourses in contact. 
 One approach in which to understand the ways the discourses of life and 
death, including the fact that Skibell’s life is in some ways limned by the death of 
his great grandfather and members of his extended family, are combined is 
through Lawrence Langer’s idea of deathlife narrative.  For Langer, deathlife is a 
way to characterize Holocaust survival and the sentiment of, as Langer quotes 
Primo Levi, “living but without being alive” (xii).  Deathlife, for some Holocaust 
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survivors, refers to the feeling that they experienced death at the camps even 
though they survived; Langer continues the development of this idea by quoting 
Jorge Semprun’s autobiography: “that I have not escaped death, but passed 
through it.  Rather: that it has passed through me.  That I have, in a way, lived 
through it” (xii).  For those who lived in the camps, they were always surrounded 
by death—of others and by the constant threat to their own lives.  The trauma of 
that experience is not one that passes since deathlife emerges post-Holocaust—
they return to their lives but always changed, knowing that their lives were 
arbitrarily chosen for survival and come at the cost of the dead.  In addition, every 
event of their lives is limned by the past and overtakes the present at any given 
moment as something happens that brings forth their experiences in the 
Holocaust.   
On the surface, the idea of intergenerational deathlife narratives seems 
incongruous given the traumatic experiences encompassed within Langer’s use of 
the term.2  But, in looking at intergenerational responses as a way of creating a 
living community of memory—of revivifying those who died—in a way that 
connects them to our lived experiences, there are aspects of the term that are apt, 
especially for writers like Skibell and Foer whose narratives exist within the void 
created by the deaths of their families.  The characters, with their self-reflexive 
ties to each respective author, that they create emerge in death—the real deaths of 
members of their families.  In Skibell’s narrative, his protagonist dies at the 
beginning of the text.  The rest of the narrative follows his journey as one of the 
dead.  Part of Foer’s text (which will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
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chapter) creates the history of the shetl his grandfather escaped from just before 
the Nazi’s destroyed it—a creation made possible only through its absence.  The 
other part of Foer’s text creates the deathlife of the perpetrator—the one who 
makes a choiceless choice that is buried in silence.  For both authors, deathlife 
potentially invokes the continued presence of the Holocaust in our world through 
the liminal space of the imagination that creates life because of death: “Exposed 
to mass death, the writer runs up against the abyssal absence of foundation which 
conditions his language; this experience is the means through which the silence of 
the dead comes to speech in its impossibility, the silence which is told to us by 
‘every word.’  The demand of thinking after Auschwitz would be above all to 
expose and bear witness to this silence at the heart of language” (Cohen 108).  In 
Skibell’s text, the historical death of his great grandfather is the imaginative 
moment of the life of his character: “It all happened so quickly.  They rounded us 
up, took us out to the forests.  We stood there, shivering, like trees in uneven 
rows, and one by one we fell.  No one was brave enough to look.  Guns kept 
cracking in the air.  Something pushed into my head.  It was hard, like a rock.  I 
fell” (3).  The first lines of Skibell’s text depict his great grandfather’s death; the 
rest of the text is the journey of Skibell’s revivified grandfather. 
In reviving his great grandfather as the character of Chaim Skibelski, 
Skibell refuses to allow the reader to forget that he is dead.  Throughout the novel, 
the visible signs of his death are constantly invoked—the bullet holes, the endless 
bleeding, the brokenness of his body and yet “Chaim exhibits most of the 
characteristics of the living: he thinks, feels, worries, wonders, acts” (Rosenfield 
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15).  Yet, Skibell cannot imaginatively escape the death of his great grandfather 
and, thus, his great grandfather is tied to this world through Skibell’s imagination.  
As Janet Burstein notes, “A ‘dead and mutilated Jew,’ he haunts this world, 
wishing to leave but unable to let it go.  He cannot be healed or restored to life, 
and before he is released into forgetfulness, he will need to wander the earth, 
listening to the sorrows of others both alive and dead, asking unanswerable 
questions about forgiveness and responsibility” (125).  In some ways, Chaim 
needs to walk this earth because of what was done to him; indeed, it seems as if 
many of the victims are doomed to this fate in the text because of the violation of 
their deaths.  Skibell talks about this in his interview with Beierle, “In the 
cartography of the Jewish afterlife, there is something called gehenna, which is 
where you purify your soul from whatever damage has been done to it over the 
course of your life,” Skibell says. “In some ways I think that is where Chaim is” 
(Beierle para 18).  While the damage can be self-inflicted, Skibell offers the idea 
that damage has been done not only to the soul of his great grandfather but also in 
the world. 
In leaving the pit where he and the rest of the Jewish community are 
buried, Chaim chooses to return to his home.  In part, this is because he does not 
yet realize he is dead and, joyful of his survival, he returns home almost 
instinctively only to find that the townspeople have already taken their 
belongings, homes, and their lives in the community.  For instance, the family that 
moves into Chaim’s household act as if the house is rightfully theirs: “They are 
people I know, people I have traded with.  Eggs sometimes, bread, linens, goods 
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of this sort.  ‘Look how nice everything is,’ the Mama says to her sons, clapping 
her hands in delight.  ‘So beautiful, Mamuśku, so beautiful,’ a daughter says, but 
she is the one they never pay attention to, and the eldest son says over her, ‘A 
toast!  To our home and our table!’  The father’s face beams with pride” (Skibell 
6).  On a basic level, this scene illustrates the banality of evil—the way in which 
individuals worked with the Nazis for personal gain.  Here, they are focused 
solely on their comfort and find easy ways to justify their actions.  In talking with 
his daughter, the only one who can see Chaim and realizes what has happened to 
their neighbors, the father says, “Blubbering over some silly people who’d do the 
same to us—yes, Ola, to us—to your mother and to your father and to you—given 
half the chance!” (Skibell 32).  Whatever moral implications exist for the choices 
the family has made, the father refuses to acknowledge them—or, he defies them 
openly when he finally becomes aware of Chaim’s presence in the house.  In 
Schorsch’s discussion of the idea of hauntings in literature and within Polish 
culture, he notes that “not all who saw Jewish ghosts gained positive self-
transformation from the experience.  Many resented (and resent) the haunting 
specter precisely for its accusations” (152).  As Schorsch notes, the father only 
thinks of the ghost in relationship to money—a tie, perhaps, to his own guilty 
conscience but ultimately shallow. 
This scene where Chaim first witnesses the usurpation of his former life 
works to illustrate the complicity backed by greed that motivated some to work 
with the Nazis in rounding up Jews; certainly, we cannot say that the Serafinskis 
are faced with a choiceless choice although by saying that the Jews would 
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persecute the non-Jews if given a chance seeks to render his decision as one of 
self-preservation.  The scene also illustrates an historical truth following the war 
when survivors went back to their homes to find their neighbors living in them—
and unwilling to return to the survivors their property.3  In mirroring Chaim’s 
return to his village to the tales told by other survivors, Skibell is also grounding 
his text with other survivor stories.  In this way, Skibell’s magical realism is 
grounded on historical fact—one that is easily recognized by those who are 
familiar with the Holocaust.  It also illustrates an aspect of the deathlife narrative; 
in returning back to their homes, many survivors faced a kind of legal death in 
their communities (and in the larger society) and were unable to reclaim their 
former lives (although the possibility of “returning to normal” was unlikely given 
the trauma of their experiences).   
In spite of the fact that his family home is inhabited by others, Chaim 
seeks to find some measure of familiarity by staying in the house.  He does so by 
assuming the familial roles from his pre-death life with the only still living person 
able (or willing) to see him, Ola.  Indeed, Ola, a “thirteen or fourteen year old,” 
becomes a surrogate daughter and, more disturbingly, lover/wife for Chaim 
(Skibell 23).  Close to death herself from illness, Ola rejects her family and 
chooses to try to care for herself.  The fact that she is unable to do so is evident by 
the appalling conditions of her room.  Her family, alienated from her by her 
critique of the acquiescence to the deaths of their neighbors, offer only minimal 
care for their dying child.  Once Ola sees Chaim (and not just the blood from his 
wounds that stains the house), he takes care of her:  
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Quietly, I open the door to her room.  She is curled up in 
the rocking chair, still, her eyes red, her cheeks drawn, sucking on 
a thumb encrusted with her own filth. 
 “You mustn’t,” I say, removing her hand from her mouth.  I 
rub it with the hot cloth, wiping the dirt away. (Skibell 35) 
In this moment, Ola is completely a child, sucking her thumb.  And, while Chaim 
completely cleans her body, this part of the scene is nonsexual—he even dresses 
her in his daughter’s clothes.  However, the lines drawn between looking at her as 
a surrogate daughter and a lover become blurred by the end of the chapter when 
Ola goes from her bed to where Chaim is sleeping in his daughter Sabina’s bed.  
Although this is not the moment when Chaim and Ola do have sex, it does 
indicate the dual nature in which Chaim sees Ola. 
 The scene where Chaim and Ola do have sex poses a dilemma for the 
readers.  As Marita Grimwood notes, “The fact that his [Chaim’s] relationship 
with Ola becomes sexual is something that troubles him, as he reflects, ‘never 
while I lived did I place myself in such compromising circumstance!’” (96).  By 
framing his concern for himself—that the act is compromising, not morally 
wrong—Chaim’s reaction is concerning, especially since the reader might believe 
that Ola is still a child.  However, Skibell immediately calls that interpretation 
into question when Chaim, immediately after their encounter, he goes to the 
garage to search for the portraits of his daughters (again, building a connection 
between Ola and his view of her as a kind of daughter).  While there, he breaks a 
piece of glass, awakening Łukasz, his porter, and Łukasz’s niece.  In this scene, 
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Skibell calls attention to the slippage of time: “The sight of her confuses me.  She 
was no more than a small child the last time I saw her, playing in the timber yard, 
a day or two before my execution.  Now, I’m astonished to see a young woman 
with a heavy bosom elevated by two crossed arms, which she uses to pin the 
blanket in its place” (54).  Because he is dead, Chaim loses his sense of time.  
This scene also indicates that Ola is probably not as young as when she is first 
introduced in the text.  But, Skibell refuses to allow this scene to absolve Chaim 
of the wrongness of his action by paralleling Chaim with Łukasz, who takes this 
moment to make a sexual advance on his niece.  The violation of the Uncle’s 
actions towards his niece (who he took in as a young child) mirror Chaim’s 
violation of his and Ola’s relationship since he acts as her father and caregiver 
through the bulk of their relationship in the text. 
 So, what is gained by first having the reader believe that Chaim has 
committed an act of pedophilia only to suggest that Ola may, at that time, been a 
young woman, and then continue to reprimand the act by paralleling it with a 
similar violation of familial-type roles?  Grimwood suggests that the relationship 
between Ola and Chaim must be contextualized with the rest of the text: “This 
relationship’s transgressiveness, however, is a feature that it shares with other 
aspects of Chaim’s afterlife, such as the rabbi’s transformation into a distinctly 
non-kosher crow, which then steals a wedding ring, and pecks out a man’s eyes” 
(96).  There is a difference, however, in the motives behind each act.  The Rebbe 
attacks a man (probably a Nazi administrator and not a soldier given the fact he is 
wearing a homburg) as he “congratulates our town on its spirit of heroic 
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cooperation” (Skibell 9).  The attack can be read as revenge.  In addition, the 
Rebbe uses the theft of the wedding ring to show Chaim his reflection in the 
water.  The motives for Chaim’s actions are much more banal.  Like other 
intergenerational writers, Skibell makes his character deeply flawed in an effort to 
both humanize (not idealize) the character and to subtly hint that the evils one 
commits, both large and small, have motives that arise out of very common  and 
often selfish desires. 
 Skibell provides a more prominent commentary on the banality of evil 
when Chaim returns to the pit where his neighbors are buried after Ola’s death.  
The return to the pit marks the end of Chaim’s  pretending at a return to his life 
before his death.  As Pamela Stadden in her article, “Narrative Techniques and 
Holocaust Literature,” notes, “Up until Ola’s death, Skibelski is basically 
stationary, living within his old home, caring for the ailing girl.  The first time he 
visits the grave, he converses with the other dead Jews.  The second time he 
returns, he sets them free” (156).  Like Chaim, his neighbors occupy the same 
liminal space—both dead but not yet in the world to come.  From the beginning of 
the text, Chaim wonders why he is not in the world to come.  The fact that all the 
townspeople (and, as we will see later, all the Jews) inhabit the same space—
gehenna—indicates a larger sense damage and a vaster idea of the soul that is 
damaged by the Holocaust.  As Alan Berger, in “Unclaimed Experience: Trauma 
and Identity in Third Generation Writing about the Holocaust,” remarks 
“Traditional piety and belief in the world to come (olam ha’ba) have been 
shattered by the catastrophe” (154).  The fact that this shattering is not singular 
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indicates that Skibell’s self-reflexive text evokes not just his family history but a 
larger sense of the community. 
Although it is technically the Rebbe who frees the rest of the town’s 
murdered Jews, the fact that Chaim found his way out of the pit and left the rest of 
his neighbors is not forgotten.  While the first greetings are filled with rejoicing 
from the freedom of being buried in the grave, the joy is edged with horror since 
it is clear that whatever damage Chaim’s death did to his body, his neighbors are 
in worse shape from their years underground, decomposing.  All of the people, 
including Chaim, bear the visible and visceral signs of their deaths—all are 
suffering.  Yet, there is a felt difference between the townspeople and Chaim.  As 
the group, led by the Rebbe, begin their march (a supernatural reflection of the 
death marches at the end of the war), one of Chaim’s friends confronts him: 
“Then why did you leave me in the pit?” 
I am startled by his question.  “Pardon me?” I say. 
“I must know” 
“Is this an accusation?” 
“You just ran, didn’t you?” 
“I ran.  Of course, I ran!  What else was I to do?” 
“Without thinking to stop or help anybody else!” 
“Keep your voice down,” I implore him, stealing a look into the 
sleeping field. 
“But how could you just leave us there?”    
“You were dead,” I whisper.  (Skibell 92) 
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In this moment, we see the aspect of Hannah Arendt’s idea of the banality of 
evil—the accusation that, even though Chaim himself is dead as well, he reacts to 
save himself and leaves his neighbors to suffer.  Thematically, this accusation 
allows us to see how the banality of evil operates, especially given the fact that, 
despite his flaws, the reader tends to view Chaim sympathetically: “the author 
presents a very likeable profile of his great grandfather.  Chaim Skibelski is a 
genuinely good man.  So much so, we feel the injustice of his murder and his 
years of pain in the afterlife” (Stadden 155).  The fact that the reader relates to 
this character is integral for the discussion of the banality of evil to work in the 
text in that it cannot simply be abjected onto the figure of the Nazi (in whatever 
form it appears). 
 The fact that the idea of the banality of evil is attached to Chaim both in 
his relationship with Ola and in his abandonment of his neighbors and friends 
does not mean that this discussion is solely centered on Chaim.  When Chaim 
becomes separated from the group, a German soldier captures him: “A young 
soldier points his rifle at my face.  ‘One step more,’ he says, ‘and I’ll kill you 
again’” (Skibell 98).  The soldier quickly takes the power in the situation, acting 
as he did during the war.  This time, however, Chaim chooses to fight back—
angry at the soldier and at God for allowing this to happen when he’s already 
dead.  The moment becomes horribly comic when Chaim takes the gun and hits 
the soldier in the chest; unfortunately, for the soldier, he, too, is dead having been 
decapitated by a partisan with an axe.  Unable to reattach the head to the body, 
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which has since run off, Chaim ends up carrying the head with him.  At first the 
talking head attacks Chaim, specifically his Jewishness, for his role in the war: 
He smiles grimly.  “I’m not prepared to argue the theoretics of 
warfare here and now with a dead Jew.”  He spits this last word off 
his tongue as though it were an annoying scrap of tobacco.  “if it 
weren’t for you,” he says, “I’d still be at the conservatory, working 
on my compositions.”  He stretches his lower lip into a frown. 
“If it weren’t for me?” 
“For your people.”  (Skibell 103) 
Unable at this moment to recognize his culpability, the head follows the 
propagandist scapegoating that was used to justify his actions.  Thus, he denies 
the evil of his actions by placing them onto the Other.   
As readers looking at this from what we know now about the history, there 
is little sympathy for the head’s statement at this moment.  Skibell, however, 
wants to avoid easy judgments; if we see the head as solely evil, we miss the 
message inherent in the theme of the banality of evil that runs through the text.  
One night, the head begins to be self-reflective, finally acknowledging the horror 
of his actions: “I have done things, Herr Jude, during the last days of my life, that 
I never dreamed possible, things which, as a child or even as a young man, I 
would not have believed myself capable.  I don’t need to detail them to you.  You 
are only too familiar with the kind of thing I mean” (Skibell 116).  As the head, 
without its body, seems to be dying (again), he voices his awareness of what he 
did and recognizes Chaim’s victimization.4  Indeed, the head states he has a 
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purpose in picking out Chaim from the other members of the group: “Perhaps 
because you were less rotted than the others, I was able to persuade myself that I 
recognized you from that morning.  I needn’t explain, I’m sure which morning I 
mean.  Perhaps it is foolish of me, Herr Jude, to believe that I killed you.  But I 
do.  There.  It’s been said.  And is it so unreasonable an assumption?” (Skibell 
117).  Chaim has reason to be skeptical of this statement, given the threat that the 
head first gave when he was in a position of power and the fact that this 
confession comes when the head is dying.  The fact that the head refers to him as 
“Herr Jude” also indicates a slippage in the referent; Chaim could be the one he 
shot or a representative figure for those that the German soldier killed.   
This scene where the head of the German soldier asks for Chaim’s 
forgiveness specifically recalls Simon Wiesenthal’s testimony of his time in a 
concentration camp in Lemberg, Poland.  Beryl Lang, in his book, The Future of 
the Holocaust: Between History and Memory, summarizes the narrative: 
Karl, an SS man, knew that he was dying.  He had asked  the nurse 
to bring to him in secret one of the Jewish laborers—for (as he 
recounted it to Wiesenthal) he had on his conscience an atrocity 
committed by his unit on the Russian front.  After capturing a 
small town there, members of the unit (Karl among them) had 
herded a number of Jews into a house which was then locked.  
Some of the Jews driven into the house had been forced to carry 
cans a gasoline with them; the soldiers then threw grenades into 
the house—and the carnage that resulted was what one could have 
  103 
predicted (and  what, indeed, had been intended).  Karl, tormented 
by this act, had asked the nun to bring one of the Jewish laborers 
so that he could now, before he died, ask forgiveness.  (131) 
The similarity in the story lines is unmistakable, even with the significant 
difference that while the head believes he is talking to his victim (or, more likely, 
one of his victims), Karl seeks out a representative figure for his apology.5  This is 
no small point of discrepancy.  Wiesenthal denies Karl that forgiveness by leaving 
the room in silence: 
How, Wiesenthal asked himself, could he forgive someone for 
harm that a person had done to someone else—which was exactly 
what the SS man was requesting (since he had not been directly 
responsible for anything that Wiesenthal himself had suffered)?  Is 
it only the injured person who may decide whether to grant or 
withhold forgiveness?  What would have been the moral value of 
Wiesenthal’s words even if he did tell Karl that he forgave him for 
the terrible act he had taken part in against other people, people 
who, because of that act, could not now or ever speak for 
themselves?  (Lang 132) 
The question of whether forgiveness is even possible is complicated in 
Wiesenthal’s case since he is not the direct victim of Karl’s actions.  In Skibell’s 
text, the dilemma of being asked for forgiveness is potentially avoided, although 
the fact that Chaim is addressed in a general, rather than specific name, indicates 
the potential that this scene can be understood as a more direct parallel to 
  104 
Wiesenthal’s experience.  Yet, however one chooses to interpret the scene, 
Skibell’s focus on the issue of forgiveness poses a dilemma in the text—both for 
Chaim and, potentially, for his readers. 
 The obligations surrounding forgiveness are complicated as one begins to 
examine Jewish notions of forgiving.  In the Ethics of Memory, Avishai Margalit 
discusses the genealogy of forgiving and forgetting:  
The Bible uses the Hebrew word salakh, meaning forgive, only for 
God’s forgiveness.  It does not use it for one person’s forgiving 
another, as is the case in modern Hebrew.  The prevalent word 
used in the Bible for the latter purpose is nasa, meaning ‘to bear’ 
or ‘to carry.’  This term is interesting because it presents an 
alternative picture of the sin as a heavy burden.  The forgiver 
shares the sinner’s burden of sin.  (186) 
In Skibell’s text, we see a direct image of this relationship through the fact that 
Chaim comes to carry the head once it has been separated from its body.  It is an 
unwieldy, demanding, pathetic burden—one that Chaim cares for even as he 
wants to punish it.  When the head does ask for forgiveness, Chaim responds, 
“‘Little head,’ I say, ‘when you killed me, you took everything.  My home, my 
wife, my children.  Must you have my forgiveness as well?’” (Skibell 117).    It is 
neither forgiveness nor the direct refusal of it, as when Wiesenthal leaves Karl 
without saying anything.  Rather, the statement potentially indicates the obligation 
of the request—a “Must.”  In his further discussion of forgiveness, Margalit 
discusses Maimonides statement about forgiveness, “This is a forceful exhortation 
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to forgive, which places an obligation on the person who was wronged to forgive 
the offender when the latter is sincerely repentant.  The passage gives the 
impression that forgiveness if not an act of loving kindness but a moral 
obligation” (194).  Wiesenthal’s situation poses a different kind of quandary 
because he is not the direct victim although it appears that Karl is sincere in 
asking for forgiveness.  Chaim feels this as an obligation—one that is painful to 
grant.  Skibell never allows the reader to see whether Chaim forgives the head but 
he continues to carry the head as a burden until he eventually (and 
anticlimactically) loses it.  Thus, we return to the idea of the ethics of forgiveness: 
“I shall argue that the image of covering up is conceptually, psychologically, and 
morally preferable to the picture of blotting out—that it is better to cross out than 
to delete the memories of an offense.  In short, I argue that forgiveness based on 
disregarding the sin rather than forgetting it” (Margalit 197).  Once he is able to 
disregard the sin, he leaves the burden of the head behind—thus healing some of 
the damage that was done to his soul. 
 The episode encompassing the head and Chaim’s personal conflict 
represents only one very small part of what the Holocaust represented—it does 
not speak to the industrialization, the bureaucratic organization that enabled mass 
genocide.  The next scene in the text forces the reader to confront the larger scale 
of the Holocaust.  Once returned to his group through the help of the Rebbe, the 
community continues its march and comes across the Hotel Amfortas.  There, 
they are faced with a choice: cross the river to the seductive comforts of the hotel 
or continue on their journey.  The Rebbe, who has acted as a guide, now 
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disappears; this is a choice that the community needs to make for themselves.  
When the boy, Pillow, crosses the river, his wounds are magically healed in the 
water.  Seeing that, the rest of the community hurries to cross the river.  Shedding 
the physical reminders of their deaths, the community goes into the hotel and find 
themselves reunited with their families.  This scene marks a deliberate departure 
from the intergenerational deathlife narrative that Skibell uses through the bulk of 
the text.  By restoring the Jews to life (and they can now breathe, taste, and eat), 
the presence of their death seemingly is washed away by the river. 
 The episode at the Hotel Amfortas forces the reader to face the appalling 
question: “How can one trick those who’ve experienced the horrors of the 
Holocaust to go willingly to their deaths again?”  The hotel is a trap; even as the 
staff feeds and cares for its Jewish guests, they are scheduling them for “the 
steam.”  The horrific truth is that the staff is killing their guests and baking 
them—the hotel is a parallel for the concentration camp.  If this text is meant to 
represent gehenna than the damage that the book is addressing is not just the 
damage done to Chaim’s soul but to the soul of the world.  The fact that the 
Holocaust continues to exist, continues to repeat itself in this space that limns 
reality speaks to the affect of the Holocaust itself.  The absolute wrongness of the 
Holocaust breaks through reality and such an event leaves a mark.  One could 
certainly argue that Skibell might continue to feel the affect of the Holocaust 
through the absence that exists in his family.  That Chaim (Skibell’s self-reflexive 
link to the Holocaust) is the center of this liminal space of the story marks 
Skibell’s perspective that the Holocaust also continues to exist, that this wrong 
  107 
transcends its physical manifestation, indicating the intergenerational affect that 
centers the response.  As in the excerpt from Agamben at the beginning of this 
chapter, Skibell’s purpose in depicting the Holocaust as an event that continues to 
cycle is not an attempt to depict Chaim as reliving the event in order to gain 
agency or control over what occurred.  The seductive nature of the hotel Amfortas 
as a means to lure the survivors back into the cycle resists that formulation.  
While the Jews certainly had a choice to not cross the river, the bureaucracy of the 
hotel—the unseeable nature of the trap—does not give Chaim control.  Instead, 
Skibell’s depiction of the affective cycle of the holocaust invokes what Agamben 
later remarks in discussing Primo Levi: “And yet for [Levi], the impossibility of 
wanting Auschwitz to return for eternity has another, different root, one which 
implies a new, unprecedented ontological consistency of what has taken place.  
One cannot want Auschwitz to return for eternity, since in truth it has never 
ceased to take place; it is always already repeating itself” (101).  While one may 
(and should) argue that the experience of repetition is very different for Levi as 
opposed to the intergenerational witness, the cycle of repeating the Holocaust in 
Skibell’s text speaks to the affect of the Holocaust being felt through 
generations—deathlife for the intergenerational witness speaks to the idea that the 
horror exists in present day life.  In the process of revivification, the 
intergenerational witness re-presents the Holocaust.6 
 Unlike the scene where the head asks for Chaim’s forgiveness, there is not 
sense of remorse at the Hotel Amfortas.  In truth, is any really possible?  The 
cycle that recreates the concentration camp is also the cycle that allows the 
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perpetrators to continue with the killing, even past their original deaths.  The 
damage to the soul exists everywhere.  As horrific as this repetition is, it also 
structurally mirrors the role of the intergenerational witness: “As Dina Wardi 
describes in the therapeutic discussion of the second generation, Memorial 
Candles, this repetition of the original event represents the unconscious role the 
second-generation survivor plays in the family.  He is forced to compulsively 
“return to the Holocaust,” to relive it in order to once again survive it and to 
attempt to come to terms with and understand his parent’s feelings of loss, guilt, 
and suffering” (McGlothlin 61-62).  In using the Hotel Amfortas as a 
representation of the camp experience, Skibell invokes both the horror and the 
distance of the intergenerational witness.  In some ways, the seduction of the hotel 
is meant as a means for allowing the intergenerational witness entry into the event 
by drawing on a more accessible representation.  In his discussion of magical 
realism, Eugene Arva notes, “Magical realism constitutes an attitude toward and a 
way of approaching reality—a reality that is rarely what it seems and is seldom 
perceived in the same way by subjects in different places or in different times” 
(68).  The historical reality of the camp is not accessible to Skibell, nor is it 
accessible to other intergenerational witnesses.  The use of magical realism, as a 
viewpoint into the past, allows the new addressor (Skibell) access: 
According to Jean-François Lyotard, “Modernity, in whatever age 
it appears, cannot exist without a shattering of belief and without 
discovery of the ‘lack of reality’ of reality, together with the 
invention of other realities” (77). The only word in Lyotard’s 
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statement whose accuracy I feel inclined to contest is “invention,” 
for the simple reason that magical realism, a postmodern 
phenomenon par excellence, does not so much create new realities 
as re-create our own reality—often by pushing its limits, true, but 
even more often by enhancing its black holes, its inaccessible 
spaces. (Arva 69) 
In becoming the new addressor, an aspect of the Holocaust is made apparent in 
Skibell’s text; it allows the reader to enter into and face a horror of repetition—
and a way of understanding the world that is not centered on forgetfulness or 
silence. 
 In this sense, Skibell is joined with other intergenerational Jewish writers 
who are seeking to revivify, to create a community of memory.  By articulating 
the past, these writers find a sense of larger community: 
Not unlike artist Robert Smithson’s earthwork Spiral Jetty (1970), 
they spiral back to the center, suggesting a counterclockwise return 
to the point of origin, and thus bear the defining traumatic imprint 
of diasporic rupture but attempts at suture as well, through a 
retelling and reconceptualizing of defining stories of a collective 
Jewish past.  American Jewish literature, since its immigrant 
beginnings, arguably can be seen as a collective expression, an 
ongoing narrative of Jewish history, despite its deviations, its 
turnings, and its absences. For sometimes it takes a while—a 
generation, even—to return to and articulate the past, especially a 
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past that contains within it some of the most monstrous and most 
transcendent moments of history. (Aarons 301) 
The process of cycling backwards represents the give and take between the 
addressor and the addressee turned new addressor.  In becoming a new addressor, 
the author is enabled to create a new affect.  At the same time, there is also a 
movement forward: “The movement of the word in the Holocaust novel is a 
turning back, a teshuvah, a movement of return, response, and redemption.  Yet it 
is also a movement forward, toward the yet-to-be” (Patterson 4).  In the horror of 
the repetition invoked by Skibell through the Hotel Amfortas, the 
intergenerational reader feels the affect.  Yet, Chaim, escapes and returns back to 
his death (after re-crossing the river).  The familiar horror of the text, the 
awareness of Chaim’s death through the damage to his body, emerges.   
 With the return of Chaim’s deteriorated body, other returnings emerge as 
well, spiraling back to where the story began. Led by a voice on the wind, Chaim 
finds himself in his hometown.  Again, time is slippery in the text since the town 
is now changed; instead of the familiar houses, Chaim finds new glass buildings, 
cars lining the streets, and airplanes in the sky.  The return to Chaim’s hometown 
marks a movement forward in the text.  Throughout much of the novel, the moon 
is absent from the sky (almost immediately following the death of Chaim and the 
other villagers).  Skibell also presents the readers with a reoccurring story of how 
to Hasids pulled the moon from the sky.  The first occurs when Chaim tells it to 
Ola as a bedtime story; the second repetition appears when the head of the 
German soldier tells Chaim the story, claiming that he was a witness to the two 
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Hasids rising up in the sky.  In the final repetition, the reader meets the two 
Hasids at the center of the tale: Zalman and Kalman.  In this final repetition, 
Chaim’s purpose is revealed; he is meant to help the Hasids return the moon to 
the sky.   
So, what does the returning of the Moon to the sky denote for the text?  
Stadden notes, “The Moon is of course the most encompassing symbol in the 
book.  When it falls from the sky, it becomes evident that this is the most 
important struggle in the book.  It is not, surprisingly, the conflict between the 
Jews and the Nazis.  It is the salvation of this life symbol that reinforces the 
integrity of the character and his quest to return the moon to its rightful place” 
(156).  At the same time, the disappearance of the moon is tied specifically to the 
Holocaust in the book since it is buried underneath a mass grave of Jews.  Indeed, 
the moon itself is marked with the mass destruction since it as drawn the blood 
from the bodies into itself and is riddled with bullet holes (Skibell 253-54).  
Critics such as Alan Berger make a direct connection between the moon and the 
Jewish people: “Just as that celestial body waxes and wanes, so too do the 
fortunes of the Jewish people.… The fact that Chaim is able to raise the moon 
symbolizes the possibility that Jewish history—despite the trauma of the 
Holocaust—has not come to an end” (154).  In looking at these two critics, one 
can see the moon through multiple signifieds: a general symbol of life and as a 
specific symbol of Jews (or even Israel).  In returning the moon, the story implies 
a resolution to the damage that has been done to the soul of the world. 
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This is only one level that the returning of the moon offers the reader of the text.  
While it is certainly a significant symbol, the context of the story—the tale of the 
two Hasids who pull down the moon—is even more essential to understanding the 
story.  In this final returning, this final spiral back to the center, we are presented 
with the idea of storytelling.  The resolution of the story—of undoing the damage 
that greed and war and death has caused—there is a return to specifically Jewish 
culture: “Responding to the trauma of the Holocaust, Skibell’s novel embraces the 
cosmos of stories and folklore which, by utilizing the supernatural, defies at least 
momentarily the murder of the Jewish people and the indifference of the world” 
(Berger 155).  Chaim’s ability to finally enter the World to Come lies squarely on 
his participation in the story.  Thus he moves from the initial storyteller to the key 
participant in the text.  From the moment that Zalman and Kalman pull down the 
moon, they wait 50 years for Chaim to appear—waiting, as they are instructed to 
do by the Rebbe:  
“The Rebbe took me aside, Reb Chaim, and this he said to me: 
‘When Reb Chaim arrives, he will hate you bitterly. He will 
pretend to enjoy the Shabbas, but all the time he will be longing to 
get away.’  He said, ‘He will give you the compass, but he will 
refuse to accompany you.  However, you must insist upon it.  You 
must tell him there is no choice, much is at stake, including the 
World to Come.’” (Skibell 228)  
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By entering the story and undoing the damage that was done to the world, Chaim 
finally has a chance to repair the damage done to his soul.  The reappearance of 
the Rebbe, returned again to his human form, ties Chaim’s redemption to faith: 
“We don’t always understand God’s ways,” the Rebbe is 
saying.  “But that is our failing, not His.” 
His voice is clear, like the sound of moving waters. 
“I have tried my best to assist you but, of course, there were 
things you had to do on your own.  You have done these things 
now, Chaim.  You have done the necessary things.  Don’t try to 
understand them.”  (Skibell 265) 
Since faith and culture and identity merge at the center, back to the point of 
origin, the role of the folktale is as important as the symbolism of the moon.  By 
combining both symbol and story to Chaim’s redemption, Skibell indicates a 
healing through a return to Jewish culture and belief. 
 There is another layer to add to the discussion of the importance of the 
folktale to the resolution of the story.  After all, is not another story teller present 
throughout the text?  By using his great grandfather as the protagonist of the 
story, Skibell as self-reflexively referred to his position as writer and 
intergenerational witness throughout the whole text.  The connection between the 
Chaim’s redemption and Skibell’s writing is also inferred from the fact that it is 
50 years since Chaim died that he finally finds resolution and healing—roughly 
the same time as when Skibell is writing the book.  In the act of revivifying his 
great grandfather, in giving voice to the absence in his family, Skibell himself 
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serves an important part in the resolution through storytelling.  As Margalit notes, 
“The comparison between the God who remembers man and the mother who 
remembers the child of her womb is interesting.  In Hebrew the words rehem 
(womb) and rahamim (mercy) stem from the same root.  Mercy is returning those 
who are far away to their source, the womb.  Hence, the act of remembering is an 
act of mercy and grace” (Margalit 189).  In remembering, in giving voice to those 
who can no longer speak, Skibell’s act of writing is also part of the resolution of 
the folktale and an act of mercy for his great grandfather. 
 The final scene of the text when Chaim finally reaches the World to Come 
is through the reunion with his mother: “I am lying on her square and enormous 
lap.  Her black hair is wild and untied, it falls into her face, a face I know, but 
which I have never seen so young” (Skibell 267).  Here, the connection between 
“mercy” and “womb” are established through the final passage; Chaim’s journey 
is through the mother.  As Grimwood notes, “Survival is a continuation of the 
maternal—it is a second birth, the birth of memory.  The ‘unbirth’ at the end of 
the novel represents a return to the very heart of that which was (supposed to have 
been) annihilated” (101).  Skibell’s role as addressor allows for the birth of 
memory through the self-reflexive act of writing the text.  It is only when the 
story has a new addressor, when the absence is filled with a voice that Chaim can 
finally end his time in gehenna.  The damage to his soul is undone. 
 While the self-reflexive nature of the text is less marked than, say, 
Spiegelman’s or Foer’s works, it does strongly connect to the idea of Jewish 
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culture.  In this sense, Spiegelman is like other intergenerational witnesses who 
write from the moment in which their family history is torn apart: 
Second-Generation literature thus mourns the dead with its own 
metaphorical rendering of the keri’ah, the marking of memory in 
the evocation of rupture.  At the same time, by using their writing 
to express the fracture caused by the Holocaust, second-generation 
writers forge a link to Jewish mourning ritual, reinscribing their 
murdered family into both personal and Jewish memory and 
effecting a sort of repair of their torn legacy.  (McGlothlin 24) 
Revivification of those who are lost allows a repair; in Skibell’s text, it is tied to 
Jewish culture, storytelling, and the act of telling the story.  In order to continue to 
have an affect on new addressees, new addressors must emerge.  At the same 
time, Skibell does not idealize his ancestor.  In giving Chaim serious flaws, 
Skibell also allows the reader to examine the banality of evil—to see its 
connections to ourselves through the identification and sympathy the reader has to 
Chaim.  The two threads of the story, the self-reflexive addressor and the 
commentary on the banality of evil, work together throughout the text to force the 
reader into a deeper reflection on the meaning of the Holocaust by considering 
our relationship to both the victims and to the attitudes that made such widespread 
genocide possible.  In that way, we are asked to consider what damage has been 
done to our own souls. 
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Notes: 
1Even though Skibell is not technically a member of the second-generation, his experiences as a 
child do reflect many characteristics of those of the second-generation, particularly in the absence 
of family relatives.  In addition, Skibell’s relationship with his grandfather and great uncles as he 
was growing up represents a similar environment in that he had close contact with them. 
 
2I should note here that I have some trepidation with using the term deathlife, especially given the 
type and trauma of the memories that are evoked with the term.  In appropriating the term, do I 
risk minimalize the experiences of Holocaust survivors who talk about their experiences as 
passing through death…and that the experience of death continues to permeate their lives?  And 
yet, second generation writers such as Skibell and Foer write narratives that evoke a similar 
position, just as their lives (with a little more separation) is marked by the deaths among their 
families.  Indeed, the appropriation of the term (by distancing the experiences of the first 
generation witness) truly invokes the struggle of the intergenerational witness. 
 
3Even now, there are ongoing cases to recover property as it evidenced by the 2009 returns of 
Klimt artwork to two Jewish families (The Bloch-Bauer and Munk). 
 
4In Using and Abusing the Holocaust, Langer talks about witnessing several trials of accused Nazi 
war criminals and the lack of remorse for their actions (82-6).  As he notes, this type of feeling is 
unlikely given the context of the courtroom, but there is a sense of dissatisfaction with the absolute 
denial of responsibility or guilt on behalf of the defendants.  Here, Skibell gives the reader some 
measure of satisfaction though this open acknowledgement. 
 
5Given Simon Wiesenthal’s prominence as a Nazi hunter after the war, it is not unlikely that 
Skibell would have heard of this story.  Of course, the question of whether this is a direct 
influence (or a part of an aggregate set of influences as we’ve seen in other parts of his text) can 
only be answered by Skibell. 
 
6Whether it is the cartoon images of Spiegelman or film versions such as Steven Spielberg’s 
Schindler’s List, the fact that representations of the Holocaust continue to emerge throughout 
intergenerational witnesses indicates an ongoing cycle.  The Holocaust is not simply locked into 
historical footage or photographs; rather, the intergenerational witness presents a vision of the 
historical event that speaks to the affective response felt in becoming a new addressor. 
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CHAPTER 5 
REVISING THE MESSAGE: ADAPTING JONTHAN SAFRAN FOER’S 
EVERYTHING IS ILLUMINATED FROM TEXT TO FILM 
Colonel Landa: “The other mistake the German soldier makes is 
their severe handling of the citizens who give shelter and aid to the 
Jews. These citizens are not enemies of the state. They are simply 
confused people, trying to make some sense out of the madness 
war creates. These citizens do not need punishing. They simply 
need to be reminded of their duty in war time. 
 Let's use you as an example Monsieur LaPadite. In this war, you 
have found yourself in the middle of a conflict that has nothing to 
do with yourself, your lovely ladies, or your cows - yet, here you 
are. 
 So Monsieur LaPadite, let me propose a question. In this time of 
war, what is your number one duty? Is it to fight the Germans in 
the name of France to your last breath? Or, is it to harass the 
occupying army to the best of your ability? Or, is it to protect the 
poor unfortunate victims of warfare who cannot protect 
themselves? 
 Or, is your number one duty in this time of bloodshed, to protect 
those very beautiful women who constitute your family?” 
  
(pause) 
 
 “That was a question Monsieur LaPadite. In this time of war, 
what do you consider your number one duty?” 
 
Perrier: “To protect my family.” 
   -Quentin Tarantino, Inglorious Basterds 
 
 
Like other intergenerational witnesses to the Holocaust, such as Joseph 
Skibell and Art Spiegelman, Jonathan Safran Foer experiences Holocaust 
memories and the discourse arising from that experience through both the larger 
culture and his personal family.  Yet, as is often the case with second and third 
generation witnesses (children/grandchildren of Holocaust survivors), Foer’s role 
as an addressee of Holocaust discourse is mainly through silence, especially from 
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his grandfather.  In his trip to uncover his grandfather’s history in the Ukraine, 
Foer says, “Armed with a photograph of the woman who, I was told, had saved 
my grandfather from the Nazis, I embarked on a journey to Trachimbrod, the 
shtetl of my family's origins. The comedy of errors lasted five days. I found 
nothing but nothing, and in that nothing — a landscape of completely realized 
absence — nothing was to be found.” (Foer interview).   
It is this absence—this nothingness—that motivates Foer to write 
Everything Is Illuminated as a way to fill the void.  In the layers of storytelling 
within Foer’s text, he puts this need to fill an absence into the mind of Safran, the 
character based on his grandfather: “…because he knew that the origin of a story 
is always absence, and he wanted her to live among presences” (230).  Like 
Skibell and Spiegelman, Foer utilizes a self-reflexive structure in his text that 
refers back to himself through the character of Jonthan Safran Foer (hereafter 
referred to as Jonathan) and through the metafictional narrative structure that calls 
attention to the act of writing.  In this way, the self-reflexive nature of the text lies 
between Spiegelman’s autobiographical discourse and Skibell’s invocation of 
family by basing his character on his great grandfather.  Like Skibell, Foer’s 
novel (and the movie based on it) picks up an aspect of Lawrence Langer’s idea 
of deathlife narratives.   
In Langer’s discussion of the “choiceless choice” of a young man on the 
forced march from Auschwitz to Bergen-Belsen who is forced to leave his uncle 
on the road, Langer notes that “this episode depicts a pivotal grim principle of the 
camp universe: no one’s survival can be separated from the unnatural death of 
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someone else” (Using and Abusing the Holocaust 102).  In this sense, the 
deathlife narrative can be marked by the unnatural deaths of others, which 
somehow allowed the witness to survive.  If one begins to look at this aspect of 
the deathlife narrative from the position of the intergenerational witness, the 
questions of the link between existence and unnatural death exist.  For the 
character of Jonathan in the text, his life is possible because his grandfather’s, 
Safran’s, first wife and child were killed (59).  They also exist for Alex since his 
grandfather’s (in the novel) survival is ensured by turning in his best friend.   
As Foer passes on Holocaust discourse through his role as a new 
addressor, he seeks to revivify the essence of Holocaust memory in two ways: to 
bring to life the people (specifically his family line) of Trachimbrod through 
recreating their history and by addressing the concept of the banality of evil in 
both the historical and the present day narrative arcs of the text.  In Liev 
Schreiber’s adaptation of the text, the film version only focuses on the present-
day narrative of the trip made by the character of Jonathan, Alex (his guide), and 
Alex’s grandfather.  The choice to focus on only one of the story arcs from the 
book is understandable.  However, in writing the adaptation, Schreiber changes 
the history of Alex’s grandfather and thus his character.  In doing so, the focus on 
the Banality of Evil from the text is lost, a choice that releases the audience from 
facing one of the brutal facts of the Holocaust—that the choices we make can 
potentially lead us to participate in widespread evil. 
The novel Everything is Illuminated is split into three narrative parts: one 
half of an epistolary novel (since we only see the fictional Alex’s letters to 
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Jonathan); a narrative history of Trachimbrod beginning March 18, 1791 and 
running through the shtel’s destruction by the Nazis during WWII (which 
Jonathan is writing and sending to Alex); and Alex’s narrative of the history of 
their journey in the present-day to find the woman, Augustine, who Jonathan 
believes saved his grandfather during WWII.  For the purposes of this discussion, 
we will begin with Jonathan’s history of Trachimbrod.  In real life, Foer travels to 
the Ukraine only to find resistance and silence in his search for the past.  This 
absence is connected with a painful history of Ukrainian collaboration and, in 
some cases, active participation.1  The narrative history of Trachimbrod also 
represents writing into absence, given that many eastern Jewish communities 
were completely destroyed during the war.  Unlike Skibell who focuses mainly on 
the destruction of family history, Foer writes to revivify a community as well as a 
family line. 
In writing the history of the community, Foer is invoking a sense of 
naming that is similar to what we’ve seen in Jean François Lyotard proposes in 
Just Playing (as discussed in Chapter 1): the subject of the enunciation makes no 
claims of autonomy with respect to his discourse.  On the contrary, both through 
his name and through the story he tells, he claims to belong to the tradition (33).  
Just as the role of naming plays an instrumental role in the establishment of 
communal history for the Cashinahua, naming invokes Foer as addressor through 
the inscription of family/community history—even as this history is obviously 
fictionalized.  The impulse to create shared history as has roots in Judaism: “The 
Biblical obligation to tell the story of the exodus from bondage as a condition of 
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continuity has proved stronger than public memorials and official discourse, 
especially when the visible ruins of an ancient culture stand as mute 
archaeological artifacts or museum exhibits, and sites of memory have been 
neglected, destroyed or altered” (Sicher 60-61).  While Foer was never able to 
find the shetl of his family (and Foer admits that his journey was not well 
planned) and, thus, no physical sites of memory in the Ukraine, the idea of 
narrative to establish a “condition of continuity” in the face of muteness, can 
certainly be applied in this text.2   
The history of Trachimbrod, as it appears in the text provides a line of 
continuity between the beginning of the shetl (at least, the origin of it as it is 
connected to Foer) to its destruction.  In his discussion of the Trachimbrod history 
as a series of allegories, critic Menachem Feuer notes, “The first allegory deals 
with what I will call the allegory of the origin—the construction of meaning out 
of fragments or the gathering of fragments” (Feuer 37).  The event that marks the 
origin on March 18, 1791 is when Trachim’s wagon overturns and sinks into the 
river Brod.  As the townspeople look on, various items emerge from the bottom of 
the river: an umbrella, gloves, white string, food, and…a baby.  As Feuer notes, 
the origin of the Trachimbrod history begins with tragedy—the wreckages 
floating in the river are like the fragments that Foer must piece together into a 
(fragmented) narrative (38).  The trauma of the origin also mirrors the trauma that 
ends the shetl with a signal difference: the baby born to Jonathan’s grandfather’s 
wife Zosha at the end of the Trachimbrod history is born in the river but dies—the 
event that allows Jonathan to exist since Jonathan is a descendent of his 
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grandfather’s second marriage.  The use of this tragedy as the starting point of the 
history of the shetl is significant as well in the context of naming.  Jonathan’s 
maternal ancestor is the baby born in the river among the wreckage of the wagon 
accident, Brod.  Thus, the narrative of continuity involves the naming of ancestors 
and the creation of a family line.  Yet, the naming also invokes the community 
since Trachimbrod is the combination of Trachim and Brod—a naming that 
emerges in the tragedy since Trachim’s body is never recovered from the river.3  
The final level of the naming exists as an evocation of space—Jonathan’s ancestor 
bears the name of the river, Brod.  The role of naming in this origin establishes 
firmly the personal and the communal in the intergenerational transmission of 
memory. 
The parallels between the origin of the Trachimbrod history and its final 
destruction have another link—one that speaks to the very easy nature of the 
banality of evil.  If we can read the origin of Trachimbrod as an allegory, than it 
teaches how very easy it is to refuse aid.  When Yankel (who later becomes 
Brod’s guardian) reaches the scene of Trachim’s accident, he tries to figure out 
what happened.  The only eyewitness of the accident appears to be Sofiowka: 
Are we sure he’s dead? someone asked. 
Quite, Sofiowka assured.  Dead as he was before his 
parents met.  Or deader, maybe, for then he was a least a bullet in 
his father’s cock and an emptiness in his mother’s belly. 
Did you try to save him? Yankel asked. 
No. 
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Although Yankel eventually dives into the water, it is far too late to save Trachim 
who is actually never found (the search for Trachim becomes a yearly ritual 
throughout the following history of the shetl).  The rawness of that “No” echoes 
later in the text when, in the present-day (Alex’s) narrative, Lista, the only 
surviving member of the Trachimbrod shootings, describes her survival after a 
German soldier shoots up into her womb, killing her unborn child: “‘She escaped, 
yes?’  ‘Yes.’  ‘Someone saved her?’  ‘No.  She knocked on one hundred doors, 
and not one of them opened’” (Foer 188).  Just as there is a failure to act to rescue 
Trachim and, very probably, his pregnant wife given the appearance of the 
newborn, Brod, “still mucus-glazed,” the town’s descendants will perish as 
witnesses look on but do not help.  Like in Skibell’s Blessing on the Moon, Foer 
chooses to emphasize the humanity and fallibility of his characters through a 
commentary on the banality of evil.  In this way, he forecasts the eventual 
revelation in the text of the truth of Alex’s grandfather’s experiences during the 
war. 
 The early scene of the Trachimbrod history is important in terms of 
establishing Jonthan’s origin and position as an intergenerational witness.  Yet, it 
is important to note that the history of Trachimbrod section of the novel is not 
meant to be read as historically factual since it heavily utilizes fantastical 
elements: “In Foer’s novel, the magical-realist and folklorist-based material is a 
self-conscious device for imagining the past, but one which always announces the 
gap between itself and the past as it was experienced” (Behlman 60).  That gap is 
precisely the position of Foer’s intergenerational witnessing. “In confining the 
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fantastic elements of the text to a narrative strand concerned with a historical dark 
area, the novel draws a clear distinction between those areas of the past which are 
accessible as objects of knowledge (the personal histories of Alex and Jonathan, 
and Alex’s grandfather’s Holocaust experience) and those of which imagination is 
the only source (the history of Trachimbrod)” (Adams 62).  Jonathan’s 
Trachimbrod section is not meant to usurp a history but to fill in absence since 
any record of that community is completely gone.  This aligns with Efraim 
Sicher’s idea of “absent memory”:  “‘Absent memory’ might be a trope for much 
writing that is impelled by the violent eradication of a past culture or of an entire 
generation so that ‘invention replaces recall.’  However, children of survivors 
who grew up hearing their parent’s memories of their birthplaces might equally 
sense an exilic diaspora in an imagined but far from empty memory that for them 
constitutes a viable Jewish identity” (Sicher 64).  In Foer’s work, absent memory 
invokes everything that was not found in Foer’s visit to the Ukraine.  As we look 
at absent memory in the Trachimbrod history, the idea of “invention” is 
fundamental since the reader is never allowed to forget that the history is the 
product of Jonathan’s imagination.  The folkloric elements invoke a tradition of 
storytelling that constantly reminds the reader of the fictionality of this section 
even as another level of the text, Alex’s letters to Jonathan, metafictively discuss 
the process of the writing itself. 
 One aspect of invention that Foer repeatedly plays with through the 
Trachimbrod history section is time, specifically compressing time so that as he 
tells the story of his ancestor, Brod, her life is limned by Safran’s story as well as 
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the destruction of the shtetl.  The same is true for Safran as parts of his story are 
told through Brod’s recounting of a dream.  In Brod’s section of the story, this 
becomes apparent as she looks through a telescope into different rooms and sees 
into the future.  Mainly, this sight is limited to Trachimbrod although Foer is 
careful not to confine it to just Trachimbrod since one room invokes a period of 
time after the destruction of the shtetl: “She tries to piece it [the room as a puzzle] 
together: A half-smoked cigarette balancing itself on an ashtray’s lip.  A damp 
washcloth on the sill.  A scrap of paper on the desk, with handwriting that looks 
like hers: This is me with Augustine, February 21, 1943” (Foer 88).  The family 
link functions as the link between Brod and the future since the spatial link by this 
point is destroyed.  If it is Safran she is looking at, he has already left the shtetl.  If 
it is Jonathan, than she is looking at the person who is creating her through his 
writing about Trachimbrod.   
 In the next area Brod looks into, she sees a young boy (who may or may 
not be Safran as a child) on a roof with a young girl reading The Book of 
Antecendents.4  Brod, through the telescope that is bridging time, reads a section 
from the community written book that describes her rape by Sofiowka N, 
including the day on which it occurs.  However, she is unable to read the 
complete section since the boy falls asleep: “Brod wants to read more—to scream, 
READ TO ME!  I NEED TO KNOW!—but they can’t hear her from where she 
is, and from where she is, she can’t turn the page.  From where she is, the page—
her paper-thin future—is infinitely heavy” (Foer 89).  The compressing of time 
allows her a glimpse of her personal future that is terrifying but incomplete; 
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realistically, this is not knowledge that she could possess in a linear view of time.  
However, Brod’s story does not exist within linear time, at least, not one that is 
accessible since any trace of that history is lost.  In this text, Brod’s story exists 
because of the absence of a real history of Trachimbrod.  Thus, any sense of time 
begins and ends with the storyteller; the compression of time throughout this 
section of Brod’s story illustrates a metafictive device that calls attention to the 
role Jonthan plays as the storyteller. 
 The implicit invocation of Jonthan as the storyteller continues into the 
next chapter, which covers the day when Brod becomes Float Queen at the 
Trachimday festival, named for Brod’s biological father and including a 
reenactment of his drowning and the act of finding items from his wagon—
including Brod herself—in the river (although the divers search for bags of gold).  
This is the day on which Brod knows she will be raped although she does nothing 
that will change that event.  Yet, the act of violence is alluded to rather than 
shown.  The strongest indicator that the reader is given is in the passage when she 
returns home from the festival: “She ignored them all.  Ignored them when they 
spat at her feet or pinched her backside.  Ignored them when they cursed and 
kissed her, and cursed her with their kisses.  Ignored them even when they made a 
woman out of her, ignored them as she had learned to ignore everything in the 
world that was not once-removed” (Foer 96).  Rather than depicting her rape, the 
violence is deflected, buried in the general idea of “being made a woman.”  By 
glossing over her rape, it feels as if Jonathan is trying to spare the character of 
Brod from the experience of the rape itself.  Instead, the chapter ends with Brod’s 
  127 
discovery of her adopted father’s death and her connection to the Kolker (later 
named Safran), who will become her husband.  Her emotional connection to the 
Kolker emits a light that can be seen in space (a light similar to but brighter than 
the light that is emitted through the act of lovemaking discussed earlier in the 
chapter) by the first astronauts, an event Jonathan is listening to over the radio 
with his mother and grandmother.  In this way, the linking of Brod and the 
Kolker, Jonathan’s ancestors, is central to Jonathan’s existence and the two acts 
merge through another compression of time. 
 Even though Jonathan passes over Brod’s rape at this point in the story, he 
does develop a fuller description of the event later when her descendent, Safran, 
reads The Book of Antecedents.  Rather than forcing the character to go through 
the event, the story is witnessed by someone else—one whose existence is tied to 
that event and its aftermath.  The predatory nature of Sofiowka, his use of power 
over Brod, and the violence of the act are displayed in this version of the story.  In 
addition to a fuller focus on Brod’s rape, the ending of the story is extended.  In 
the first recounting of that night, the story ends with a generative energy; in this 
depiction of the event, the story ends in death.  When Brod agrees to marry the 
Kolker, she has a price: 
Then you must do something for me, she said. 
Sofiowka was found the next morning, swinging by the 
neck from the wooden bridge.  His severed hands were hanging 
from strings tied to his feet, and across his chest was written, in 
Brod’s red lipstick: A N I M A L.  (Foer 205)    
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In terms of the family line descending to Jonathan, the marriage of Brod and the 
Kolker is the origin.  Yet, the life that is enabled through their joining is marked 
by a brutal murder.  In this sense, the deathlife narrative is evoked in Safran’s 
reading of Brod’s rape; his life exists through the unnatural death of Sofiowka.     
In reading this story of Brod’s rape as an invocation of the deathlife 
narrative, it is important to note that this is a much more stylized and broader 
version than what Langer discusses in Using and Abusing the Holocaust.  In 
Langer’s discussion, the context of life and death is completely different since the 
ability for the survivors to control their circumstances is gone.  While one’s life in 
the Holocaust is marked be someone else’s unnatural death, the survivor’s ability 
to control—to act—is minimal.  Here, the Kolker has a choice: to kill Sofiowka 
and marry Brod or not.  Foer’s use of the deathlife narrative is stylized since it 
serves to create a parallel structure in the text; just as Safran’s life is determined 
by the unnatural death of Sofiowka, Brod’s life is determined by the unnatural 
deaths of the Jewish population of Trachimbod.  Or, more specifically, the life of 
her character since it is the unnatural deaths of Jonathan’s grandfather’s first wife 
and child that make this story possible: “The oblique telling can only ‘speak’ the 
narrative truth of history when this historical context is the space that both frames 
and conditions its signification” (Adams 72).  Just as Safran is used as the vehicle 
to show Brod’s rape and the murder of Sofiowka, Brod is used to show the 
destruction of the shtetl.  Again, this could be read as an unwillingness to force 
the characters through these events of trauma.  However, it also establishes a 
cyclical link between Safran and Brod, one that compresses time to the act of 
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writing the story, this time in The Book of Recurrent Dreams.  It is Brod’s dream 
from the perspective of herself and as the river, entitled “The dream of the end of 
the world,” that tells the account of Zosha’s death as Trachimbrod is attacked 
during the Trachimday festival:  
…my safran picked up his wife and carried her like a newlywed 
into the water which seemed amid the falling trees and hackling 
crackling explosions the safest place hundreds of bodies poured 
into the brod that river with my name I embraced them with open 
arms come to me come I wanted to save them all to save 
everybody from every-body the bombs rained from the sky and it 
was not explosions or scattering shrapnel that would be our death 
not the heckling cinders not the laughing debris but all the bodies 
bodies flailing and grabbing hold of one another… (Foer 272). 
The stream of consciousness passage continues on, describing in graphic detail 
Zosha’s giving birth in the river and the drowning death of both Zosha and her 
newborn daughter amid all the bodies fighting for escape in the river.  Menachem 
Feuer talks of this scene as a signal that Jonathan is unable to forgive what 
happened: “At the very end of this account is a recorded dream, taken from the 
Book of Recurrent Dreams: a dream of apocalypse.  This is nothing less than 
Jonathan’s assertion that he can neither forgive nor forget what happened, even if 
he has imagined it all, which indeed is the case.  (This is not simply an ironic 
viewpoint; it delimits an essential difference between Jonathan and Alex, and it 
repeats Eli Wiesel’s imperative to ‘never forget’)” (43-44).  Yet, if this is 
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Jonathan’s declaration against forgiving or forgetfulness (a statement which itself 
disregards the differences between the both actions), why present it as a dream?  
The act of recording is significant, but if the reality of this history is confined to a 
recounting of a dream, then what happens to the idea of “never forget”?  Again, 
the key is the invocation of Jonathan as the writer, the point from which the 
narrative goes out and to whom the narrative must return.   
 The cyclical nature and compression of time between the beginning and 
ending of Trachimbrod’s history serve to invoke the point of destruction which 
makes both the storytelling imperative just as it also makes the position of 
Jonathan as writer possible.  Yet, Jonthan’s relationship to his characters is often 
complex, especially since he portrays his characters as incredibly flawed.  From 
the beginning of the Trachimbrod history when all the bystanders wait too long 
before going into the water to rescue Trachim (and the townspeople have no hand 
in bringing Brod up to surface) to Brod’s rape to the Kolker’s murder and 
Jonathan’s grandfather’s sexual exploits (including infidelity), the residents of 
Trachimbrod are not treated as good or pure.  Indeed, their motivations are often 
selfish and common—in some case, banal.  Just as Joseph Skibell depicts his 
great grandfather as flawed, so too does Jonathan in his history of Trachimbrod, a 
point that Alex’s letters call attention to: “How can you do this to your 
grandfather, writing about his life in such a manner?  Could you write in this 
manner if he was alive?  And if not, what does that signify?” (Foer 178).  This 
point is significant since it calls attention to the act of choice in writing—to the 
fact that is one is seeking to invoke a community of memory, than why does one 
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need to make that community so imperfect?  Further in the same letter, Alex 
expands on this question:  
We are being very nomadic with the truth, yes?  The both of us?  
Do you think that this is acceptable when we are writing about 
things that occurred?  If your answer is no, then why do you write 
about Trachimbrod and your grandfather in the manner that you 
do, and why do you command me to be untruthful?  If your answer 
is yes, then this creates another question, which is if we are to be 
such nomads with the truth, why do we not make the story more 
premium than life?  (Foer 179). 
Fundamentally, the answer lies in the need to tell the story truthfully, in the sense 
that this is an exploration of complex human beings who are both good and bad.  
Jonathan refuses to change the story for Alex, just as Alex resists Jonathan’s 
desire to edit out scenes that are embarrassing.  Jonathan, however, in creating a 
history that no longer exists, has more power over the choices he makes. 
 Jonathan’s choices to show the flaws of Trachimbrod pose a real dilemma 
for Alex—one that moves him to anger even as it also aids Alex in understanding 
Jonathan’s position.  As Feuer notes, “In short, Jonathan’s writing introduces 
transgression and confusion into Alex’s life.  It ruins his concept of love and truth 
and makes him, in some way, ‘mad’” (42).  To be more precise, it ruins Alex’s 
fantasy of love and truth as simple concepts and forces him on a path of self-
reflexivity that finally allows him to openly talk about his family’s history—to 
talk not only about his grandfather’s actions in the war but to also acknowledge 
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the abuse he has been living with from his father.  The ideals of love and truth 
rely on simplicity; the human reality is wrought with complexity.  Francisco 
Collado-Rodriguez points out that the Trachimbrod history is essential to Alex’s 
understanding of the Holocaust and the communities that were destroyed: 
With the referential power of language at stake thanks to Alex’s 
role as an alledgedly realist narrator, the fantastic elements that 
saturate Jonathan’s story of Trachimbrod’s mythical creation and 
destruction turn into a powerful strategy with ethical implications.  
Foer builds a narrative structure in which myth and fantasy end up 
helping readers—and eventually Alex himself—to come to a better 
understanding of the unsayable traumatic events that are gradually 
disclosed in Alex’s reports rather than in Jonathan’s.  
Paradoxically, Jonathan’s magic-realist passages eventually bring 
illumination to the historical darkness that pervades Alex’s letters 
and Alex’s story.  The issue at stake is no small matter, since it 
poses the question of the ways in which the narration of myth and 
magic can illuminate historical events characterized by referential 
uncertainty.  (57). 
In the text, the absence of any history of Trachimbrod marks the point of a 
differend—one that Jonathan seeks to overcome through narration.5  Instead of 
leaving it as an absence, Jonathan creates a presence in the text.  The complexity 
of that presence, however, does not just “bring illumination to historical darkness” 
although that is certainly an important aspect of Jonathan’s narration.  On a subtle 
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level, it signals Jonathan’s understanding of Alex’s grandfather’s choice.  
Trachimbrod’s existence, the very act of its naming, rests on the fact that no one 
acted to save Trachim, which mirrors the destruction that marks the end of the 
Jewish community in Trachimbrod that the reader sees so painfully in both 
Augustine/Lista’s recounting in Alex’s narration and Brod’s dream in Jonathan’s.  
In a different context and time, would the people Jonthan depicts be capable of 
making a different decision than what Alex’s grandfather made?  Jonathan’s 
history makes that possibility highly questionable, although that ultimately does 
little to spare Alex the pain, the feeling of complicity that he has, when he finally 
learns what his grandfather did in the war. 
 Whatever Jonathan’s internal struggles are with writing the story or his 
reactions to Alex’s narrative, the reader only sees them if Alex himself comments 
on them.  Thus, the primary (and most obvious) use of metanarrative in the text 
falls into Alex’s sections, both his letters to Jonathan and his narration of the 
present-day journey Jonathan, Alex, and Alex’s grandfather take to uncover the 
remains of Trachimbrod and find Augustine, the woman who, Jonathan believes, 
rescued Safran during the war.  The use of metanarrative is multi-layered 
throughout Alex’s section since he functions as both narrator and translator.  It is 
the latter one that needs the most explanation; it is also Alex’s role as a translator 
that brings him into direct contact in a very personal way.   
One key passage in the text is when Alex is translating for Jonathan 
Lista’s account of the deaths of the Jews of Trachimbrod.  Of all the characters in 
the novel, she is the one who is most defined by the theme of deathlife.  Lista 
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lives in a house, surrounded by belongings she has gathered from all the Jews 
who died in Trachimbrod as well as mementos that invoke the neighboring town 
of Kolki and, thus, Alex’s grandfather’s history.  Even though years have passed, 
Lista is still trapped in the past through her isolation—one that is so complete that 
she does not even know if the war has ended (Foer 193).  When Lista, Jonathan, 
Alex, and Alex’s grandfather arrive in Trachimbrod, Lista recounts the actions of 
the Nazis who did not merely destroy the synagogue and kill the Jews; the Nazis 
forced the town to participate in the desecration of the Torah.  In translating these 
events, Alex says, “You cannot know how it felt to have to hear these things and 
then repeat them, because when I repeated them, I felt like I was making them 
new again” (Foer 185).   
As he becomes the translator of the events, Alex is coming to a more 
intimate understanding of what the Holocaust means.  Even when Jonathan says 
“I don’t want to hear anymore,” Alex’s translation continues as he narrates the 
rest of Lista’s story.  Throughout Lista’s account, she does not specifically say 
what she herself went through; it is only at the end of the chapter that the reader 
(as well as Alex) comes to the realization that the account of her pregnant older 
sister, whose baby takes the bullet and spares the mother’s life, is in fact Lista 
when she says “‘I must go in and care for my baby,’ she said.  ‘It is missing me’” 
(Foer 193).  In that moment, the levels of Lista’s deathlife are fully and awfully 
realized.  It also parallels Alex’s sensation of “making them new” since it 
becomes fully clear how traumatized Lista is by the Nazis since she transfers her 
experience onto the figure of her older sister, which allows her to continue with 
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the repression of the event that took her own child’s life—a repression that keeps 
her trapped in the past.  As Jenni Adams notes, “While not factually accurate by 
the criterion of correspondence, Lista’s account enables her to communicate the 
experiential reality of the event, demonstrating the value of narrative truth in 
articulating experience which could not, as a result of its traumatic nature, be told 
in any more factually accurate way” (73).  Yet, there are limits to the sense of 
experiential, as Lista herself says, “‘It is not a thing that you can imagine.  It only 
is.  After that, there can be no imagining” (Foer 188).  In his role as translator of 
the events, Alex seems to be aware of these limits, calling attention at times to his 
emotions but careful not to usurp Lista’s position as witness. 
 The distinction between Alex’s voice and his relationship to the role of the 
witness that he establishes in Lista’s section of his narration is complicated when 
he is forced to face Alex’s grandfather’s choiceless choice.  Alex’s grandfather’s 
section of the novel functions as both a deathlife narrative through the role of the 
perpetrator and as a view of the Banality of Evil, one that invites the reader’s 
identification with his grandfather since it is difficult to imagine what one might 
choose in the same situation.  That, however, does not lessen the guilt that Alex 
and his grandfather feel nor does it lessen the ongoing impact of that decision, 
which begins a cycle of violence that Alex decides to break.  In the novel, there 
are two versions of the story of Alex’s grandfather and Herschel.  The first is in 
Lista’s section: 
“Here is Herschel,” she said, holding a photograph up to the light 
of the window.  “We will go,” Grandfather said.  “tell him we are 
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leaving.”  “Do not go,” she said.  “Shut up,” he told her, and even 
if she was not Augustine, he still should not have uttered this to 
her.  “I am sorry,” I told her, “please continue.”  “He lived in 
Kolki, which was a shtetl near to Trachimbrod.  Herschel and Eli 
were best friends, and Eli had to shoot Herschel, because if he did 
not, they would shoot him.”  “Shut up,” he said again, and this 
time he also punched the table.  But she did not shut up.  “Eli did 
not want to, but he did it.”  “You are lying about it all.”  “He does 
not intend this,” I told her, and I could not clutch why he was 
doing what he was doing.  “Grandfather—”  “You can keep your 
not-truths for yourself,” he said.  “I heard this story,” she said, 
“and I believe it is a truth.”  (Foer 152) 
By the time Alex is writing this story, he already knows the truth about Herschel 
and his grandfather although he chooses to focus on a realistic version of the give 
and take conversation that indicates Alex’s grandfather’s unwillingness to hear 
the story because he has not yet acknowledged that he pointed the finger at 
Herschel.  There is also a subtlety hinted at in the text that both Feuer and 
Collado-Rodriguez draw attention to in their respective analyses of Foer’s work: 
that if Grandfather is Eli than he is also Jewish.  If true, this leads to an 
uncomfortable relationship to the theme of the Banality of Evil that exists in the 
text since it compresses victim with perpetrator.6  At the same time, this 
possibility is called into question since Lista does not witness these events (“I 
heard this story”) and the specific details do not match up with Grandfather’s 
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telling of the event.  Moreover, the heritage of the perpetrator is the theme that is 
ultimately stressed throughout the novel since this possibility is never developed 
into a significant plot point in the novel even though the idea of perpetrator (in the 
context of the choiceless choice) is also a victim is present. 
 The conflict between Lista and Alex’s grandfather that marks the first 
telling of the story of Herschel brings to the foreground the idea of characters in 
conflict.  The minor (in terms of the larger aims of the novel) conflict in this 
version addresses the silence that exists in the Ukraine: 
In the midst of the two conflicting literary modes is a plotline in 
which Augustine and Alex’s grandfather must face each other.  
Only by confronting each other are they finally able to give voice 
to the persistent silence that for decades traumatically concealed 
the horror of the crime and the Ukrainian peasants’ passivity, if not 
downright complicity, in the extermination of the Jews.  In other 
words, the author’s strategy of refraction (two stories that 
eventually collide in the same time span, two characters who need 
to face each other) aims at producing a critical debate on ethical 
matters. (Collado-Rodriguez 58). 
Throughout Lista’s sections, Alex’s grandfather is often uncomfortable with 
Lista’s bleak outlook: “‘We were the not-lucky ones,’ she said.  ‘It is not true,’ 
Grandfather said, although I [Alex] do not know what part he was saying was not 
true’” (Foer 153).  Since Lista’s view is in opposition to the motives and result 
that guided Alex’s grandfather’s decision, he is unwilling to give this view 
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credence.  In addition, the confrontation between Lista and Grandfather takes 
place outside of Alex’s narration since he is asked to leave while Lista and 
Grandfather talk privately.  The result of that conversation is a breaking of silence 
but only through Lista’s testimony.  Grandfather only recounts his story of 
Herschel’s death when Jonathan pulls a photograph out of the “In Case” and 
recognizes Alex’s grandfather.  In this way, the refraction of the two characters is 
marked by the inescapability of the past. 
 The past as inescapable also marks Jonathan’s and Alex’s relationship, 
although it is more acknowledged in Alex’s sections for both the obvious reason 
that Alex’s letters are the only ones presented in the novel and the more 
complicated relationship Alex has to the past since the possibility of his life is 
marked by the unnatural death of Herschel.  The ongoing realization that he 
cannot evade the past is the mark of his growth throughout the text: “The legacy 
of trauma effects the third, non-Jewish, generation.  The maturing of Alex’s own 
identity occurs over time and in stages” (Berger 156).  The hesitations that 
interrupt Alex’s narration are centered on his heritage as a perpetrator: “I have 
been putting on a high shelf what I know I must do, which is point a finger at 
Grandfather pointing at Herschel” (Foer 178).  Silence, indeed, will be broken 
but there is an emotional cost involved.  This is apparent when Alex finally comes 
to write the second version of Herschel’s story, the one that his grandfather finally 
tells when confronted by the fact that both Jonathan and Alex recognize him in 
the photograph taken from Lista’s box.   
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Alex’s narration is split into two sections: the first leads to his 
grandfather’s acknowledgement that he killed Herschel and the second is the 
fuller description of what happened the night the Nazis came to Kolki.  It is in the 
first section that Alex struggles: “(Here it is too forbidding to continue.  I have 
written to this point many times, and corrected the parts you would have me 
correct, and made more funnies, and more inventions, and written as if I were you 
writing this, but every time I try to persevere, my hand shakes so I can no longer 
hold my pen.  Do it for me.  Please.  It is now yours.)” (Foer 226).  Yet, the rest of 
the passage continues to be written as if it is from Alex’s viewpoint including 
other parentheticals that seem to be from Alex’s voice and using his wording.  At 
the same time, this passage could be read as a metafictional device, calling 
attention to Foer’s own role as the author.  Throughout much of the text, Alex and 
Jonathan occupy differentiated positions: “The refracting position of the two 
young men provides Foer a means to not only establish a metafictional game, but 
also suggest literature’s power to help his protagonists resolve the unnerving 
situation they have to face” (Collado-Rodriguez 56).  In this sense, we see the 
possibility of a resolution to the differend enacted through the dual narratives 
since the possibility of both narrative voices becomes compressed at the 
metafictional site of the author’s role in the creation of the work. 
 The fact of Alex’s father’s drinking and physical abuse of both Alex and 
his younger brother, Igor, is a significant theme in Alex’s personal story.  At first, 
he is unable to name the abuse for what it really is: “It was Little Igor’s fourteen 
birthday yesterday.  He made his arm broken the day yore, because he fell again, 
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this time from a fence he was hiking on, if you can believe it” (Foer 52).  As 
Alex’s voice matures, he begins to face the violence from his father: “Sometimes I 
feel ensnared in this, as if no matter what I do, what will come has already been 
fixed.  For me, OK, but there are things that I want for Little Igor.  There is so 
much violence around him, and I mean more than merely the kind that occurs 
with fists.  I do not want him to feel violence anymore, but also I do not want him 
to one day make others feel violence” (Foer 145).  Silence and shame work on 
multiple levels throughout Alex’s story of his family and the abuse is the first to 
be acknowledged.  The starting point of the cycle is not fully revealed until the 
second part of Alex’s grandfather’s story of Herschel towards the end of the novel 
and written as if Alex is quoting from Jonathan’s diary entry: 
…and I knew I could never allow him to learn of whoIwas or 
whatIdid because it was for him that I didwhatIdid it was for him 
that I pointed and for him that Herschel was murdered that I 
murdered Herschel and this is why he is how he is he is how he is 
he because a father is always responsible for his son and I am I and 
Iamresponsible not for Herschel but for my son because I held him 
with somuchforcethathecried because I loved him so much that I 
madeloveimpossible and I am sorry for you and sorry for Iggy and 
it is you who must forgive me… (Foer 251-2). 
Grandfather’s choiceless choice comes when the Nazis round up all the citizens of 
Kolki and force the shtetl inhabitants to identify the Jews who are then rounded 
up into the synagogue.  Just before the General comes to Alex’s grandfather, the 
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previous two men who said there were no more Jews were shot in the head.  As he 
stands there next to his wife and child on one side and his best friend, Herschel, 
on the other, Grandfather points to Herschel.  The Nazis force Herschel into the 
synagogue, which they then set on fire.  The legacy of that choice haunts 
Grandfather and makes it impossible for him to love.  This is the legacy, defined 
by silence, which starts the cycle of abuse that Alex faces. 
 Just as Brod’s dream is used as the device to depict the bombing of 
Trachimbrod, Alex’s struggle with his father and his breaking of the cycle of 
violence inherited from his grandfather’s choiceless choice are depicted by others 
rather than Alex himself.  The first depiction is actually midway through the text 
when Alex is asked to leave Lista and Grandfather to talk.  He goes outside with 
Jonathan and reads Jonathan’s diary:  
He told his father that he could care for Mother and Little Igor.  It 
took his saying it to make it true.  Finally he was ready.  His father 
could not believe this thing.  What? he asked.  What?  And Sasha 
told him again that he would take care of the family, that he would 
understand if his father had to leave and never return, and that it 
would not even make him less of a father.  He told his father that 
he would forgive.  Oh, his father became so angry, so full of wrath, 
and he told Sasha that he would kill him, and Sasha told his father 
that he would kill him, and they moved at each other with violence 
and his father said, Say it to my face, not to the floor, and Sasha 
said, You are not my father.  (Foer 160). 
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This passage, in its entirety, also appears in the final letter from the Ukraine that 
closes out the novel, the one Alex’s grandfather wrote just before committing 
suicide.  As Feuer points out, “The twist is that these words are clearly not the 
grandfather’s, as he never saw Jonathan’s diary, and the repetition of them is a 
postmodern literary device: it indicates the presence of the author, as well as the 
fictionality of this letter and the suicide” (44).  Given the complete absence that 
Foer writes into, it illustrates his desire for memory, for a breaking of silence that 
he found in his visit to the Ukraine.  So, is a legacy of the perpetrator a cycle of 
violence?  In the end, it marks his belief that such a legacy has an impact, 
especially if that history is so completely repressed. 
 The metafictional device that calls attention to Foer at the end of the novel 
appears in a different form elsewhere in the novel—one that calls attention to 
similarity rather than difference.  It is the idea that both Jonathan and Alex are 
working to form one story:  
We are talking not, Jonathan, together, and not apart.  We are with 
each other, working on the same story, and I am certain you also 
feel this.  Do you know that I am the Gypsy girl and you are 
Safran, and that I am Kolker and you are Brod, and that I am your 
grandmother and you are Grandfather, and that I am Alex and you 
are you, and that I am you and you are me?  Do you not 
comprehend that we can bring each other safety and peace? (Foer 
214). 
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The focus here is a type of compression, similar to the function of time in the 
Trachimbrod history.  Alex’s letter speaks to understanding, to the similarities 
rather than the differences—or at least a desire for that type of resolution to the 
differend.  In this passage, the focus is more on the viewpoint of the victim.  In 
the later compression that occurs in Grandfather’s full retelling of his and 
Herschel’s story, the focus is on the perpetrator:  
…the truth is that I also pointedatHerschel and I also said heisaJew 
and I will tell you that you also pointedatHerschel and you also 
said heisaJew and you also pointedathim and said heisaJew and 
your grandmother and Little Igor and we all pointedateachother so 
what is it he should have done 
hewouldhavebeenafooltodoanythingelse but is it forgivable…. 
(Foer 252)   
While this is also Alex’s section, the passage potentially comes from Jonathan’s 
diary as well (although it could be a device Alex uses to make it possible to 
write).  Yet, just as the viewer feels sympathy for Monsiuer LaPadite at the 
beginning of Quentin Tarantino’s Inglorious Basterds, the reader here is asked the 
question, “What choice can one make?”  As much as one would wish to be able to 
label every perpetrator as evil, the reality is much more complicated…and banal: 
“Everything is Illuminated represents the universal dimension of intergenerational 
transmission of trauma.  Jews were the killers’ obsession, but the lives of others 
were deeply etched by Nazism’s evil.  Foer’s novel may in fact be read as a 
warning to humanity” (Berger 158).  The warning is that the possibility of great 
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evil, given the right circumstances, can still happen, no matter the person.  As 
Alex says in a letter to Jonathan, “A bad person is someone who does not lament 
his bad actions.  Grandfather is now dying because of his.  I beseech you to 
forgive us, and to make us better than we are.  Make us good” (Foer 145).  Is 
Alex talking to Jonathan or to Foer?  The possibility of forgiveness is absent since 
the request is made out of a desire on the author’s part—on his choice to give 
voice to the silence he encountered—not on any acknowledgement of guilt or 
responsibility by those who allowed the atrocities to happen. 
Liev Schreiber’s Adaptation of Everything is Illuminated 
 The questions of forgiveness and responsibility, especially in relation to 
Foer’s use of the Banality of Evil is completely bypassed when one comes to look 
at the movie version of Everything is Illuminated.  The film, directed by Liev 
Schreiber who also wrote the screenplay, focuses solely on the present-day 
narration of Alex, Alex’s grandfather, and Jonathan’s journey to find 
Trachimbrod.  The purpose of this critique of the film is not to complain that a 
majority of the novel is cut out; it is impossible to include every aspect of a novel 
into a film, especially one as complicated as Foer’s.  As one looks at the film, the 
viewer can see how Schreiber cinematically tried to include multiple aspects from 
the book, including the fantastical, without destroying the realism of the story arc.  
One aspect of his use of folkloric elements appears in the shots of Augustine’s 
house, standing alone in a field of sunflowers.  When Alex and Jonathan first 
approach the house, all the flowers are standing up, alert.  Later, as the story of 
Trachimbrod begins to emerge, the sunflowers droop.  Another more significant 
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use of folkloric imagery is when Alex, Jonathan, Alex’s grandfather, and 
Augustine are in Trachimbrod, and the river begins to swell with papers floating 
down the river—a scene that invokes both Trachim’s death and Brod’s dream of 
destruction albeit in a more peaceful, beautiful way.  The papers also serve as a 
context for the story of Trachimbrod: “Memory can be recorded only through the 
interpretation of the indicators of memory—speech is sometimes juxtaposed with 
objects from the past” (Kramer 143).   
Yet, these stylistic devices pose a risk of aestheticizing the Holocaust.  
The pairing of the imagery of the river with the history of what occurred lends a 
sense of unreality to the whole scene—beautiful but otherworldly.  As a New 
York Times film review noted, “[the film] does not really illuminate much of 
anything about the destruction of Ukraine’s Jews or survivor’s guilt or the 
problems of historical memory, though these are its announced themes.  Rather, 
the film chiefly dramatizes its own earnest desire to engage these topics, and to 
make something beautiful out of them…” (Scott para 6).  Yet, it is not just the 
desire to make something beautiful that defines the changes made between the 
book and the film.  The whole discussion of the perpetrator with the strong ties to 
the idea of the Banality of Evil is left out in the decision to change the character 
of Alex’s grandfather into a Jewish victim of the Nazis:  
Any guilt Alexander—or Baruch (meaning: blessed), as his Jewish 
name is—might have incurred rest, in Schreiber’s screenplay, 
rather with his having denied his Jewish identity and thus having 
‘betrayed’ the victims of the Holocaust.  He does not, as he does in 
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the novel, point his finger to denounce his Jewish friend, if only to 
save the lives of his family, and his own.  Thus the dimension of 
innocently becoming guilty and the whole intricate web of being 
perpetrator and victim at the same time, which is so central to the 
novel and, indeed, one of its most striking features, is largely 
ignored in Schreiber’s film. (Kern-Stӓhler 176-7) 
Repression, in the context of the film, has more to do with identity.  It is paired, 
visually, with a landscape where the remnants of the Nazis still exist (abandoned 
and decaying tanks) but one where, at least in the urban setting, the memory of 
atrocity is linked more closely with the Soviets than the Germans. 
In the film version of the text, grandfather becomes a Jew, one of the few 
survivors of the massacre at Trachimbrod.7  The journey to take Jonathan to find 
Trachimbrod becomes for grandfather a coming to terms with his past as a 
victim—one who the Nazis thought they killed but who emerges from the mass 
grave of his townspeople.  In leaving the pit, grandfather throws his coat with its 
yellow star back down, a sign that in this second life, he will no longer be a Jew.  
Thus, the fact of his Jewishness and his victimization during the Holocaust 
becomes the suppressed memory.  By changing the history of the character, the 
film version no longer addresses the concept of the Banality of Evil, except for, 
perhaps, in its accusation towards the victims themselves.  In returning to 
Trachimbrod, Alex’s grandfather finally tells Alex his history, a move that allows 
him to connect emotionally with his grandson, as exemplified in the scene where 
Grandfather is driving from Trachimbrod and touches Alex’s face lovingly—an 
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acknowledgement of the idea that suppressing history impacts all aspects of our 
relationships.  In the film version as well, Alex’s grandfather commits suicide as a 
result of the emergence of these memories.  However, the meaning of that suicide 
is different.  As Annette Kern-Stӓhler notes, “The film, in striking contrast, 
suggests that by killing himself, Alexander/Baruch finally takes his place among 
the victims and acknowledges his Jewishness thus to be reconciled with his past 
and the ghosts of that past (177-78).  Both suicides in the book and film stem 
from survivor’s guilt.  However, the film version’s does not ask the viewer to 
question the idea of responsibility and choiceless choice in the face of great evil.   
 Indeed, the film ends with themes of reconciliation rather than separation.  
By rediscovering the past and reclaiming their Jewish heritage, Alex’s family is 
able to heal.  The violence that so marks Alex’s personal history is eclipsed by 
one of the ending scenes where Alex’s whole family, wearing yarmulkes, are at 
Alex’s grandfather’s grave—a cohesive and supportive family unit.  Jonathan’s 
character, who appears “dead” throughout the film (best exemplified by the 
opening scene where a distance shot of Jonathan at his grandfather’s gravestone 
makes him appear as if he is one of the gravestones) is alive because of the 
discovery of his past.  In the voiceover that emerges in Jonathan’s return, Alex 
states, “I have reflected many times upon our rigid search. It has shown me that 
everything is illuminated in the light of the past. It is always along the side of us, 
on the inside, looking out. Like you say, inside out. Jonathan, in this way, I will 
always be along the side of your life. And you will always be along the side of 
mine.”  In this moment, the story ends with the interconnections and healing 
  148 
created through coming to terms with the past.  The connections built through the 
compressions of the metafictional devices in the novel ask the reader for a 
complex identification with Alex’s grandfather—one that is meant to elicit self-
reflexive questioning on the part of the reader.  The film does not ask the same of 
its viewer. 
 It is identification that becomes central to understanding the larger 
purposes of the novel.  The two genres—book and film—have the power to mold 
a reader’s reaction: “Both the novel and the film are fictions of ‘witnessing’ 
which, through the interpreter they introduce, and through the transmission of 
trauma he suffers, induce our identification with the victims and—although this is 
only in the novel—with the perpetrators and facilitate the further transmission of 
trauma” (Kern-Stӓhler 175).  Since both forms allow for a kind of immersion into 
a story, they both allow for a more complex relationship to history: “Drama and 
film are a case in point because they perform roles and act out dilemmas.  Like 
some installation art and museum exhibits, the viewer is placed within the space 
of the Holocaust and forced into an imaginative identification with the victims or 
survivors” (Sicher 68).  While some may call Grandfather a victim in the novel 
(in being forced into this choiceless choice) and hence a survivor, there still 
remains the stigma of the choice he made—one that the character feels given his 
long-term repression of the memory and the fact of his suicide.  In making the 
character in the film into the “Lista” type character—surviving from among the 
dead of the whole rest of the community, the viewer is denied that possibility of 
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identifying with the perpetrator.  In that denial, we fail to connect to the idea that 
the Banality of Evil exists as a part of ourselves. 
 So, does this mean that there is a failure on the part of Schreiber in making 
these changes or does the act of changing a message to make it “palatable” 
something inherent in film?  Even in the beginning of film (1915), the question of 
purpose emerges: “Yet this power of the moving pictures to supplement the 
schoolroom and the newspaper and the library is, after all, much less important 
than its chief task—to bring entertainment and enjoyment and happiness to the 
masses” (Münsterberg).  As the artistry of film continues to grow, the relationship 
between real historical messages and entertainment becomes more complex, 
especially in relation to the Holocaust: “From the word go, it [the Holocaust] was 
not a subject that was particularly appealing to audiences.  Maybe they didn’t 
want to be reminded of their own anti-Semitism or racism.  Maybe people don’t 
go to movies to feel awful about themselves and what they are and what they do” 
(Imaginary Witness).  Again, we can look to Tarantino’s film, Inglorious 
Basterds, as an example of how complex the relationship is between viewer and 
movie.  The film opens with a truthful depiction of the choiceless choice.  Faced 
with the fact that Colonal Landa’s men have his daughters outside (and the 
obvious fact that these men are armed), Monsieur LaPadite must ask himself 
whether he should risk their lives and his in order to protect the family of Jews 
hiding under his house—a bluff that may end in the deaths of both families rather 
than one.  The scene is incredibly painful to watch, inviting the viewer into a 
sympathetic relationship with Monsieur LaPadite and, thus, the choiceless choice.  
  150 
Yet, what makes that opening bearable?  Immediately after that scene, the film 
embarks on a fantasy of revenge, culminating in the graphic death of Hitler at the 
hands of American Jews.  While the viewer begins with painful emotion, there is 
a satisfying, cathartic release at the end, one that transforms the raw emotion of 
identification with a perpetrator into entertainment. 
 The film version of Everything is Illuminated also represents elements that 
make it a distinctly American response to the Holocaust.  In the documentary, 
Imaginary Witness: Hollywood and the Holocaust, Michael Berenbaum discusses 
the ways in which place can affect the message of a film: “The place from which 
you remember an event shapes the nature of what you remember.  In Poland, you 
tell the story of the Holocaust one way; in Berlin, you tell it another way.  In 
America, the story of the Holocaust does not teach the differences between people 
but the notion that society must be broad enough and bold enough and wide 
enough to encompass all.”  In essence, it teaches an ideal of America that speaks 
to values of inclusivity and democracy.  In the film, Everything is Illuminated, the 
scene towards the end of the film when Jonathan arrives back in the United States, 
exemplifies this idea.  As he walks through the airport, he sees many of the 
Ukrainians he has met on his journey (many of whom openly displayed anti-
Semitism) who are now airport workers, fellow travelers, or a boy with his 
parents.  Visually, we read this as a moment of healing and forgiveness.  Yet, 
does it also imply that if these people were American, they would not be anti-
Semitic?  Carrying that thought to its implied conclusion, the (American) viewer 
is left with the uplifting notion of “not in America.”   
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 In comparing the film and written versions of Everything is Illuminated, 
one is left with two very different messages.  In the book, identification with the 
perpetrator allows for the possibility of self-reflexive questioning on the part of 
the reader.  In addition, the book allows Foer to intricately explore the role of the 
intergenerational witness who writes into absence.  The question of forgiveness is 
withheld through Foer’s metafictional invocation of the author in the text; Alex 
does not exist in the real world for Foer.  Thus, the character of Alex becomes a 
fantasy of what Foer perhaps hoped to find in the Ukraine.  The film version 
evades all of these issues by removing the role of the perpetrator completely from 
the film. That change in character along with the decidedly American viewpoint 
at the end of the film, focuses more on healing rather than self-reflexively facing 
one’s relationship to the Banality of Evil.  In looking at this adaptation, one must 
ask why these changes were made.  Does it reflect the viewpoint of the director?  
Or is this part of film as a medium of entertainment?  In the next two chapters, I 
will continue to explore this question of whether film, as a genre, is capable (or 
willing) to enter into a discussion on the Banality of Evil. 
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Notes: 
1The massacre at Babi Yar in September 1941 where over 30,000 Jews were shot and killed during 
a two day time span was carried out by SS soldiers and local Ukrainians.  Yet, this is hardly the 
only episode of mass atrocity.  As Menachem Feuer in “Almost Friends: Post-Holocaust Comedy, 
Tragedy, and Friendship in Jonathan Safran Foer’s Everything is Illuminated” notes, Ukraine’s 
history during the war should be considered with a longer history of progroms that occurred before 
the war (as well as anti-Semitic incidents since that time). 
 
2Here, I am not necessarily arguing that Jewish religious practice calls for this inscription of the 
Holocaust into religious faith.  Rather, I am speaking to cultural traditions that deal with the 
passing down of history through oral storytelling. 
 
3In the story, there are questions about who was in the wagon when it overturned since the only 
person who claims to have seen Trachim is unreliable.  This sets up the instability of the 
Trachimbrod history that mirrors the Jonathan’s position as he is writing it. 
 
4Later in the Trachimbrod section, there is a developed scene of Safran reading The Book of 
Antecendents that specifically includes the section that Brod sees in this scene.  However, the 
other details that Brod sees are not apparent in the scene with Safran, especially the young girl.  
While there is certainly a parallel structure between the two scenes, it is impossible to conclude 
that Brod is seeing Safran. 
 
5In Alex’s story, Jonathan finds remnants of Trachimbrod’s history but those are stolen when he 
leaves the Ukraine, and thus, unavailable to him in his reconstruction of the history. 
 
6Arendt’s discussion of the Banality of Evil does address the role of the victim as a component in 
the Nazi’s ability to carry out such widespread destruction through both the groups like the 
Judenrat who aided in the administration of the ghettos (including liquefying) and the overall lack 
of resistance.  However, that continues to be a component of the discussion of the Banality of Evil 
that continues to cause unease. 
 
7Possibly, he is the only Jewish survivor who was there when the Nazis arrived.  The character of 
Augustine, who is really Lista in the novel, also undergoes a transformation from victim to 
bystander. 
 
  153 
CHAPTER 6 
TRANSITIONING FROM BOOK INTO FILM:  
EXPLORING THE MEANING OF THE HOLOCAUST IN  
THE PAWNBROKER 
Manifestly, we have not yet learned how to 
integrate the Holocaust into Jewish consciousness 
as we once integrated the exodus or the destruction 
of the Temples.  The reason is clear.  The Holocaust 
does not point anywhere but everywhere. 
-Jonathan Sacks, The Holocaust in Jewish Theology  
 
“Because while the truncheon may be used in lieu 
of conversation, words will always retain their 
power. Words offer the means to meaning, and for 
those who will listen, the enunciation of truth. And 
the truth is, there is something terribly wrong with 
this country, isn't there? Cruelty and injustice, 
intolerance and oppression. And where once you 
had the freedom to object, to think and speak as you 
saw fit, you now have censors and systems of 
surveillance coercing your conformity and soliciting 
your submission. How did this happen? Who's to 
blame? Well certainly there are those more 
responsible than others, and they will be held 
accountable, but again truth be told, if you're 
looking for the guilty, you need only look into a 
mirror.” 
    -V, V for Vendetta 
 
 
 In looking over the previous chapters leading to this one, there are two 
arcs that are being developed: one follows the use of self-reflexivity while another 
follows the developing commentary on Arendt’s idea of the Banality of Evil, 
which is strongly tied to narratives that use themes that can best be described by 
Lawrence Langer’s idea of deathlife narratives.  The Pawnbroker, both Edward 
Lewis Wallant’s novel and Sidney Lumet’s film version, is the least self-reflexive 
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of the works explored; the role of the intergenerational witness is invoked through 
space as both the novel and the film build parallels between 1960’s Harlem and 
Sol Nazerman’s experiences of the Holocaust.1  At the same time, The 
Pawnbroker also utilizes a version of the deathlife narrative that aligns most with 
Langer’s conceptualization of the term in relation to Holocaust witness testimony 
in that both versions depict a survivor whose life is constantly shadowed by the 
unnatural deaths of others, including his family.  Like the survivors Langer 
discusses, Nazerman’s consciousness can be thrown into the past as something (a 
sound, a feeling, a sight) reminds him of the camps.  There is a political motive 
for these flashbacks since it is meant to invoke the connections between Harlem 
and the Holocaust, specifically through an invocation of the Banality of Evil—one 
that Nazerman must come to terms with as he considers the role he plays in the 
corruption within Harlem.  Thus, the community of memory that is invoked in 
both the novel and the film has ethical implications by asking the reader/viewer if 
there is a connection between the past and what is occurring in Harlem.  Given the 
differences between the two forms, novel and film, it is striking how much Lumet 
was able to capture, especially the use of flashback, to invoke the connections 
between Nazerman’s present and his past.  At the same time, there are aspects of 
the film version, specifically character changes, that do affect the commentary on 
the Banality of Evil; while Lumet’s changes are not as obvious as Liev 
Schreiber’s cinematic version of Everything is Illuminated, the results are 
potentially similar in allowing the American viewer to disassociate oneself from 
the idea of the Banality of Evil as it could be applied to the race dynamics within 
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Harlem.  This is not to say that Lumet’s film fails completely in its aim; the 
viewer’s ability to connect to the character of Nazerman in the film potentially 
invites self-reflection.  At the same time, the film moves away from commentary 
that could challenge the viewer to consider how race constructions and power 
dynamics within the United States perpetuate exploitation and corruption. 
  To begin, it is important to understand Wallant’s position as an 
intergenerational witness and the affect it has on both the development of his 
characters and the connections he builds between Harlem and the Holocaust.  
Compared with Art Spiegelman, Joseph Skibell, and Jonathan Safran Foer, 
Wallant’s connection to the Holocaust seems to depend on what Avishai Margalit 
might characterize as a thinner relationship; whereas the former writers have 
direct family ties, Wallant’s relies on being part of the Jewish community on the 
East Coast.  The only possibility of a more direct link is based on information 
given by his editor: “According to Dan Wickenden, his editor at Harcourt, Brace, 
Wallant also had a close friend who had survived the death camps and may have 
related details relevant to scenes in The Pawnbroker” (Mesher para 6).  Wallant’s 
novel reflects this position since it focuses on the survivor in New York, haunted 
by memory rather than the self-reflexive positions related to family and personal 
memory that are at the core of Spiegelman’s, Skibell’s, and Foer’s works.  If The 
Pawnbroker can be seen as self-reflexive at all, it centers on place, New York, 
and seeks to build a connection between that space and the past: 
A direct rendition of the Holocaust throughout the novel would 
have placed the author on decidedly slippery ground because of the 
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danger that he would fail to achieve the required authenticity, 
which is after all one of the necessary preconditions of Holocaust 
literature…Wallant realized that in order to achieve a certain 
degree of credibility it would be more appropriate to build the 
Holocaust story into a narrative using “props” that were more 
familiar to his own experience and to that of his American readers, 
i.e. to set the narrative in the America of his time.  (Kolář 23) 
As Stanislav Kolář goes on to note, this strategy is found in other American 
Holocaust novels and is useful for an American audience since it preserves 
distance from the event and allows for a familiar context.  The Holocaust then 
appears through the medium of recollections (23).  In this sense, the self-
reflexivity relies on an American context.   
 Wallant’s exposure to the Holocaust and witness testimony also influences 
the characterization of Nazerman in the text.  Compared to the texts explored in 
the previous chapters, Nazerman most closely aligns with Spiegelman’s father 
and the biographical sections of Maus although Nazerman can perhaps be read as 
a more stylized version in that he is represented as a kind of icon of suffering for 
the other characters: “The sight of the big white man lifted Cecil’s spirits 
perceptibly; the awkward caution of his walk indicated misery on a different scale 
from his own.  For a few minutes he forgot his wife…forgot even the anticipated 
misery of a whole day’s work plastering walls with shaky, unwilling hands.  He 
was actually moved to smile as Sol Nazerman approached, and he thought gaily, 
That man suffer!” (Wallant 4).  The scale of Nazerman’s suffering, even though it 
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is recognized by other characters in the novel, is represented on a different scale.2  
The few instances where this is not true are with the other Holocaust survivors in 
the text, which will be discusses more fully later in the chapter.  Though the other 
characters might not know why Nazerman suffers, unless they see and understand 
the significance of the tattooed numbers on his arm, his misery is a clear sign in 
the text. 
 From the very first chapter, the reader is privy to the reasons for 
Nazerman’s suffering since Wallant utilizes characteristics of the deathlife 
narrative revealed through the 3rd person narrator.  Compared to the versions of 
intergenerational deathlife narratives that are seen in Skibell’s and Foer’s texts, 
Wallant’s version follows more closely the witness testimony that Lawrence 
Langer uses in his conceptualization of the term: “In many instances the sensation 
of being dead while alive reflects a dual thrust of their present being: in 
chronological time they seek their future while in durational time, those isolated 
moments of dreadful memories do not dissipate but congeal into dense claws of 
tenacious consciousness.  A lethal past relentlessly pursues them” (Using and 
Abusing 2).  As Langer notes, the triggers for memory can be varied but, once the 
memory is evoked, it overwhelms the survivor, who suddenly finds oneself back 
in the past re-experiencing trauma.  The witness, in these moments, has no power 
over the memory and cannot stop its emergence.  This characteristic is present in 
Nazerman from the beginning of the text:  
Suddenly he had the sensation of being clubbed.  An image was 
stamped behind his eyes like a bolt of pain.  For an instant he 
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moved blindly in the rosy morning, seeing a floodlit night filled 
with screaming.  A groan escaped him, and he stretched his eyes 
wide.  There was only the massed detail of a thousand buildings in 
quiet sunlight.  In a minute he hardly remembered the hellish 
vision and sighed at just the recollection of a brief ache, his glass-
covered eyes as bland and aloof as before. (Wallant 5). 
Although the text is not clear about what sparks the memory at this point (Wallant 
will make specific connections later in the novel), the moment invokes the 
deathlife narrative and its connection to a duality of time: as Nazerman walks to 
work, he simultaneously finds himself thrust into the past through traumatic 
memory. 
 Nazerman’s physical disfigurement also adds a layer to the development 
of the deathlife narrative in the novel.  In the novel, Nazerman is a survivor of 
Nazi medical experimentation, an aspect that is hinted at from the beginning of 
the text as well: “No fear that he could be taken in by it; he had the battered 
memento of his body and his brain to protect him from illusion” (Wallant 4).  The 
extent of the damage is not made apparent until the second chapter when 
Nazerman is bathing: 
It ran over the bulky, subtly deformed body, the body he never 
looked at, with its peculiar unevennesses, its inexplicable collapses 
and thickenings.  There was a piece of his pelvic bone missing, two 
of his ribs were gone, and his collarbone slanted in weird 
misdirection.  Seeing him, one might wonder what kind of bizarre 
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accident had malformed him so shrewdly, with such perverse 
design.  But, when he dried and covered himself with a robe, it 
became apparent that, by some coincidence (or queer design), each 
distortion had been compensated for by another, and nothing 
untoward showed in his clothed body except perhaps the careful 
awkwardness of his walk…  (Wallant 37). 
Of course, there is nothing accidental about what happened to Nazerman’s body; 
it represents a kind of experimentation the purpose of which is grotesque rather 
than expanding legitimate medical knowledge, as the reader can see through the 
dream that recalls his experience: “‘All done,’ a doctor said.  ‘It will be interesting 
to see how he functions now’” (Wallant 131).  In terms of his characterization, the 
deformation of his body (even if he does not look at it, he must feel it) serves as a 
constant, visceral reminder.  Both body and mind are trapped within the 
deathlife—the constant reminder of the past and its continued presence. 
 The deathlife narrative in Wallant’s novel is the underpinning to his 
alienation from the people that surround him—his sister’s family in Mount 
Vernon, his customers, Tessie and her father (both survivors of the Holocaust), 
Jesus Ortiz, and Marilyn Birchfield, the social worker who tries to befriend him.  
Nazerman’s alienation is conscious, cultivated to act as a shield.  At points, he 
frames it mockingly like the moment where he quotes T.S. Eliot’s The Lovesong 
of J. Alfred Prufrock: “I grow old…I grow old…/I shall wear the bottoms of my 
trousers rolled” (Wallant 55).  The heart of Eliot’s poem is the alienation of 
Prufrock from the world around him, seeing only fragments of people (women) as 
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he internally builds barriers that prevent him from participating in society and 
pursuing love.  The lightness of the passage Nazerman recalls provides a sharp 
counterpoint for Nazerman’s deeper alienation; Prufrock’s inability to face social 
judgment seems superficial compared to Nazerman’s experience of what 
humanity is capable of as seen through his experiences in the Holocaust.  
Immediately following the quote, Nazerman decides to visit Tessie Rubin, with 
whom Nazerman is having an affair.  Both are survivors and both share the 
potential for a deep connection; Nazerman was a witness to Tessie’s husband’s 
brutal death in the camps.  Yet, their relationship, even the physical act of sex, is 
without love: “And then they made love on the lumpy couch with the sounds of 
the old man’s groaning madness in the other room, and there was very little of 
passion between them and nothing of real love or tenderness, but, rather, that 
immensely stronger force of desperation and mutual anguish” (Wallant 62).  In 
his most intimate relationships, Nazerman is alienated, consumed by the past that 
prevents him from connecting on an emotional level with those who surround 
him. 
 The origins of his alienation are rooted in the Holocaust through the 
process of dehumanization he is forced into, the process of which is unfolded 
through the memories of the Holocaust that appear as dreams that Wallant 
visually distinguishes from the rest of the text by using italics.  In his discussion 
of the dream passages, Kolář notes the progression of Nazerman’s alienation as he 
relives his experiences in the war.  The first dream focuses on the deportation of 
Nazerman and his family to the camps; crushed together in the cattle car, 
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Nazerman is unable to help his son, David, when he slips to the bottom of the car 
into the filth.  As Nazerman’s wife, Ruth, calls on him to help their son, he 
responds, “‘But I can’t, I can’t.  I can do nothing.’  His voice sounded flat and 
unconcerned and he tried to put more passion into it.  ‘I am helpless, do you 
hear?’” (Wallant 38).  The process of dehumanization has begun, leading to 
alienation as a way to deal with the extremities of his circumstances—ones that 
reinforce his powerlessness.  Unable to act, he withdraws emotionally from his 
own family.  The focus in the dreams then becomes Nazerman’s role as a witness 
to Rubin’s death, Ruth’s sexual exploitation, and, finally, his work as a 
Sonderkommando: “It was a pair of spectacles, remarkably unbroken.  He put 
them on, and the whole vast spectacle leapt into horrid clarity.  He clenched his 
jaw as though to break the bone there and went back to his work, inflicting the 
cleared vision on himself.  It was the very least he could do” (Wallant 198).  Yet, 
this witnessing does not take place on an emotional level (and, indeed, in that 
extreme situation, it might not be possible).  As Kolář notes, it is during 
Nazerman’s work as a Sonderkommando that marks the final stage of his 
alienation: “When he comes across the dead body of Ruth, Sol feels estranged, 
perceiving the whole moment as a betrayal of their mutual love” (33).  Kolář goes 
on to quote Wallant, “How ugly, what a mockery of their love!  Why did she do 
this to him?” (224).  Nazerman’s focus is pushed so far into himself so that he no 
longer sees the larger context of why Ruth is dead; he blames her for the effect 
her death has on him, not the Nazi perpetrators.  It is a narrowing of focus onto 
himself, onto what is immediate, that prevents him from seeing the larger power 
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structures that are the causes of his trauma—a result not uncommon in the camps 
when survival often might mean putting oneself above a fellow inmate.3 
 Although the alienation that Nazerman learns in the camps extends 
to the people he is surrounded by in America, he still becomes a figure on which 
members inscribe their various needs.  While some of these may be more 
superficial than others, many of them call for a deeper emotional connection that 
Nazerman denies them. This is clear in the sections of the text where the narration 
focuses on Nazerman’s family and the ways in which each member tries to 
visualize him in certain roles.  Joan, for instance, tries to fit Nazerman into the 
portrait of what an American family should be: “she was even able to include her 
Uncle Sol in that rosy-tinted picture.  She referred to Sol as being an old-
fashioned bachelor, a very learned European ex-professor, and intimated to 
outsiders that his taciturnity was only a guise for a shyly affectionate nature” 
(Wallant 32).  Certainly, Nazerman resists this reading of himself; when the 
family turns to conflict, he insists that he should be left alone.  However, this does 
not prevent the other family members from seeing him in similar ways.  Selig, 
Nazerman’s brother-in-law, sees Nazerman as a sort of father figure: “You’re 
younger than I am…but it’s funny, this will sound foolish, I feel as protected with 
you here as I did when I was a kid still living with my father” (Wallant 82).  
Despite the distance that Nazerman places between himself and other people, their 
personal needs define how they perceive him, inscribing onto Nazerman identities 
that do not truly exist. 
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While the needs of his sister, Joan, and Selig are largely superficial (and 
have much more to do with his financial support), other characters in Wallant’s 
novel have much deeper needs.  For instance, Morton, the marginalized artist son 
of his sister, looks to Nazerman as the one who shows some value for his work—
encouragement that does not exist in the rest of his family (166-67).  For one of 
Nazerman’s customers, George Smith, Nazerman serves as a bridge between the 
theory he reads and its application to real life.  Among all the minor characters, 
George sees Nazerman as a way for him to ground himself in reality—
specifically, to help him suppress his pedophiliac desire: “Thank the weekly visits 
to the Pawnbroker for the nourishing of his wistful discipline.  Sol had appeared 
to him one day three years before, when he had been wandering in a maddened 
haze of lust, had answered him in that heady language he had formerly 
encountered only in books, had thus lent reality to words he had been losing 
contact with” (Wallant 48).  Through the narration, Wallant establishes George’s 
personal need for Nazerman.  Despite Nazerman’s dislike of associating with 
George, he still gives him something of himself: “Every few days [George] 
brought a token article for pawn, and Sol Nazerman had been unable to deny him 
that, had, in spite of a deep exasperation, played the strange, sad game with the 
frail Negro, as though it were some unwelcome yet necessary tribute he paid” 
(Wallant 48).  Nazerman’s alienation, however, makes the relationship fragile, as 
exemplified when he rejects George.  Certainly, Nazerman is unaware of why 
George seeks him out.  Conscious or not, the fact that there are (inferred) 
consequences to this rejection places a level of judgment on Nazerman.4 
  164 
There are only two characters who are depicted as having an impact on 
Nazerman that begins to break down the boundaries between his memories of the 
camp and his present life in Harlem: Marilyn Birchfield and Jesus Ortiz.  Their 
influence marks Nazerman’s slow return to life—to the need to feel and to care 
for other people.  Marilyn’s determination to open Nazerman up is marked by 
both her persistence in pursuing him and by her recognition of his past.  Of all the 
characters who are not Holocaust survivors, she is the only one who quickly 
recognizes the impact that the event had on Nazerman and chooses to confront it 
openly.  When she sees the numbers tattooed onto his arm, she understands their 
significance; the other ghetto characters, including Ortiz, know that the numbers 
are significant but they do not know why.  In contrast, Nazerman’s family knows 
of his experience but chooses not to address it.   Murillio, in his final 
confrontation with Nazerman, realizes the power—perhaps even the cause—of 
Nazerman’s refusal to participate in victimizing others when he really looks at the 
tattoo and considers its implications.  Yet, Marilyn is the only one who really tries 
to make a connection with Nazerman: “And then, just when he had her on the 
point of angrily humiliated departure, her eyes fell on the blue numbers on his 
arm.  Her eyes went dreamy with pity, and she looked back up to his strange, ugly 
face with an exasperating humility, armored now beyond his insult.  ‘I am sorry, 
Mr. Nazerman’” (Wallant 103-04).  While her consciousness of his past mediates 
her reactions to him, Marilyn still critiques his responses to others, his 
unwillingness to be truly alive: “tell me this, then, Mr. Nazerman.  If your 
reasoning is correct, why haven’t you found peace?  Isn’t it possible your 
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philosophy, or whatever you live by, is in error?” (Wallant 146-7).  In the midst of 
Nazerman’s declared desire for peace and quiet, he still talks with her; this is an 
indication of the ways in which his actions suggest an unspoken need for him to 
reach out to other people—and Marilyn is quick to recognize it. 
 The other major relationship that Nazerman participates in is with Jesus 
Ortiz, his assistant in the pawnshop.  Nazerman’s view of Ortiz focuses on how 
alive he seems to be: “And with that he was around the corner and on the steps 
leading up to the lost, moving with the amazing litheness that so startled 
Sol…Briefly, he tried to recall the distant sensation of youth” (Wallant 11).  
Throughout the text, there are brief moments when Nazerman seems to be making 
a connection with Ortiz: 
Outside, the early-evening traffic sounds crowded the last bits of silence 
into the store, where it surrounded them and left them like undiscovered 
islands in their private dusk.  “But, most of all, I do not trust people and 
their talk, for they have created hell with that talk, for they have proved 
they do not deserve to exist for what they are.” (Wallant 114-5) 
The narration focuses on a connection between the two through its use of the term 
“them” combined with “surrounded” and “their private dusk.”  Sol is also 
expressing, in an oblique way, his experiences in the camps. The relationship 
between Nazerman and Ortiz is characterized by Alan Rosen as one of teacher 
and pupil: “At bottom, then, the lesson is about learning, about how to take what 
seems natural and, by examining its lineage, to see how history taught it to be 
what it is” (86).  In this quote, Rosen is examining the lecture about the history of 
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Jews as “good businessmen.”  Yet, in explaining his experience, Nazerman is also 
teaching Ortiz about his history—albeit in a bitter way, utilizing stereotypes that 
are part of anti-Semitic views.5  This marks the push and pull of Nazerman’s 
relationship with Ortiz; even as Nazerman seems to be reaching out to Ortiz, he 
tries to close off their relationship: “‘You are nothing to me,’ Sol said savagely as 
the phantom of pain suddenly shot through him” (Wallant 180).  Given that 
Nazerman’s pain, both physical (from the medical experiments) and emotional, 
stems from his experience in the concentration camps, one reads this moment of 
rejection as connected to Nazerman’s experience—a learned response that 
supports his alienation. 
 Nazerman’s continued alienation, however, is not necessarily 
representative of all Holocaust survivors; while Tessie, Mendel, and Goberman 
certainly all bear trauma, they have not fully isolated themselves.  Through the 
other Holocaust survivors in the text, the reader can contextualize Nazerman’s 
responses to and alienation from his community since these characters serve as a 
sort of communal voice that echoes and contradicts Nazerman’s choices as a 
survivor: “The survivor community acts as a Greek chorus whose comments and 
behavior provide a gauge by which to measure the protagonist” (Kremer 62).  By 
refusing to isolate Nazerman’s experience within the text, the reader is forced to 
consider other possible responses to the horrors of the Holocaust—especially ones 
that do not cut the survivor off from his/her emotions (i.e. Nazerman’s response).  
As S. Lillian Kremer notes: “Since both Tessie and Sol are consumed with grief, 
one expressing it while the other suppresses it, their own relationship is void of 
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joy” (63).  While it is not clear that Tessie’s emotions are an adequate release for 
her trauma, she is not alienated.  Her need for Nazerman, especially following the 
death of her father, is founded in shared experience.  Yet, the fact that their 
emotions work in opposition to each other undermines the benefits each could 
share from this connection. 
In looking at the survivor community as a chorus, it is perhaps Goberman 
who provides the closest mirror to Nazerman in terms of the larger message in the 
novel.  As a survivor himself, Goberman also has access to memories of the 
horrors of the camps, but his response is different from that of Nazerman or 
Tessie in that his learned experience—survival at any cost—underlies his 
exploitation of other survivors as seen through his treatment of Tessie.  
Supposedly working as a fundraiser to aid Jews worldwide, the texts infers that he 
is secretly taking the money.6  To further his cause, he preys on the survival guilt 
of the others: “…in a grotesque parody of justice, Goberman confuses Holocaust 
survivors with their oppressors, demanding that the victims expiate their sin of 
outliving fellow Holocaust victims by helping Jews in current peril” (Kramer 63).  
At the same time, it may not be confusion that underlies Goberman’s actions; 
rather, he exploits anyone he can to ensure his own wellbeing.  When Nazerman 
meets Goberman, he recognizes Goberman from Bergen-Belsen:  
“Yes, yes, I’m certain now.  You were even a little fatter 
then.  You had a method for getting more food.  There was some 
talk—I don’t know for sure how true—but there was some talk of 
co-operation with a certain…” 
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“It was a lie, a complete lie!” Goberman shouted, beating 
on his briefcase.  “No one could accuse…” 
“If I am not mistaken there was someone who claimed that 
you even informed on members of your own family…”  (Wallant 
123). 
While many survivors felt some guilt for the choiceless choices they made 
(Nazerman working as a Sonderkommando, a worker in the process of death, 
faces guilt for his role in enabling the camps to function), Goberman’s actions, if 
true, marks a more extreme violation by betraying his family.  That some measure 
of Nazerman’s accusation is true comes out in Goberman’s response: “No one can 
say to my face that I…never in a million years would I have done a thing like that 
to my immediate family.  Do you think I could sleep at night, do you think I could 
sit still for a minute if…?  Would I run around like a madman, day and night, if 
I…?” (Wallant 124).  The stress on “immediate” family indicates a partial, not 
complete rejection of Nazerman’s accusation.  Pairing that stress with the 
fractured questions, the second contradicting the first, reveals a level of guilt 
beyond that of most survivors.  While “many witnesses evince a questioning, 
retrospective ‘why me’ guilt, most often thought of as survivor guilt,” 
Goberman’s active exploitation of Jews during the Holocaust by acting as an 
informant goes beyond the choiceless choice seen in the novel Everything is 
Illuminated (Kraft 138).7  The motivation of his actions is banal—it is a basic 
human instinct to want to survive—but by betraying his ethical (thick) 
relationships, Goberman’s actions would be seen as less forgivable.  
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 It is precisely that guilt that Nazerman uses against Goberman to free 
Tessie from being exploited through her survivor guilt; yet, Nazerman 
simultaneously claims not to judge him: “But you feel guilt about some of your 
crimes, you cannot sleep so well.  So you run around with that brief case and try 
to make everyone feel as guilty as you, meantime turning a pretty penny.  Now I 
do not judge you, understand, it does not matter to me what you do.  Only you 
must know that you are naked to me” (Wallant 124).  On one level, this speaks to 
Nazerman’s alienation—he does not care enough to judge; on another level, the 
inability to judge is a comment on Nazerman’s own actions in the present.  While 
there is discussion throughout the novel about how the pawning industry preys 
economically on the poor, Nazerman’s shop also serves as a money laundering 
center for Murillio’s illegal activities.  Goberman is indeed naked to Nazerman in 
that Nazerman can relate to Goberman’s actions in New York.  At the same time, 
Nazerman is not yet self-reflexively aware of the ways in which he has 
dehumanized the people around him—an act that allows him to participate in the 
evil going on in New York.  Although Mintz’s commentary is aimed at the film 
version of The Pawnbroker, it applies to the novel as well:  
Detachment is understood in The Pawnbroker as a process in 
which, because of unspeakable suffering, a person severs 
connections to others, becomes insensible to their pain, and 
thereby withdraws from the interconnectedness of humanity.  
Within the ethos of social conscience, detachment is the ultimate 
sin; it is the antithesis of sensitivity and makes engagement and 
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commitment impossible…His moral disfigurement is extreme 
because his victimization has been extreme.  (113-14). 
As Mintz notes here (and as discussed earlier in the chapter), Nazerman’s sense of 
alienation is grounded in his experiences during the Holocaust.  That fact, 
however, does not eclipse the critique that is at the heart of the novel—that 
Nazerman’s actions in the present make him a part of a system of violence and 
exploitation.  This invites one to revisit Margalit’s quote, “There is not so much of 
the banality of evil as the banality of indifference.  Yet, one has to admit that the 
combination of evil and indifference is lethal, like the combination of poison and 
water” (34).  While Wallant’s novel predates Hannah Arendt’s Eichman in 
Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, he does question how such 
widespread evil was (and is) possible through alienation and indifference. 
 A fair amount of the critique on Wallant’s text (and the film version) 
centers on the perceived mode through which Nazerman overcomes his 
indifference, namely the death of his assistant Jesus Ortiz.  As Kolář notes, 
“Jesus’ sacrificial death, by means of which Wallant highlights a series of biblical 
parallels (e.g. with the symbolic name of the character of the assistant or the 
crucifixion scenes in the novel), consummates the pawnbroker’s emotional 
transformation.  It liberates him from emotional deficiency and inertia” (36).  The 
fact that the novel (and the film) applies Christian redemptive themes to a 
Holocaust survivor is problematic, as critics like Alan Mintz note.  Yet, it is 
important to recognize that the rising action of the novel centers on Nazerman’s 
self-reflexive realization of the consequences of his actions—that he is part of the 
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oppressive forces at play in Harlem.  This realization begins to occur when 
Nazerman focuses on the presence of the brothel and its connection to Murillio 
and, through him, to Nazerman and his pawn shop.  In Nazerman’s realization of 
his role in the exploitation of young women, he makes the association with his 
wife’s rape and forced prostitution in the camps; part of his trauma is that he is 
made to witness his wife in the camp’s brothel (and that she sees him witnessing 
it).  Once he becomes aware of the brothel, he begins the process of change. 
 The dream that contains Nazerman’s witnessing of his wife’s sexual 
exploitation does not occur until after his confrontation with Murillio during 
which he attempts to sever their relationship.  At first, Nazerman recognizes his 
unease and decides to act, without forcing himself to recognize the causes of his 
emotion.  The full emotional response that triggers the dream is not invoked until 
after he is emasculated by having a gun shoved into his mouth: “And Sol stood 
there gagging on the horrible curb in his mouth, his gaze swinging wildly over the 
trappings of the hideously sumptuous room…It had been so long, so long since 
his nightmares were as real as taste and touch, since they came to him in waking 
hours.  He should have remembered more faithfully that this was the real taste of 
life, that it was not confined to dreams” (Wallant 163-4).  The depravity that was 
so often displayed in the camps is not isolated to the Holocaust—brutality can 
exist elsewhere.  Yet, the connection between Nazerman’s present and his dreams 
of the camps does not mean that Harlem and the Holocaust are interchangeable: 
“Although Wallant juxtaposes Harlem ghetto and European concentration camp, 
he judiciously distinguishes between the attendant human debasement of the 
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American ghetto and government sponsored genocide in the German 
concentration camps” (Kremer 66).  Rather, the point being made is that evil and 
the banality, the indifference that allows it to perpetuate exists on multiple 
levels—and that even a Holocaust survivor can become part of a system of 
exploitation. 
  It is Nazerman’s realization of his own implication in the violence and 
exploitation in Harlem that is the driving force of his transformation.  This is 
clearly indicated in his dream about his daughter Naomi, whose body he finds in 
the camp hanging from a hook.  During the dream, he begins to see the faces from 
New York superimposed upon the body of his daughter: “Each face appeared on 
the frail baby body with the cruel hook pointing up toward the head.  They were 
like slides projected there.  Yet in spite of the unreality, the succession of faces 
brought him no relief, indeed, made his pain grow worse, become cumulative, and 
each moment he thought to be the ultimate agony was exposed by the next 
moment’s increased intensity” (Wallant 194).  This moment of grief, containing 
screams that are characterized as like “vomiting or giving birth,” reflects 
Nazerman’s transformation, his step back from alienation and indifference 
(Wallant 193).  It is also the foundation for his choice to die rather than to 
continue as part of Murillio’s criminal syndicate.  While Murillio chooses to 
allow Nazerman to live, Nazerman must still face the consequences of his 
choices.  Motivated by greed and anger at Nazerman’s rejection of him, Ortiz 
chooses to participate in the robbery of the pawn shop; when one of the gun men, 
Robinson, decides to shoot Nazerman, Ortiz intercedes and dies.  Like Nazerman, 
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Ortiz must make a choice and he chooses to take responsibility for his actions.  
Because of that choice, Nazerman must take responsibility for living.  While the 
ending certainly does invite a reading of Christian redemption, condensing 
Nazerman’s transformation to that moment undermines Wallant’s theme on 
indifference and evil.  It is that theme that invites the reader to consider how racial 
tensions and ongoing inequality might also be characterized in terms of the 
Banality of Evil. 
Sidney Lumet’s adaptation of The Pawnbroker 
 The narrative choices in Wallant’s text serve to focus the meaning of the 
novel around Nazerman; even when the narrative moves from Nazerman’s 
experience, he is still present.  As critic Lillian S. Kremer notes: “Wallant 
successfully moved the Holocaust from the shadowy realm of symbolism and 
allusion to the foreground of fiction, presenting it as a major component of theme, 
narrative, and character construct” (59).  Certainly, a similar argument has been 
made for Sidney Lumet’s film adaptation of the novel.  By using editing and 
cross-cutting, Lumet also establishes the focus on Nazerman’s subjective 
experience; thus creating a metalanguage of visual images in a montage to express 
the consciousness of a Holocaust witness.8  At the same time, it is important to 
analyze this metalanguage in terms of the subtexts that are created.  While the 
film manages to capture Nazerman’s self-reflexive recognition of his role in the 
ongoing crime and violence in Harlem, the larger message of the novel—the one 
that asks the reader to consider if there are aspects of American life that might be  
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characterized in terms of the Banality of Evil (and, potentially, the American 
reader’s own participation in that system)—is impacted by key changes made in 
the film. 
 The importance of film, a media that reaches larger audiences then most 
novels, as a way to represent the Holocaust is widely felt, especially in terms of 
the importance placed on remembering.  At the same time, films have often been 
critiqued for their failure to fully grasp the nature of the Holocaust; behind this 
critique, there is a widespread concern for how films represent this event to a 
consumer market.  In Between Witness and Testimony, authors Michael Bernard-
Donals and Richard Glejzer note the ways that these issues affect the value of film 
representations.  They begin by discussing the ways that film functions as 
testimony: “But if we see testimony as an attempt to render in language that 
which we know—if we see testimony as a narrative account of the occurrence of 
events, events we have experienced by bringing them to knowledge ourselves—
then …films all function as testimony” (Bernard-Donals 104).  These events, 
especially in relation to an event as horrific as the Holocaust—one that defies 
words to hold it—break down when film (and other forms) attempt to express it in 
a universal language: “while you can arrive at knowledge—a universal position 
that can be understood by every speaking subject—something is lost from it: the 
encounter with the object is itself not recognizable in knowledge.  The trauma of 
the event is covered over by the language that endeavors to speak it” (Bernard-
Donals 105).  Yet, the issue is not just in the language but also in the genre, as 
Annette Insdorf notes in the documentary, Imaginary Witness: Hollywood and the 
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Holocaust: “Of all art forms, film is the one that gives the greatest illusion of 
authenticity, of truth.  A motion picture takes a viewer inside where real people 
are supposed to be doing real things.  We assume there is a certain verisimilitude, 
a certain authenticity but there is always some degree of manipulation, some 
degree of distortion.”  In the act of trying to put this event into film, there is a 
breakdown in possibilities of understanding due to the lack of a common 
experience that makes it intelligible to everyone; the availability of the knowledge 
is not there for everyone and the referents that one may bring to fore to try to 
make this event understandable potentially strips it of its magnitude.  In addition, 
the genre itself potentially distorts since it cannot be an exact replication of the 
event. 
So, how does one represent the Holocaust?  Insdorf, in Indelible Shadows: 
Film and the Holocaust, posits the importance of subjectivity of view—the focus 
on one character’s understanding and relation to the Holocaust—as more 
“truthful” then a fictional reconstruction of the camps themselves (23).  Since this 
subjectivity focuses on the individual, it resists attempts to universalize its 
message.  From the very beginning of the film, Lumet tries to emphasize the fact 
that the metalanguage of the film—the flashbacks—are representative of 
Nazerman’s subjectivity.  The film opens with a dream sequence in which 
Nazerman remembers a picnic with his family.  The scene is pastoral: a medium-
long shot of children running through the long grass transitioning to a medium 
close-up of a beautiful dark-haired woman that pans away into a long shot of the 
field.  The scene continues, moving from medium-long shots to medium close-ups 
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as each person (father, mother, Nazerman, wife, children) are considered.  The 
children run to Nazerman and he picks them up; the music changes from a 
discordant melody to a tone of danger.  Then one hears the name, “Sol,” and the 
scene dissolves into a “present day” suburb until the camera finally picks out 
Nazerman waking up at the house he shares with his wife’s sister’s family.  The 
representation of the family changes since the film relies on visual representation 
and not voice over to work as the commentary/summary/interiority does in the 
novel.  And, since viewing time is less than syuzhet (which is less than the fabula) 
the screenplay (written by Morton Fine and David Friedkin) focuses the dialogue 
on the most obvious relationship between the Nazerman and the family: money.  
The only exception is when Bertha reminisces about her sister, Ruth, and notes 
that it is almost 25 years since her death.  As Bertha is speaking, the camera 
moves from a one shot of her to a one shot of Nazerman.  When the one shot of 
Nazerman appears, the viewer sees a quick blip—a flash frame—of the woman 
from the dream.  By framing this initial flash frame within a one shot of 
Nazerman, the camera is constructing the memory in such a way that the viewer 
interprets the memory as Nazerman’s since his face is the only referent for the 
flash frame.   
The scene then dissolves into one of Nazerman driving in Harlem.  In this 
scene, Lumet uses a different camera angle to establish Nazerman’s perspective.  
When Nazerman leaves the car, the camera angle moves diagonally up as if the 
camera was getting out of the car.  This movement, which is visually awkward, 
reflects the movement of Nazerman getting out of the car; the viewer is meant to 
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think that they are viewing the scene from Nazerman’s perspective.  The view 
then moves through Harlem, picking up people here and there, a shop window full 
of a pile of shoes (reflecting the well-known piles of clothing, shoes, etc. that 
were found at the camps), and again more people—all of whom are wearing worn 
clothes.  Throughout this movement through Harlem, the shot shifts back to a 
medium close-up of Nazerman; his face is the constant referent of his perspective.  
The indication that the narrative has moved out of Nazerman’s viewpoint is a high 
crane shot that shows him crossing the street to the pawnshop.   
Since the demands of the viewing time necessitate a compression of 
characters, the film really only focuses on two characters: Nazerman and (to a 
much lesser extent) Jesus.  Yet, Lumet still tries to depict Nazerman’s relationship 
to the community.  In the pawn shop, Nazerman quickly enters his cage—the 
visual metaphor for his emotional entrapment.  When he is participating with the 
community, the camera picks them up as two shots, generally moving back and 
forth between the characters in over the shoulder angles.  When he is trying to 
establish distance between himself and the character he is facing, the camera still 
moves back and forth but each character is framed in a one shot.  The strongest 
example of the effectiveness of this camera movement is when George comes in 
to talk to Nazerman but he has nothing to pawn.  The character of George is 
changed in the movie; while he still reads complex books of theory, his voice is 
thick—almost as if he had a stroke.  To understand his words, the viewer has to 
pay attention.  This reflects the demands that George makes on Nazerman’s time 
but in a wholly different way; patience is now required for a physical impairment 
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and not a psychological one that the medium of film would have a great deal of 
difficulty in representing, specifically in terms of time constraints.  Nazerman’s 
responses are a limited to his business, which is also a deviation from the novel.  
When George comes to talk to Nazerman (without having anything to pawn), 
Nazerman cuts short his dialogue by asking what George has brought in.  The 
scene is visually constructed in a series of one shots; as George explains that he 
has nothing, the camera stays on him for an uncomfortably long shot.  The viewer 
is forced to see George’s pain.  The camera then cross cuts to Nazerman’s 
unresponsive face for a brief shot and then returns to another long one shot of 
George’s face attempting to control his emotions as he backs away and finally 
leaves.  By keeping the camera focused on George for such an uncomfortable 
length, the camera forces the viewer to participate in his discomfort.   By 
constructing the space of the pawn shop through these series of two shots/one 
shots, Lumet is visually attempting to express Nazerman’s alienation from the 
community. 
It is also during this day at the pawnshop that Marilyn Birchfield first 
appears.  Throughout the film, the figure of Marilyn is constantly framed by 
doors, a visual metaphor for a passageway.  Given that Marilyn’s character 
represents connection to the community, the use of the doors indicates the 
potential for Nazerman to reject his alienation and indifference.   In this first 
scene, the door behind her is closed, a reflection of Nazerman’s complete refusal 
to connect to her.  The shots of Nazerman are one shots behind his cage, a visual 
representation of the bars between them.  During their conversation, the door 
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behind Marilyn opens and a group of musicians come in to redeem their 
instruments.  The musicians also play a little, a reflection of the music that is used 
when the filmic narrative moves into Harlem (the pawnshop is quiet).  This 
framing indicates her participation in the community; Nazerman remains inside 
his cage until he is finally drawn out far enough to be framed by the open 
transaction window of the cage.  Throughout the scene, Nazerman tries to resist 
coming closer to her until he finally agrees to give her money.  When she leaves 
in anger at his comments, she leaves with the musicians; the larger connection to 
the community is severed with her exit. 
 The framing of Marilyn with doorways is a key visual image when 
Nazerman comes to talk with her after his confrontation with Rodriguez (Murillio 
in the novel).  Inside the apartment, the camera captures Nazerman sitting on a 
chair and Marilyn standing, trying to get him to talk.  In these two shots, there is 
an open door between them.  Marilyn convinces Nazerman to go outside with 
her—a passage into a moment where he tries to share part of himself with her.  He 
briefly looks at the city: tenements, industry, and a train yard meet his eyes.  
Nazerman wearily moves to sit; in the one shots of him sitting, he is framed by 
the shadows of the metal framework of the balcony—a visual rhetoric of 
entrapment.  The conversation between the two moves from one shots (medium 
close-ups) of each.  Unlike in the novel, Nazerman chooses to tell her that it is the 
anniversary of his family’s massacre.  When he says, “I didn’t die,” the mise-en-
scène (the background framing the characters) changes as the one shot shifts to 
his profile; behind him in the middle distance is an abandoned train car and the 
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horizon is marked by the smokestacks of an industrial plant.  Clearly, these are 
visual reminders of both the ways Holocaust victims were transported and of the 
crematorium of the concentration camps.  The framing of the shop also places the 
smokestacks in between Nazerman and Marilyn, a reinforcing image of the 
experience that separates the two characters.  Nazerman’s ongoing alienation 
continues through the end of the scene as the characters remain visually separated.  
After telling her, Nazerman stands up and walks past her, a passage back from the 
small bit of connection that he has allowed himself.  The shot moves back to the 
interior with Marilyn sitting holding herself and Nazerman coming in and sitting 
behind her.  The two shot again shows the distance between them, separated again 
by the open door.  Yet, there is also a small plant (an indication of new life) 
between them.  But the sharing is not enough, when Marilyn reaches back to 
touch him, Nazerman doesn’t respond. 
While the mise-en-scène and the shifts between one shots and two shots 
show one aspect of Nazerman’s relationship to the community, Lumet also uses 
cross-cutting (shifts from one scene to another) to emphasize differences between 
Nazerman’s relationship with Tessie and Ortiz’s with Mabel.  This is especially 
evident in the cross-cutting between the two couples having sex.  Nazerman and 
Tessie are shown as not moving; she is lying underneath him, her head turned to 
the camera while his is turned away.  They don’t move.  The scene then cuts to 
one of Mabel and Ortiz, she is one top of him and they are looking into each 
other’s eyes.  After a few moments, they begin to laugh.  The scene then cuts back 
to Nazerman and Tessie.  The cross-cutting narrates the differences between the 
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Holocaust survivors’ relationship (without passion or love) and the young Harlem 
couple (who are full of passion).  In this way, the editing of the two scenes in 
juxtaposition emphasizes the lack of emotion that prevails in Nazerman’s 
relationship with Tessie. 
The most notable use of film editing throughout this film is the flash cuts; 
while it sets up Nazerman’s subjectivity, it also creates a feeling of discomfort for 
the viewer who barely has time to see what the flash frame contains until it 
develops into a sustained scene.  In Imaginary Witness, Sidney Lumet discusses 
the origin of his use of the flash cuts: “I simply went back to the simplest thing, 
which is how my own memory works if I am trying to avoid something.  It was a 
quite literal interpretation of what happens in my own head, which is if I am 
fighting it, it flashes and flashes until finally it smashes through of its own 
volition.”  In the scene where Nazerman is leaving the pawnshop, a dog begins 
barking and the film flashes from Nazerman to an image of a dog running.  
Nazerman continues walking, to his right behind a fence a gang of young men are 
beating up one young black man.  The man tries to escape and runs to the fence, 
the scene flashes to that of a man trying to escape the German Shepard by 
climbing a fence.  This series of flash frames between present day Harlem and 
concentration camp also flicker between a shot of Nazerman (with bald head and 
striped uniform) watching the man on the fence to present-day Nazerman 
watching the young black man trying to escape.  The violence of the present 
echoes the past just as Nazerman’s position as witness in both periods is 
emphasized.  A procedural schemata is established since the similarity of the 
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pairings of images represent a connection between time and space (as well as 
establishing a causal link for the past to emerge). 
A similar link is established in the scene where Nazerman is on the train.  
After Nazerman sits down, he begins looking at his fellow passengers.  The 
camera shifts to a medium close-up/one shot of a man with hollowed cheeks—an 
emaciated face.  The camera shifts back to Nazerman and tracks him as he moves 
to the center of the car.  From that central position, the camera again picks out 
another emaciated face.  The frame flashes to scenes in a packed train car.  
Nazerman’s center of subjectivity remains since the camera frames each shot 
from his position in the center of the car.  As the camera moves in a 360 degree 
turn, the frames flash from the contemporary train to the packed train car of 
Nazerman’s memory.  When the turn is complete, the camera tracks Nazerman’s 
attempt to flee from the car.  As he opens another train car door, the train screams 
and the picture of Nazerman flashes into a sustained vision of the past with a baby 
crying.  Nazerman again relives his inability to keep his son David from falling, 
crying out again and again, “I can do nothing!”  This scene cuts away to the 
present as Nazerman stumbles off the train, disheveled, his mouth opening in a 
soundless cry.  On one level, the use of the flash cuts visually connects the present 
to the past; on another level, it invokes the death-life narrative—the sense that a 
trigger can propel one back in time even as one is living in the present.  The fact 
that these flash cuts overwhelm the screen, blotting out the present altogether for a 
brief space of time, reinforces the intensity of Nazerman’s trauma. 
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The use of the flash frames to enact Nazerman’s painful memories creates 
a powerful image, creating a dialogue between Nazerman’s experiences in New 
York and his memories in the camps.  As in the novel, the memories emerge 
based on a trigger.  When Mabel offers herself to Nazerman as a prostitute, she 
bares her breasts and demands that he look at her.  Moving from flash frames of 
Nazerman’s naked wife, the viewer becomes immersed in a scene where 
Nazerman is watching a group of women being forced into a building while 
laughing, black-uniformed Nazi officers enter from the other side.  The officer in 
charge of Nazerman grabs him and forces him to the window of the building.  
When he refuses to look in, the guard smashes his head through the window.  
From his position, the camera scans from an image of a woman being scrubbed by 
two Nazi officers to other cubicles and finally to his naked wife.  All the while, 
the viewer hears Mabel’s voice saying, “It don’t cost you nothing to 
look…look…look.”  The inclusion of her voice breaks down the boundaries 
between the present and the past joining both women’s sexual exploitation.  This 
does not mean that each women’s victimization is represented as the same; Ruth’s 
forced prostitution is different than Mabel’s choice based on economic 
subjugation.  Rather, the bleeding of the memory of his wife’s rape into the 
present is a condensed version of Nazerman’s motivations for deciding to end his 
relationship with Rodriguez.  
Yet, does this do justice to the distance between the Holocaust and Harlem 
that Wallant places in his narrative?  While it is clear that Lumet does not have 
the time to use separate dream sequences, the compression of the past and the 
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present through the flash frames seems to indicate that the violence in the present 
is similar to what Nazerman experiences in the past.  This connection is further 
emphasized in the scene where Nazerman confronts Rodriguez.  The choice to 
change the character of the Italian-American Murillio to the black Rodriguez is 
problematic.  As Alan Rosen notes, “In the novel, then, the chain of exploitation, 
from syndicate chief to the pawnbroker to the mainly black population of Harlem, 
replicates that of European Colonialism.  For Lumet, however, the agent of 
oppression comes not from without but from within...from one, in other words, 
who himself comes out of Harlem” (90).  It is in these choices, which change the 
broader political thrust of the novel, that one begins to question the ideological 
subtext of the film.  While it is somewhat misleading to say that these choices are 
auteur-like, the existence of a clear set of choices that changes the subtext of the 
film seems to indicate a controlling figure.  As Peter Wollen notes, one branch of 
auteur critics “grew up,” “those who insisted on revealing a core of meanings, of 
thematic motifs.”  The main focus of auteur theory centered on issues of style, 
including film editing such as has been discussed in this chapter.  Yet, the 
addition of ideological purpose is problematic in considering this theory; there are 
semantic approaches that would seem to fit better if one were to look at film as 
language.  In that way, one could access the ideological in terms of the 
encodement of language based on a suture model (Silverman).  Yet, these 
critiques focus on what is absent and, following a Lacanian linguistic model, seem 
to say that these meanings are as much inherited as they are pre-existing in 
language.  In moving from a novel to a film, the choice made to change a 
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character indicates an authority that is actively choosing the conditions of 
representation.  In this way, auteur critics allow one a way to directly address the 
fact that film, as a structured medium, represents choices that in turn affect how 
the movie is read. 
Returning to the example of Rodriguez, Lumet structures the confrontation 
between Nazerman and Rodriguez in the same way that he constructs the 
subjective memory of Nazerman.  In the face of Rodriguez’s anger, Nazerman 
assumes the role of victim; Rodriguez has the power not only to physically force 
Nazerman to look at him, but to force him to see his own participation in the 
victimizing of others.  The narrative of the film emphasizes Nazerman’s transition 
from blindness to sight; his glasses shift from opaque with the light bouncing off 
them to translucent where one can see Nazerman’s eyes.  When Rodriguez moves 
back to his side of the room, he tells Nazerman to sign the papers.  The camera 
focuses on Nazerman’s face and as he repeats the word yes, the shortest of the 
flash frames begin.  These flashes do not, however, focus on the past; they focus 
on Rodriguez.  Since the viewer is already conditioned to see these flashes as 
representative of Nazi atrocity, one draws a parallel between Rodriguez and the 
Nazis in terms of the potential for violence that exists within humanity (not in 
terms of the scale of atrocity).  At the same time, the change of the character 
potentially changes how the audience connects to the social issues in New York: 
as Alan Rosen notes, the change of race of the syndicate boss emphasizes the 
ways in which the victim is responsible for his/her own persecution—a parallel 
between Harlem and Hannah Arendt’s criticism in Eichmann in Jerusalem that 
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the Jews were responsible for their own victimization (90).  By presenting the 
viewers with the idea that victims are ultimately responsible for their suffering—
an idea that totally fails to consider the power structures that created each of these 
spaces—the viewer is potentially released from the larger political message 
concerning power structures and race relations in America. 
The pairing of Rodriguez with the Nazi is also problematized through 
another subtext in the film.  In earlier scenes, the viewer connects Rodriguez with 
a young white (Aryan looking) man who in some ways serves him (dialing the 
telephone) although he also seems to be on terms of some equality (he sits at the 
same table as Rodriguez).  This is an entirely new character with minimal action 
in the film—meant for a visual effect that could potentially recall the power 
dynamics of the book except for his subservience to Rodriguez.  When the young 
man enters at the end of Nazerman’s confrontation with Rodriguez, Rodriguez 
cuts the conversation short and follows the young man upstairs.  The inference of 
a homosexual relationship between the two might be ignored if not for other 
connections made between the homoerotic and the criminal throughout the film.  
Early in the film during the club scene, Tangee, Buck, and Robinson begin 
formulating a plan to rob the pawnshop (and trying to seduce Ortiz into joining 
them); on stage as background to their interaction is what appears to be a woman 
onstage, dancing with her skirt held up to just below her crotch.  At the end of the 
scene, it is revealed that the performer is actually male.  This is also combined 
with a scene (just before the robbing of the pawnshop) consisting of a one shot  
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where Robinson is laying on his bed with an open magazine depicting two bare-
chested men.  With his gun, Robinson touches the nipples of the men, tooting on 
his harmonica for emphasis. 
This subtext that links homosexuality to the evil in Harlem is problematic 
for two reasons: one, it associates homosexuality with crime and violence (in the 
context of the 1960’s, homosexuality is still widely considered a mental illness), 
and two, the character of Rodriguez invokes stereotypes about black male 
sexuality.  As Angela Davis notes in Rape, Racism, and the Myth of the Black 
Rapist, “For once the notion is accepted that Black men harbor irresistible and 
animal-like sexual urges, the entire race is invested with bestiality” (54).  In The 
Pawnbroker, the target of sexual control shifts from white women to a young 
white man, potentially invoking homophobia.  The use of homosexuality also 
combines with the images of the sexual exploitation of women in the film 
(including the one from the concentration camp), linking socially deviant 
sexuality with evil.  If one of the larger goals of the novel is to ask how the 
indifference combines with evil in the racial politics of America, the subtexts 
created in the movie through its commentary on sexuality combined with the idea 
that the evil happening is a result of blacks taking advantage of other blacks 
obscure that message.  In that way, an American audience of the film is released 
from self-reflexively considering how their own actions might be contributing to 
the institutionalization of racism in the United States. 
While the audience may not be forced to consider the larger political 
commentary on the Banality of Evil as it may apply to America, the film does 
  188 
exact a consideration of indifference on a personal level through the audience’s 
connection to Sol Nazerman, as portrayed by Rod Steiger.  Despite the fact that 
Nazerman (as he is in the novel) is a cold character, one feels a great deal of 
sympathy for his character, especially as one sees what he experienced during the 
Holocaust.  That connection allows for a personal exploration of the theme of the 
Banality of Evil, a consideration of personal actions on a localized scale.  At the 
end of the film, when Nazerman goes to the dying Ortiz, the viewer sees a flood 
of emotion.  In Imaginary Witness, Steiger discussed the choices he made as an 
actor in that moment: “I had one of the best moments I have had in acting.  I was 
involved, I was upset, I was crying.  And then my intellect came in and I was 
supposed to scream ‘Don’t make a sound.’  I put my head back and I did a silent 
scream, which was twice as powerful than if I would of screamed because you put 
your scream in my mouth.”  By denying the audience catharsis—a release of the 
audience’s emotion through the actor—the viewer is forced into a personal 
connection with the moment.  The commentary on the theme of the Banality of 
Evil is not lost in the film but it remains compressed, distanced from a larger 
political commentary on race relations. 
By looking at the choices that Lumet makes in adapting Wallant’s book 
into film, one can see how Lumet both succeeded and failed in portraying the 
narrative purpose of Wallant’s text.  The film, with it metalanguage, does an 
excellent job of portraying one individual’s experience of the Holocaust—the 
subjective view.  On a personal, compressed scale, the viewer is forced into a 
consideration of indifference and violence/exploitation—to the theme of the 
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Banality of Evil.  At the same time, the changes in characterization release the 
audience from the larger socio-political commentary that comes from the book’s 
representation of Harlem as a microcosm for racial politics in the United States.  
This stands in stark contrast to the passage from V for Vendetta quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter.  When the character of V says, “if you're looking for the 
guilty, you need only look into a mirror,” he is speaking to the whole of England, 
which in the film is under a Nazi-esque dictatorship.9  How can that film, which is 
so obviously an action packed fantasy, make a clearer statement about the 
Banality of Evil than films like The Pawnbroker or Everything is Illuminated?  
The answer lies in V for Vendetta’s overt fictionality—the audience has a release 
from the first moments of the film in that nothing presented is real.  In addition, 
films like The Pawnbroker and Everything is Illuminated address the Banality of 
Evil in more complex ways.  In critiquing these films for failing to force the 
viewer into a consideration of the Banality of Evil in a personal way, we must ask 
whether the problem is one of genre or one of audience.   
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Notes: 
1As Leonard J. Jeff notes in his discussion of how the film The Pawnbroker was developed into a 
movie, it would be a mistake to see the film as the work of an auteur since there were many 
different people involved in the development of the screenplay long before Sidney Lumet became 
involved with the project.  For the purposes of this analysis, however, it is important to look at the 
film’s message holistically and I will be using Lumet’s position as director to talk about the film in 
terms of the final product. 
 
2This passage could be read as potentially invoking a comparison of suffering between Jews and 
African Americans if both Nazerman and Cecil are read as representatives of each larger group.  
However, each character’s point of suffering is so individualized and, given Nazerman’s 
experiences in the camp, there is really no point of comparison.  At the same time, I do not think 
each character’s relative position undermines the parallels between Harlem and the Holocaust that 
Wallant is trying to discuss.  For a fuller discussion of the debates on comparisons of suffering 
between African Americans and Holocaust scholars, please see chapter 6. 
 
3In Night, Eli Wiesel painfully discusses the ways in which the struggle for survival affects even 
the closest relationships like that of Rabbi Eliahou’s son, who abandons his father and Wiesel’s 
own view of his father as a hindrance on his survival.  In the camps where survival is so tenuous, 
the focus can turn inwards.  There is also another form of emotional distance that happens when 
these relationships also become sites of trauma (the guilt for doing nothing and seeing a loved one 
die—even when one has no ability to help). 
 
4Although the reader is never shown what George does, on p. 243, he is shown waiting “spitefully 
predatory” for a victim on George’s “own road to hell.” 
 
5In Popular Culture and the Shaping of Memory, Alan Mintz discusses both his and Ilan Avisar’s 
discomfort with the way these stereotypes are used in the film version. 
 
6Nazerman believes this is what Goberman is doing, even before he meets him. 
 
7See the discussion of Alexander’s Grandfather in Chapter 4. 
 
8The ensuing analysis of film through editing relies on Bordwell’s theory of filmic narrative as he 
delineates it in his text, Narration in the Fiction Film.  
 
9V does this through a television broadcast on the government’s emergency broadcast channel. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INTERGENERATIONAL WITNESSING:  
COMPARING AFRICAN AMERICAN AND JEWISH AMERICAN 
RESPONSES TO TRAUMA 
Finally she speaks and her voice is soft but stern. "I 
don't know", she says. "I don't know whether the 
bird you are holding is dead or alive, but what I do 
know is that it is in your hands. It is in your hands." 
 
Her answer can be taken to mean: if it is dead, you 
have either found it that way or you have killed it. If 
it is alive, you can still kill it. Whether it is to stay 
alive, it is your decision. Whatever the case, it is 
your responsibility.… 
 
Speculation on what (other than its own frail body) 
that bird-in-the-hand might signify has always been 
attractive to me, but especially so now thinking, as I 
have been, about the work I do that has brought me 
to this company. So I choose to read the bird as 
language and the woman as a practiced writer. She 
is worried about how the language she dreams in, 
given to her at birth, is handled, put into service, 
even withheld from her for certain nefarious 
purposes. Being a writer she thinks of language 
partly as a system, partly as a living thing over 
which one has control, but mostly as agency—as an 
act with consequences. So the question the children 
put to her: "Is it living or dead?" is not unreal 
because she thinks of language as susceptible to 
death, erasure; certainly imperiled and salvageable 
only by an effort of the will. She believes that if the 
bird in the hands of her visitors is dead the 
custodians are responsible for the corpse. For her a 
dead language is not only one no longer spoken or 
written, it is unyielding language content to admire 
its own paralysis. 
 -Toni Morrison, Nobel Prize Lecture 1993 
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There are two main barriers to finding a rhetorical position within 
American discourse to represent the interrelationships of trauma and identity: on 
the one hand, language can be seen as a vehicle that perpetuates the dominant 
discourse that enables the source of trauma.  On the other hand, there is concern 
that language itself is unable to contain the experience of trauma.  These concerns 
are heightened as one begins to consider how the intergenerational addressee 
turned addressor responds to both identity and trauma.  Given the fact that the 
intergenerational witness cannot have any direct experience of the trauma, this 
position can be marginalized, especially in the context of Holocaust studies where 
the First Generation Witness is not only seen as the primary voice, but is also seen 
as the only voice that should be allowed to speak.  The ideal of this can perhaps 
be found in Emmanuel Levinas’ use of the “Hineni”—of subjectivity in relation to 
an ethical response to the other.  As Sarah Pessin in her conference presentation, 
“Memory in the Face of the Other: Counter-Memorialization as Ethics over Art” 
notes, the Hineni invokes the sense that “I can never successfully remember you; 
you exceed me.”  There is something …awesome in this relationship—a purity of 
memory is invoked.  And yet, there is a kind of helplessness since Levinas does 
not necessarily advocate for the addressee becoming the addressor; there is 
always a movement towards the other and, in terms of the Holocaust, the past.  It 
speaks to the notion of the Holocaust as a unique event and privileges a sense of 
sanctity (as does the religious origins of the term “Hineni”).  Yet, as we move 
temporally away from the Holocaust (and as the disparity between what the 
Holocaust invokes in the academic world vs. mainstream American culture, which 
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is full of irresponsible appropriations and commercialized representations of the 
Holocaust), the role of the addressee turned addressor must be explored, and an 
ethics of transmittal must be established so that the intergenerational voice can 
construct meaning that can be passed down.  It is through this process that new 
addressees can derive their own relationships to the Holocaust.  Comparing 
intergenerational witnessing between African American cultures and those who 
respond to the Holocaust can allow us a means of identifying intergenerational 
strategies that invoke trauma and identity (both personal and communal) but are 
not static—locked into a past that continues to recede. 
In beginning this comparison, it is important to note the contextual 
differences between these types of intergenerational witnesses.  In some ways, 
African Americans had one unique advantage in responding to the history of 
slavery in the United States—there was never a question of “did this really 
happen?”  The very Constitution of the United States contains within it an 
acknowledgement of slavery and, later, racism (along with a number of other 
“isms”).  While one could argue this is also true in present-day Germany, it still 
did not prevent revisionism, whether a complete denial of the Holocaust or the 
more modern German historiographies that Dan Stone discusses in Constructing 
the Holocaust (as was discussed in Chapter 1).  The movement towards 
revisionist positions in relation to the Holocaust spurred the gathering of 
documentation that relied on factual accuracy, which marginalizes even some 
First Generation Witness testimony, much less intergenerational responses.  This, 
combined with the notion of the Holocaust as a unique event, began a process of 
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limiting what was considered acceptable responses.  While today’s revisionist 
rhetoric is largely dismissed (as being by extremist groups or as a political 
rhetoric that has more to do with current world politics in relation to Israel), the 
legacy of responding to revisionism still remains.  In that sense, African American 
intergenerational witnesses have had more freedom to respond to the history of 
slavery and racism in the United States. 
While African Americans have not needed to prove the existence of 
slavery within this country, they have faced a more insidious question that those 
responding to the Holocaust have managed to evade—the question of “How bad 
was it?”  Institutionalized Slavery in the United States is almost 150 years in the 
past and even many slave narratives from the period, written in the dominant 
discourse and to a white audience, rarely showed the full range of brutality 
inherent in slavery.  In contrast, visual documentation of the Holocaust depicts the 
horrific conditions the camps.  Additionally, while the value of life under slavery 
was minimized to that of possessions (reproduction was encouraged in order for 
the slave owners to gain more slaves), the major focus of slavery was not mass 
genocide like the Holocaust even though the loss of life was significant (both 
during the Middle Passage and through acts of violence on plantations).  Here, we 
see the rise of the issue of comparative levels of trauma.  This debate can perhaps 
be best invoked through the conversations surrounding Toni Morrison’s Beloved.  
From Stanley Crouch’s claim that Beloved is a “holocaust novel in blackface” to 
critiques of Morrison’s dedication at the beginning of the novel to the “60 million 
and more” as being 10 times the 6 million associated with the Holocaust, a 
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reductive competition of comparative trauma has arisen (40).1  Yet, the question 
of “How bad was it?” is one that has and continues to haunt African American 
responses to slavery and racism.  Part of this reality arises from authors who, for 
very specific purposes, minimized the damage done by slavery like Booker T 
Washington’s positive presentation of slavery as a “school” in his autobiography, 
Up from Slavery:  
Then, when we rid ourselves of prejudice, or racial feeling, and 
look facts in the face, we must acknowledge that, notwithstanding 
the cruelty and moral wrong of slavery, the ten million Negroes 
inhabiting this country, who themselves or whose ancestors went 
through the school of American slavery, are in a stronger and more 
hopeful condition, materially, morally, and religiously, than is true 
of an equal number of black people in any other portion of the 
globe.  (680-81)    
In looking at Washington’s statements, it is important to recognize how 
precarious a rhetorical situation he was in—fundraising in the South (after 
Reconstruction) for an African American vocational school.2  Yet, the motives for 
his representations of slavery do not negate how Washington’s message was 
received by a white audience.  The main culprit for the question, “How bad was 
it?” seems to be a resistance to acknowledge the impact of slavery in the dominant 
discourse of American society—one that arises from a resistance to take 
responsibility and to question if these issues are still present in American society 
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(not just in pockets of extremists but institutionalized).  As more time passes, that 
resistance grows stronger.   
The resistance, however, has not stopped African American writers from 
authoring responses to the trauma of slavery even into the present.  To understand 
this process, we can look at Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s theory of Signifyin(g), or 
repetition with signal difference.  This operates on multiple levels: it is a 
repetition and revision of English and a form of intertextuality built up from one 
author to the next.  In doing so, Signifyin(g) draws on African American oral 
traditions that promote both language play and intergenerational transmittals, 
forming a rhetorical position that encompasses both an inherited history of trauma 
and identity.  While there are debates about the use of English to represent 
identity (i.e. Audre Lorde’s discussion of whether the master’s tools can 
dismantle the master’s house?), the act of revision, of shifting the relationship 
between sign, signifier, and signified forms a remixing that allows the author to 
create a space to speak back to the dominant discourse.  Often, that voice is not 
speaking alone since the other aspect of Signifyin(g)—the act of repetition and 
revision between African American authors also invokes a communal voice.  
Thus, a distinct African American tradition can be understood as well as a method 
of intergenerational transmission that takes the history of trauma and self 
reflexively (at the point of revision) brings that memory into the present. 
Gates primarily grounds the idea of signification within African faith 
systems and their counterparts in the African American oral tradition.  The main 
African figure that he uses is Esu (or Esu-Elegbara) who functions as an 
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interpreter between men and Gods (one foot on the Earth, one foot on in the 
heavens).  This figure is often portrayed as having two mouths—an indication that 
he speaks for both men and the Gods.  Gates focuses on this myth to establish the 
idea of the double voice: “Signifyin(g) is the figure of the double-voiced, 
epitomized by Esu’s depictions in sculpture as having two mouths” (Signifying 
xxv).  Thus, the two mouths indicate a duality of meaning within one figure.  
Gates then connects the figure of Esu with that of the Signifying Monkey in black 
folklore by saying, “If the Esu-Elegbara stands as the central figure of the Ifa 
system of interpretation, then his Afro-American relative, the Signifying Monkey, 
stands as the rhetorical principle in Afro-American discourse” (Signifying 44).  
The connection between the two is one of family although the Signifying Monkey 
also functions as a trickster figure.  Indeed, it is perhaps the “trickster” part of his 
nature that makes this figure the sign for a specifically black use of language. The 
key to the story is that while the Monkey navigates between “this relationship 
between the literal and the figurative,” the Lion cannot “mediate between these 
two poles of signification, of meaning” (Signifying 55).  It is the ability to create 
multiple signifieds that enables the Monkey to fool the Lion.   
From this foundation, Gates develops his theory of Signifyin(g) as “a 
metaphor for black intertextuality and, therefore, for formal literary history” 
(Signifying 55).  If “intertextuality represents a process of repetition and 
difference,” then the act of taking a received meaning and then revising that 
sign/signified relationship through the role of the signifier, as the Signifying 
Monkey does, creates a strategy for black authors to formally tie their work with 
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that of their predecessors using a strategy that reflects their own culture 
(Signifying 60).  Thus, the framework for the black literary tradition is 
emphasized: “the originality of so much of the black tradition emphasizes 
refiguration, or repetition and difference, or troping, underscoring the 
foregrounding of the chain of signifiers, rather than the mimetic representation of 
a novel content” (Signifying 79).  While using African culture as a key point of his 
conceptualization of Signifyin(g), Gates draws on Western ideas of language 
(specifically sign=signified/signifier) and disrupts them by de-emphasizing the 
focus on the sign’s connection to its abstract meaning through his emphasis on the 
role of the speaker (the signifier) in determining the meaning of the words.  The 
very fact that Gates Signifies on the Western concept of the Sign is a political 
move of empowerment, one that Homi Bhabha might characterize as a “Third 
Space:” “It is that Third Space, though unrepresentable in itself, which constitutes 
the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning and symbols 
of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be 
appropriated, translated, rehistoricized, and read anew” (p. 208).  Ultimately, 
Gates’ act of Signifyin(g) can be characterized as a retelling of stories—one that 
transforms it into a theoretical method for mapping African American culture and 
intergenerational witnessing. 
So, let’s take a brief look at how Signifyin(g) operates in Beloved.  The 
first level of intergenerational response lies in the true story of Margaret Garner, a 
slave who escapes in 1856 and, on the point of capture, tries to kill her children 
rather than have them return into slavery.  Garner succeeds in killing her young 
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daughter.  Morrison repeats the story but revises it into a kind of ghost tale, 
allowing her to explore the issues of race, love, ownership, and (re)memory 
through the figure of Beloved, the child Sethe kills and others who also died 
under slavery (there is some slippage about who and what Beloved really is).  In 
that moment of revision, Morrison becomes the intergenerational witness who 
responds back to the initial trauma(s) through a postmodernist lens—one that 
seeks to explore the reason behind the choice to kill one’s own child rather than 
return her to slavery.  Morrison’s novel also offers a brutal image of slavery; 
while many slave narratives deal with atrocity, it is not necessarily presented in 
such a brutal way.3  The ideals about gender and sexuality in the period, for 
instance, made it difficult for Black female writers to fully express the sexual 
exploitation that they and others experienced.  As an intergenerational witness, 
Morrison has more freedom from those conventions.   
One can also look at the figure of Sethe’s brutal slave owner, 
“Schoolteacher,” and see another aspect of Signifyin(g)—if slavery was, as 
Washington claimed, a school than Morrison’s revision signals how brutal a 
school it could be. The process of Signifyin(g) self-reflexively calls attention to 
the role each author embodies as they relate back in time to trauma.  The act of 
revision foregrounds the choices that the author makes in writing the response.  In 
Morrison’s case, the process of self-reflexivity is also highlighted by the 
metafictional movement she makes at the end: this is not a “story to pass on” and 
yet here it is—passed on to a new audience.  In her discussion of the role of 
silence in terms of the unspeakable in Beloved, Naomi Mandel discusses the shift 
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at the end of the text “It was not a story to pass on” to “This is not a story to pass 
on” as a narrative of forgetting (194).  On one level, this passage can be read that 
way.  Yet, as a self-reflexive movement from Margaret Garner to Morrison 
herself, it speaks to the inescapability of the past.  The story exists and must be 
passed on. It is in the act of calling attention to one’s role of addressee turned 
addressor that an ethical position begins to be articulated.  In this way, the 
intergenerational witness does not simply appropriate the original witness.  That 
witness is invoked simultaneously with the new response.  Oral traditions adapt 
through time but still carry with them the invocation of the culture and the past—
one’s ancestors.  Yet, these stories are improvised with each new speaker, 
adapting and changing throughout time in order to maintain relevancy. 
In exploring discussions of intergenerational witnessing in other countries 
like Israel and Brazil, one can see the importance of self-reflexivity as an ethical 
response to the Holocaust, especially in texts that tend to be more fictionalized.  
In her discussion Second Generation writing in Israel, Hanna Yaoz notes that two 
categories emerge:  
Essentially there were two clear trends in the literary expression of 
the Holocaust complex, one historical and one transhistorical.  The 
first trend is mimetic, based on the conventions of the various 
forms of realism… Transhistorical prose fiction, however, avoids 
reference to specific historical fact or conventional historical 
conceptions.  The factual background rests on a sort of inner set of 
rules that derive from a world ruled by mythical powers, by 
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madness, or by the absurd.  Second-generation prose writing 
moves from the real to the fantastic. (Yaoz 161)   
Yaoz goes on to note that the movement towards the fantastic in Second 
Generation writers in Israel reflects the intergenerational witnesses’ response to 
the trauma of the Holocaust.  These texts are not necessarily divorced from the 
history but, rather, they focus on how the intergenerational witness understands, 
integrates, and conceptualizes that history.  In looking at the example of David 
Grossman’s See Under: Love, which was discussed in the first chapter, it explores 
the process of learning (the misunderstanding of the word Sonderkommando) and 
uses metafiction to call attention to act of writing itself.   
  In Márcio Seligman-Silva’s discussion of Jewish responses to the 
Holocaust in Brazil, he draws on Regina Igel’s categorization of Holocaust 
responses (written by both First and intergenerational witnesses) as “pedagogical” 
(presenting what happened without elaboration), “fictional” (omniscient third 
person narrator with literary strategies, and “hybrid” (a mix) :  
This typology could be transposed in terms of a theory of 
representation that runs from a “representationalist” posture.  This 
would contemplate a “direct” and “objective” representation of the 
historical facts, to a very different one that would be marked by a 
consciously assumed “literary” undertaking, one that engages in a 
reflection on the difficulties and strategies for representing the 
“real” and, in particular, the Shoah, a historical fact that must be 
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considered an event that challenges any strategy of representation.  
(64)  
In this discussion, one can see striking similarities to the self-reflexive 
characteristics of the intergenerational responses discussed so far in this work, 
especially Spiegelman, Skibell, and Foer.  The use of the literary or hybrid 
characterizations in Brazil is also marked by proximity (“at a later moment”) to 
the event for both First and intergenerational witnesses—an indication that as the 
past recedes, literary strategies are increasingly needed (64).    Seligman-Silva is 
careful to say that these characteristics are not absolute; he also does not privilege 
First Generation writing over intergenerational, noting: “for a survivor like Jorge 
Semprum, the best testimonies of the Shoah have been written by those who are 
not survivors” (66).  Here, one sees the value of the ability to connect to the event, 
regardless of whether one experienced the Holocaust directly or not. 
The fact that Jewish responses to the Holocaust in Brazil comes from a 
community whose writing is marginalized might explain why there is less stress 
on First Generation witnesses since the ability to pass on these experiences is 
limited.  Yet, this must be combined with an intrinsic openness to what 
intergenerational texts offer:   
We must learn to see the very texts that are born from the 
catastrophe as complex events that should be dealt with in all of 
their strata: aesthetic, testimonial, individual, collective, 
mnemonic, historical, and so on.  Even the text that appears 
scarcest in aesthetic terms can hold a vital literary lesson, just as 
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the novel that appears far removed from the facts or a very dense 
narrative in linguistic terms contains testimonial elements.  
Testimony and literature are inseparable.  (Seligman-Silva 65) 
What one sees is a focus on the text itself; judgment on the text is without 
precedent (to echo Lyotard).  Instead, what Seligman-Silva is arguing is that these 
texts need to be considered based on its merits—as events that contain multiple 
components.  In looking at both Israeli and Brazilian intergenerational responses, 
one can see the movement towards acceptance of these texts.  This is not a 
wholesale embrace, however.  Grossman’s text is certainly not the first 
intergenerational text in Israel but it was one of the first to garner popularity and 
acceptance.  The fact that intergenerational writers in both Israel and Brazil 
incorporate self-reflexive modes and question the strategies of how they represent 
trauma speaks to an ethics where the intergenerational witness does not usurp the 
position of the First Generation witness since the self-reflexive mode calls 
attention to a subject position in relation to but separate from the ones who 
experienced the Holocaust.  The growing acceptance of these writers and their 
work also speaks to ongoing concerns about avoiding stasis—the Holocaust 
experience must be made relevant for new generations. 
 To use Morrison’s terminology from her Nobel Lecture, the bird/language 
can be either alive or dead; one can remained locked into the past or to make it 
new.  Certainly, the call to become a new addressor is being answered in 
American responses to the Holocaust.  In charting the arcs established in the 
previous chapters, we can see a pattern of self-reflexive texts that specifically 
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invoke subjective rather than universalizing communities of memory.  At the 
same time, the community of memory revivifies but does not lock one into the 
past: “For us, by contrast, a community of memory is prospective, not 
memorializing; its memory is in the service of future transformations, not a 
mythicized past; its history is critical, not monumental.  A community of memory, 
as we seek to discuss it here, problematizes the present rather than sacrilizing the 
past” (Milchman and Rosenberg 252).  In addition to the role of communities of 
memory, we also saw thematic approaches that stylistically invoke aspects of 
survivor testimony, specifically the death-life narrative.  The other major theme 
on the Banality of Evil speaks to a consciousness on why the Holocaust must be 
transmitted; Evil is not a just a metaphysical concept perpetuated by monstrosity; 
the potential for evil is both universal and common.  The central connection for 
all these author (Spiegelman, Skibell, Foer, and Wallant) lies in the ability to have 
an affect: “Words have instrumentality when the word Jew becomes a fact or a 
thing, a star to be worn, a reason to be defiled.  Words also have materiality when 
they fictively render that process into a text that lives in its effects on others” 
(Schwarz 22).  The ability to transmit memory while at the same time 
acknowledging the complexity of the Holocaust by using subjective rather than 
universal positions are key characteristics in valuing the role of the 
intergenerational witness. 
 This is not to say that every work of intergenerational witnessing was not 
without its flaws; in exploring the film adaptations of both Everything is 
Illuminated and The Pawnbroker, we are faced with questions about how medium 
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potentially impacts the messages of the books.  The fact that these issues tend to 
emerge in relation to the themes on the Banality of Evil is telling.  In his 
discussion of art and the Holocaust, Stephen Feinstein notes, “If there is a 
problem with art, it is less with the artist and more with the medium and the 
audience” (247).  In taking that point to the discussion of film, the concern of how 
the audience will react to the message of the Banality of Evil, specifically if they 
are made to consider their own lives in relation to the theme, leads to mediations 
of the theme or its removal entirely.  In A War Against Memory, Isabella 
Wollaston notes, “Certain forms of the rhetoric of remembrance simplify the 
Holocaust by presenting it in dualistic terms as a battle of absolute good and 
absolute evil, highlighting the ‘lessons’ to be learned by reference to the faith and 
heroism of victims in extremis” (10).  The focus on relating to the victim is more 
commonly accepted than the more complex subject relationship that can be built 
with the perpetrator or the bystander.  The fact that good and evil take on 
metaphysical characteristics also removes complex identification in that it is less 
grounded in everyday reality.  That these choices are made before the film is even 
seen by the audience is problematic—how can we know how an audience will 
truly react if they never are given the possibility? 
 The question about the potential for the audience to connect to the 
Banality of Evil as a theme in multiple mediums can perhaps be answered by a 
consideration of African American intergenerational witnessing.  Signifyin(g) 
allows authors to pass on memory, to integrate a history of trauma with their own 
lives, but does it connect with a wide audience?  The answer is not simple.  Many 
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years ago, I was in a graduate class discussing Toni Morrison’s work and her 
widespread popularity through the promotion of her work by Oprah Winfrey.  The 
question posed to the class was whether Morrison’s popularity meant that she was 
not a specifically African American writer.  After all, if her books were so 
popular, than it might indicate that her work was universal (in a Liberal Humanist 
sense) rather than specifically African American.  This brought forth a range of 
responses—some argued that she was American (and some, that she was 
American in the context of counteracting a marginalization of African American 
literature), some argued that she was specifically African American—that her 
stories were specifically grounded in black experiences.  Very few argued for a 
hybrid position—one where Morrison could be both specific and universal.  In 
Interrupting Auschwitz, Josh Cohen notes the importance of the singular: “The 
essential unity of the human race, far from authorizing the subordination of 
singularity to collective identity, demands the maintenance of singularity—and so 
alterity—as its first and last imperative.  The true ethical counteraction to the 
destruction of the human is not the restoration of the destroyed ‘Self-Subject’ to 
its rightful power over the other” (143).  In claiming Morrison’s work as not 
representing African American experience, there is a risk of appropriation.  The 
dominant discourse adapts and absorbs the oppositional voice and, in doing so, 
empties it of its meaning, thus allowing the dominant discourse to remain in 
power.  So, the question of how an audience might react is forced to identify with 
the Banality of Evil is compounded with the question of whether American 
culture already has a system for minimizing the possibility in the first place? 
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 The discussion of slavery in the United States has always faced an 
obstacle in that Americans are directly implicated in this history.  In some ways, 
studying the Holocaust is easier because, while accepting some responsibility for 
the Holocaust in that America turned away refugees and failed to bomb the rail 
lines, Americans do not directly feel responsible.  Yet, as one pushes the 
discussion of the Holocaust deeper, it does pose challenges for American 
discourse.  In his discussion of the coalitions between Jews and blacks in the 
United States (as well as the failure of those coalitions), Eric Sundquist notes the 
impact on American idealism: “As activists, polemicists, and writers, they reset 
the course of American liberalism—its promise that all could belong to the nation, 
as well as the seeming demise of the idea of one nation to which all could belong; 
its promise of equality, as well as the failure to find a definition of equality on 
which all could agree” (527).  The reason for this failure is perhaps best illustrated 
in a comment that Seligman-Silva makes about Brazilian Jewish writers on the 
Holocaust engaging in an “international dialogue around the theme that has 
shown itself to be central in the reformulation of Western culture (that is, in the 
work of criticism on the Aufklärung [Enlightenment] by Adorno and 
Horkheimer)…” (79). Given that Enlightenment thinking is still central to 
American thought, the study of the Holocaust can potentially challenge those 
beliefs.   
 In a way, it is possible to look at the institution of slavery and the 
Holocaust as a kind of bookending of the Enlightenment.  The rise of Postmodern 
thought is directly linked to the Holocaust, to the fact that the values of reason and 
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equality that were considered the hallmarks of modern society still allowed the 
Holocaust to exist: “The fact is that the Holocaust signified an immense human 
failure.  It did harm to ethics by showing how ethical teachings could be 
overridden or even subverted to serve the interests of genocide” (Rubenstein and 
Roth 368).  Indeed, the quality of reason enabled the Nazis to carry out genocide 
on a massive scale.  Yet, if one looks at the history of slavery, at its ideological 
constructions, one can see that from its beginnings, the Enlightenment contained 
the ability to Other:  
Writing, especially after the printing press became so widespread, 
was taken to be the visible sign of reason.  Blacks were 
“reasonable” and hence “men” if—and only if—they demonstrated 
mastery of “the arts and sciences,” the eighteenth century’s 
formula for writing.  So, while the Enlightenment is characterized 
by its foundation on man’s ability to reason, it simultaneously used 
the absence and presence of reason to delimit and circumscribe the 
very humanity of the cultures and people of color which Europeans 
had been “discovering” since the Renaissance.  (8) 
The Enlightenment, with its ideals of reason and equality, also contained the 
possibility of negating the humanity.  Using Subject/Object relationships, 
Enlightenment ideals were circumscribed by their opposite.  Although laws and 
attitudes changed over time, the fact that these ideals could be a foundation for the 
Holocaust is not without precedent. 
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 In understanding what an ethics of intergenerational witnessing might 
mean, there are a multitude of concerns that these new addressors must face.  
There is a sense of an ethical relationship to those who experienced the Holocaust.  
This operates in how one constructs a community of memory that revivifies 
without locking one’s perception into the past.  In addition, there is a sense of 
obligation to the survivor as well—a concern about how to transmit the survivor’s 
perspective without supplanting it.  Further, there is a question of how to connect 
the Holocaust to new generations in ways that force them to consider the 
implications of this event on their own ways of thinking.  The truth is that 
Enlightenment ideals are still central to how we conceptualize what it means to be 
an American—it is the center of our notion of freedom and equality.  Yet, there 
still exists the ability to do great evil, even if all one does is nothing.  In the end, is 
it even possible to have a concrete idea of what such witnessing would look like?  
No, but that only means that we are forced into judgments without set precedents.  
In exploring an ethics of intergenerational witnessing to the Holocaust, it is 
imperative to look at these addressors in terms of their complexity, the ways that 
these witnesses address multiple concerns without universalizing the response.  In 
that sense, intergenerational witnessing becomes more about transmittal and 
exchange rather than paralysis. 
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Notes: 
1The point about the dedication to “60 million” is discussed by a number of critics, including 
Naomi Mendel, Stanley Crouch, Peter Novick, and Emily Budick. 
 
2This is not to say that Washington never spoke out openly against racial prejudice and racial 
violence (lynchings) but that the circumstances of his position and purpose certainly mediated how 
he discussed racial issues. 
 
3Given that most slave narratives were written to a white audience, many of the authors were 
cautious about how they represented their experiences.  For instance, Harriet Jacobs, in Incidents 
in the Life of a Slave Girl, was very conscious about the way she dealt with sexuality and sexual 
exploitation –a response to both racial and gender constructions. 
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